A legitimacy crisis in the European Union? : a neo-functionalist examination of the state of legitimacy in the EU by Billante, Nicole Kelina
A Legitimacy Crisis in the European Union? 
A neo-functionalist examination of the state of legitimacy in the EU 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Masters of Arts in Political Science 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Nicole K. Billante 
University of Canterbury 
2000 
Contents 
List of Figures 111 
List of Gi-aphs 1v 
Abstract v1 
Acknowledgements vu 
Chapter One: Introduction 1 
Chapter Two: Legitimacy Theory 8 
Examining Legitimacy 8 
The Concept of Legitimacy 11 
The Legacy of Weber 12 
A Contemporary Theory of Legitimacy 15 
Chapter Three: Legitimacy and the European Union 23 
Intergovernmental Legitimacy 23 
Beyond Intergovernmental Legitimacy 25 
The Ideal Model of EU Legitimacy 27 
Legal Legitimacy 27 
Legal Acquisition and Exercise of Power 27 
Popular Legitimacy 30 
Government Actions Congruent with Societal Values 32 
Evidence of Consent 33 
Assessing EU Legitimacy 34 
EU Treaties 35 
Authorisation, Accountability, and Representation 37 
Democratic Deficit 38 
Chapter Four: EU Popular Legitimacy 46 
Research Method 47 
Relationship Between EU Elite Actions and Public Values and Belief 49 
A Reaction Against Maastricht? 57 
Accountability to the European Parliament 63 
A Comparison with Hewstone 68 
Voter Turnout 72 
The Implication for EU Legitimacy 82 
Chapter Five: Identity 
Identity and Legitimacy 
The 'Nation' as 'the People' 
The Idea of a European Nation 
Problems with a European Nation 
Unity in Diversity 
Evidence of a European Identity 
Hewstone on Identity 
The Eurobarometre After Hewstone 
Implications for Integration and Legitimacy 
Identity and Integration 
Legitimacy 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Legitimacy in the EU according to the state model 























List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Model of Legitimacy 21 
Figure 3.1 Ideal Model of EU Legitimacy 34 
Figure 5.1 The Eut'Opean Flag 92 
Figure 6.1 Ideal Model of EU Legitimacy 112 
Figure 6.2 Concluding Model of Problems of Legitimacy in the 118 
European Union 
iii 
List of Graphs 
Graph 4.1 Support for unification amongst all member state 52 
Graph 4.2 Support for unification in Denmark 53 
Graph4.3 Attitudes towards EU membership in all member states 54 
Graph 4.4 Belief in whether EU Membership is beneficial 55 
in all members states 
Graph 4.5 Average percentage in favour of ratification in individual 57 
member states in 1992 and 1993 
Graph 4.6 Support for EMU amongst all member states 59 
Graph 4.7 Satisfaction with democracy in the EU amongst 61 
all member states 
Graph4.8 Satisfaction with democracy in the EU ( conflated) 61 
Graph 4.9 Pe1·centage of people of have heard of the 64 
European Parliament amongst all member states 
Graph4.10 Impression of the European Parliament 65 
amongst all member states 
Graph 4.11 Desire role for the EP amongst all member states 66 
Graph4.12 EU voter turnout 73 
Graph4.13 Variations in voter turnout 74 
Graph4.14 Relationship between voter turnout and attitudes 74 
towards integration in Belgium 
Graph 4.15 Relationship between voter turnout and attitudes 75 
towards integration in Luxembourg 
Graph4.16 Relationship between voter turnout and attitudes 76 
towards integration in The Netherlands 
Graph 4.17 Voter turnout in Belgium 77 
Graph 4.18 Voter turnout in The Netherlands 78 





Identification with nation and or Europe 
amongst all member states 
A comparison between levels of identification 
in France and Greece 
A comparison between levels of identification 






The extensive deepening and widening of the European Union that has taken place 
during the 1990's has resulted in the emergence of many issues that challenge the course 
of integration. The legitimacy of the Union is one of the key areas that has been 
questioned from a neo-functionalist perspective with the development of a united 
Europe. In scholarly discussions of legitimacy in the EU many authors have asserted 
that there is a legitimacy crisis at present. By examining the current state of legitimacy it 
is argued that the description of a crisis is overstated. However, there is still evidence of 
significant legitimacy problems that must be addressed by the Union elite in order for 
further integration to be successful. This analysis also highlights the limitations of the 
state-framework in EU studies. Through the application of a state concept of legitimacy 
it is demonstrated that constraints are placed upon examinations of the Union due to the 
narrow focus of a state model. 
vi 
Acknowledgements 
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support of many 
people (and a couple animals). My experiences as a post-graduate have re-affirmed my 
belief that the key to being able to write a thesis is good supervision- something I was 
fortunate enough to have. For this I must thank my supervisors, Martin Holland and 
Joanna Goven, particularly for their patience in answering my numerous questions. I 
must also thank the other staff in the Department of Political Science who helped with 
my studies, most importantly Jill Dolby, without whom we would never survive. 
I must also thank Karen Foster for providing the means to support my studies. 
But specifically, thank you for the patience, flexibility, generosity, and friendship that I 
was shown during my employment. Also, thank you to Bridget and Cindy who made 9 
am starts a little less harsh. 
An extremely big thank you must be extended to all my friends who tolerated my 
less than sociable behaviour at times during the past year. In particular I must thank my 
dear friends Amber, my partner in crime, and Katherine, one of the most selfless friends 
a person could have. 
Also, to Tom, for his love and friendship and putting up with my tantrums 
during various discussions on nationalism. Another big thanks to Jim and Joan for 
opening their home to me and my animals. Your generosity has been immeasurable. 
To my darling Panda, the light of my life, thank you for acting as a wonderful 
distractions and providing me with a break by knowing the right time to sit on my notes. 
And last, but certainly not least (to use a terrible cliche) I extend my sincerest 
gratitude to my mother without whom none of this would have been possible. Her 
support and generosity throughout my whole education has not only enabled me to 
complete this thesis, but also made me who I am today. For that I will be eternally 




Legitimacy is a political concept that is often alluded to but very rarely discussed in great 
detail. One key reason for this may be the difficulty in measuring legitimacy of 
governments. Such difficulty is exacerbated when 'extended beyond state governments 
and applied to the ever-changing supra-national body of the European Union (EU). 
However, it is perhaps because of this difficulty that the issue of European legitimacy has 
become more pressing in recent times. The lack of literature regarding this issue has only 
recently been addressed; the problem of legitimacy requires much further exploration. It 
is the aim of this thesis to identify the complexities of this issue and address possible 
directions for future research. At the centre of this effort is the question: "Does the 
European Union lack legitimacy?" and if so in what regard. 
Since the initial creation of what has come to be known at the European Union, 
attitudes towards integration have varied significantly. There are those who have always 
supported attempts at extensive integration, many with a view towards a federated 
Europe. However, others have also remained highly critical of integration attempts, 
maintaining that national interests should remain paramount. 
In current discussions of integration two main theoretical frameworks are used: 
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Intergovernmentalism divides politics into 
areas of high and low politics; low politics concerning economic and welfare issues and 
high politics covering areas associated with national prestige, i.e. foreign policy and 
defence (Richardson, 1996, p. 49). Intergovernmentalists argue that integration should 
remain largely in the area of low politics, leaving high politics to policy decisions within 
the states. It is asserted that nationalism will come to the fore when matters of high 
politics arise because states are not willing to enter into policy affecting national prestige 
that is not secure and definite (p. 49). Neo-functionalism takes a contrasting view to 
integration. According to neo-functionalist thought the emergence of greater 
transnational and transgovernmental pressure1 would further the integration process 
(George, 1991, p. 21). The theory of spill-over was at the heart of this thought, which 
essentially asserted that if states were to integrate one sector of their economies, 
pressures would force them to integrate further (p. 22). It is arguable that the view of a 
federated Europe is at the heart of neo-functionalist thought2• 
These varymg views greatly influence issues of contention surrounding 
integration. For example, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher epitomises 
intergovernmental thought. The influence of Thatcher upon the integration process is 
characterised by resistance to further integration and impediments to European 'high 
politics'. Neo-functionalism is embodied in the work of former Commission President 
Jacque Delo rs and former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The rapid advances in 
integration, namely common currency and foreign policy co-operation, were enacted 
through the neo-functionalist leadership of Delors and Kohl. Application of legitimacy 
the01y to the European Union is one contentious area that is affected by these varying 
views of integration. It is by no means accepted that notions of political legitimacy can 
be applied to the European Union without great debate. In fact, the two major 
theoretical frameworks take opposing views. 
1 The pressures that influence political decision makers, such as interest groups and bureaucratic actors are, 
as explained by George, the pressures that neo-functionalists felt would transcend national boundaries 
(transnationalism) and could be unregulated by state foreign offices (transgovernmentalism). (George, 
1991, p. 21) 
2 or vice versa 
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Under an intergovernmental framework the need to examine legitimacy of the 
Union is limited. With the belief that integration concerns should remain within the 
realm of low politics it is arguable that the European Union can be viewed simply as any 
other international institution. Therefore, the application of legitimacy theory to the EU 
should be done within an international relations paradigm. Such theories of legitimacy in 
an IR paradigm are applied to institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organisation, and the International Monetary Fund. The application of legitimacy to 
international institutions is based upon the legitimacy of those states that comprise the 
members of the institutions. Beetham and Lord clarify this by saying: 
«The legitimacy of international institutions follows the prinaple: 
that system of authority is /e,gjtimate 'lWOse authority is reagnised 
and confomed by the acts of otlxr ~ authorities. The 
addressees of legitimation claims cm the part of such institutions are 
the memkr states and their offu:ials, not citiW'IS more generally, for 
the simple reason that it is cmly the oledience and co-operation of 
such o.lfo:ials that is required for the releumt international lody tv 
achm its purposes" 
(Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 11). 
However, as the Community has developed into the European Union the 
intergovernmental aspect of the EU has incorporated increasing supra-national elements 
that affect citizens to a much larger degree. The powers that the European Union holds 
under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Trea~es undoubtedly affect the citizens of the 
member states. The rules and decisions of the Union, such as quota policy, directly 
impinge upon its citizens. This in turn requires acknowledgement by the citizens that the 
rules and regulations are authoritative and binding (p. 13). This is one important 
objection to using a framework of legitimacy in an international relations paradigm. 
A second objection to the use of these principles of legitimacy is the constant 
process of change of the EU. The EU is not "a static institution" (p. 15). As the powers 
and jurisdiction of the EU are further expanded new questions arise regarding the 
authority and accountability of those powers (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 148-151). Such 
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questions indicate that the role of the public in legitimating authority is becoming a 
greater issue as the EU develops more supra-national powers, as was demonstrated 
through the difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty and the debates over EMU 
(Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 15). 
A further argument against using an international relations paradigm is due to the 
affect the EU has on the legitimacy of its member states. Since EU decisions affect the 
internal policies of states (for example, as the effects that criteria for monetary- unification 
had on member states' economies) the legitimacy of the member states can in fact be 
undermined by the authority of the EU (p. 16). Given that under the above framework 
the legitimacy of the international institution is built upon the legitimacy of its members, 
this undermining of member state legitimacy will ultimately undermine the legitimacy of 
the EU (p. 16). Clearly, this implies that the principle of legitimacy of international 
institutions is flawed with reference to this aspect of the EU. Therefore, assessing 
legitimacy within a framework that is purely elite based is now inadequate due to the 
effect that the EU's decisions can now have upon its citizens and member states' 
legitimacy. 
A neo-functionalist view, on the other hand, accepts that the European Union 
should not be confined to an international relations (IR) paradigm. The belief in spill-
over and further integration sees the European Union becoming more of a state-like 
actor than an international organisation. The prevalence of EU policies within member-
states demonstrates the prevalence of neo-functionalism in the post-Maastricht era and 
thus sees the Union assuming state-like attributes. 
In the Stud-j of the European Ccmmunity: the Challenge to OJmparatiu! Politics, Simon 
Hix discusses the main limitations of an international relations approach to the EU. In 
the course of doing so the attributes of a comparative politics perspective are highlighted. 
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The IR approach as noted above has traditionally studied the EU as a intergovernmental 
co-operation between sovereign states. As Hix notes this has become inadequate 
because "now that the EC [sic] is more than an international organisation, theories of 
international politics are of limited use for studying the 'internal' politics of the 
Community[sic]" (Hix, 1994, p. 1). 
As Hix states, the European Union is now more than an international 
organisation. In fact, Hix argues "politics in the EC [sic] is not inherently different to the 
practice of government in any democratic system. As in all modern politics, EC [sic] 
'politics' is dominated by questions of representation and participation, the distribution 
and allocation of resources, and political and administrative efficiency" (p. 1). It is this 
shift away from an international institution that necessitates a framework of legitimacy 
beyond an intergovernmental framework. 
It should be noted however that the European Union is not a neo-functionalist 
centric organisation. The future of Europe is still veiy flexible and by no means clear. 
Stagnation of the integration process may see the realm of high politics stay largely 
within the confines of the individual states. Yet the avenues for future integration still 
include possible paths towards federation. The study of Europe needs to include 
considerations of all these future possibilities. An intergovernmental path of integration 
can rely on international relations theories of legitimacy in which the legitimacy of the 
Union would be under little dispute. Neo-functionalism on the other hand requires 
more extensive studies of EU legitimacy. It is for this reason that the framework of the 
following paper will be done within the context of a neo-functionalist perspective. 
Within this framework, the study of legitimacy becomes necessary in that the EU is 
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considered to be expanding beyond the role of an international organisation and into the 
realm of state-orientated politics3. 
Furthermore, the focus of discussions on legitimacy can centre on various regime 
types. This thesis will confine legitimacy discussions to theories particularly applicable to 
democracies. There are two main reasons for this narrowed focus. Firstly, one of the 
main criteria for EU membership is that all members must have a democratic political 
system. Secondly, if democratic states transfer elements of sovereignty to a supranational 
body, arguably this body must also be built upon democratic principles to make this 
transfer of sovereignty legitimate in its own right. Hence, the legitimacy of the European 
Union must be a democratic legitimacy. 
With these parameters, the thesis begins with examination of the political 
concept of legitimacy. Chapter Two examines the theoretical literature of legitimacy in 
order to construct a workable democratic model that may be applied to the European 
Union. Chapter Three then applies this model of legitimacy to the European Union 
creating an ideal model for the EU within a neo-functionalist framework. This creation 
allows for assessment of the degree to which the Union meets the criteria of the ideal 
model. Of the factors of legitimacy that are discussed and addressed it is the elements of 
'popular legitimacy' that are said by authors such as Beetham and Lord to be most 
lacking within the European Union. 
3 It is accepted that this classification is also inadequate. The creation of the European Union has 
presented political studies with a new and complex institution that challenges modern notions of political 
frameworks. Due to this all contemporaiy theories will be lacking in some regard. However the point to 
emphasise is the need to disregard theories that place limitations upon conceptualising the European 
Union, eg: international relations, and adopt theories that provide adaptable solutions to this problem such 
as comparative politics. 
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It is this lack of 'popular legitimacy' in which the true complexities of this issue 
lie for the EU. From here this thesis will concentrate on whether the European Union 
does in fact lack this legitimacy or whether modern concepts of state legitimacy are 
simply too narrow to encompass acts of popular support at a supra-national level. 
Chapter Four explores the overall hypothesis 'based on the review of legitimacy 
literature, there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union'. In testing this hypotheses 
empirical research from the Eurobarometre, based upon the initial method of Miles 
Hewstone in 1986, will be the primary- source of information. A subsequent hypothesis 
that 'the decline in popular support for unification is a reaction against some level of 
actions which were perceived to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of 
society'. The initial conclusions from these examinations will then be tested against the 
1986 findings of Hewstone in order to identify whether there are identifiable trends 
which will allow for future predictions regarding popular legitimacy. Chapter Four also 
explores the hypothesis that voter turnout for elections to the European Parliament is an 
inadequate measure of the population's consent. It is argued that examination of 
external factor will demonstrate that voter turnout is not a true reflection of public 
opinion towards integration. 
Chapter Five addresses aspects of identity and legitimacy that have been largely 
overlooked in the bulk of previous legitimacy research. Identity is presented as an area 
where future studies may find resonance in measuring the Union's legitimacy. 
Conclusions are drawn regarding the true state of legitimacy within the EU according to 
a neo-functionalist framework by exploring the complexities of legitimacy issues. At the 
same time conclusions will also be drawn about the adequacy of a state-centric approach 




The question of legitimacy for the EU has come to the fore with recent attempts to 
enlarge and widen the Union. Legitimacy in the European Union appears to have been 
largely overlooked until problems with emerged in the 1990's, notably the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty. Consequently it has only recently become a prominent area of 
study for contemporary research. However, as the process of integration continues to 
develop the issue of legitimacy becomes more vital to its continued success. The 
European Union is increasing its involvement in everyday life in Europe; this would 
seem to imply a greater need for legitimacy. Before assessing the legitimacy of the 
European Union an understanding of what constitutes legitimate democratic government 
is required. Only then can a comprehensive assessment of the legitimacy of the 
integration process be made. 
Examining Legitimacy 
The debate about the legitimation of power and authority has been approached from 
varying views throughout modern histoiy; legal theorists, philosophers, and sociologists 
have all discussed the concept. Literature dealing with legitimacy is therefore extensive 
and complex. In order for any assessment of democratic legitimacy to commence an 
understanding of the complexities of the theories involved must be reached. Therefore, 
the initial task in such social science research is the constrnction of a coherent framework 
for examination. This begins with the exploration of the primary theories and 
arguments. 
Legitimacy can be associated with many different forms of government. 
However, in democracies the need for legitimacy is greater than that of other regimes 
(Dahl, 1965 p. 19). This is largely due to a democracy's inability to impose its wishes 
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upon a society if there is great opposltlon: "in democracies political leaders need 
authority because they are not permitted to acquire sufficient resources to enforce their 
policies through naked power" (p. 32). This acquisition of resources to force compliance 
is contrary to basic democratic principle of free will and thus other means of compliance 
are required. Hence, legitimacy is needed in order for a democratic government to 
function. It would be plausible to state that democracy is not a prerequisite for legitimacy 
but rather legitimacy is a prerequisite for democracy4. (Lipset, 1959, p. 87). 
Stability is often cited as a further reason why legitimacy is important to political 
powers. The concept that a regime's stability is relative to the regime's legitimacy appears 
repeatedly throughout legitimacy theory. Max Weber was one of the modern pioneers of 
this thought. In 7he Theory of Social and Econmuc Organisatinn, Weber proposes that 
regimes follow on a spectrum from (1) expediency to (2) customary order to (3) 
legitimate order. Stability, according to Weber, follows on a parallel spectrum from least 
stable to most stable orders (Weber, 1947, p. 114). 
Many authors incorporate this idea in their commentaries. Legitimacy's 
connection to stability is a widely accepted proposition amongst theorists according to 
Grafstein (Grafstein 1981a, p. 51). In his own work he explicitly states that "the 
legitimate regime is more likely to be stable than an illegitimate one" (p. 51). He also 
continues on to say "legitimacy, in effect, is a highly efficient way to secure obedience 
and thus is conducive to stability" (p. 51). This theme can be found in Lipset's 
discussions as well. In his work, he concludes that the stability of a political system is 
dependent in part upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system (Lipset, 
1959, p. 86). 
4 However, some authors argue that a democracy is the only legitimate form of government--an argument 
that shall be briefly highlighted later. 
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Both Grafstein and Lipset relate efficiency and effectiveness to legitimacy. Other 
theorists have noted this connection as well. Mereleman proposes that illegitimate 
political regimes operate far less efficiently than legitimate regimes (Mereleman, 1966, p. 
549). Enhanced effectiveness results from legitimacy, according to Beetham, because the 
ability of the powerful to achieve their goals is increased (Beetham, 1991, p. 33). Thus, 
for more efficient, effective, and stable government, legitimate authority is advantageous. 
It is not sufficient to say that a connection between stability/ effectiveness and 
legitimacy exists simply because it is accepted by many theorists. The reason why 
legitimacy causes such effects needs also to be explained. The primary explanations stem 
from the issue of obedience. Beetham asserts that in a legitimate power relationship the 
power "has the right to expect obedience from subordinates, even where they may 
disagree with the content of a particular law or institution" (p. 26). When obedience is 
rightfully expected by a legitimate authority the role that government plays within society 
becomes easier. Lack of continual resistance allows for easier policy implementation. 
This translates eventually into stable and effective government. Furthermore, continual 
resistance would require coercive means to implement policy, which ultimately proves to 
be expensive. Dahl explains: 
"When a political system is widely accepted by its memb:rs as 
legitimate, and uhen the policies of its officials and other leaders are 
gµarded as morally binding by its citizens, then the costs of 
compliance are low. OJnwrsely, uhen legitimacy and authority are 
bw, leaders must use more of tlxir money, police, privileges, W?ajJOns, 
status, and other politiad resources to secure compliance. " 
(Dahl, 1965, p. 32). 
With lower costs and less effort in securing compliance government is better able to 
execute their objectives. A government that is better able to achieve their aims equates 
to greater eff ectiveness5. Continual ability to do this ultimately results in greater stability. 
5 Although this is also dependent upon the fact that a government will know how to achieve its aims. 
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Hence, when legitimate authority results in obedience, government will be more stable 
and effective because policy is easier to implement. 6 
It thus becomes clear why the EU desires legitimacy. What remains unclear 
however, is how it attains legitimacy. Beetham reminds us of this by noting that the 
observer should not confuse legitimacy with the effect that it has on the system 
(Beetham 1991, p. 38). The increased stability and effectiveness of a government does 
not translate directly to the meaning of legitimacy. These justify the need for legitimacy 
but do not explain the concept of legitimacy itself; this is a much greater task. 
The Concept of Legitin1acy 
Throughout the literature Max Weber's work is continually presented as the starting 
point for debate. Political theorists have used the work of Weber as the basis for their 
examinations to such an extent that Weber's concepts have proven to be the dominant 
models for empirical investigation of legitimacy (Grafstein, 1981a, p. 456). Accordingly, it 
is appropriate that these theories form the starting point for a contemporary critique of 
legitimacy literature. 
Weber appears preoccupied with the idea of authority, power, and order in his 
social theory. A key element of his theory construction was the legitimation of 
authority. He defines legitimacy as the uniformity of social action oriented by belief in 
the existence of legitimate order (Weber, 1947, p. 113). Social science has commonly 
paraphrased Weber's understanding to the definition of legitimacy as the bdief in 
legitimacy (Beetham 1991, Pitkin 1972, Grafstein 1981a). 
6 This argument is quite distinct from analysis of good government. The above explanation merely 
examines effective and stable government in terms of the abilityto achieve government objectives. 
Whether these objectives are always in line with the wishes of the public is a separate issue and should not 
be confused with the above discussion. Theoretical analysis of appropriateness of government actions will 
not be dealt with in this context as it opens the discussion up to larger political theory issues that cannot be 
discussed adequately within the confines of this examination. 
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In Weber's view submission to an order can imply a belief in legitimacy. He 
clearly maintains that "so far as it is not derived merely from fear or from motives of 
expediency, a willingness to submit to an order imposed by one man or a small group, 
always in some sense implies a belief in the legitimate authority of the source imposing 
it" (Weber, 1947, p. 121). Actions, according to Weber, were the indicator of belief; acts 
of obedience imply the belief in legitimacy (p. 299-300). However, Weber acknowledges 
that submission does not automatically validate authority. The validation of authority is 
relative to the degree that the appropriate attitudes will exist- the greater the attitudes, 
the greater the validation (p. 300). Yet, Weber does not seem to clarify how the social 
scientist, as an objective observer, is able to differentiate between obedience as a result of 
these appropriate attitudes and obedience as a result of other motives such as fear, 
apathy, or instrnmentalism. 
The Legacy of Weber 
The influence of Weber's theory can be recognised in the works of many theorists, 
although distinctions are clearly present7. Weber's concept of belief as the defining 
characteristic of legitimacy is evident, for example, in Seymour Lipset's definition. To 
Lipset, "Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain 
the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for 
the society'' (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Robert Dahl is another example of this influence. 
According to Dahl legitimacy is the "belief that the strncture, procedures, acts, decisions, 
policies, officials, or leaders of government possess the quality of 'rightness', proper or 
moral goodness" (Dahl, 1965, p. 19). Weber's influence is identifiable in Richard 
Mereleman's definition, which also derives from Lipset's definition. In brief, Mereleman 
describes legitimacy as the "quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to 
inhere in a political regime" and further that "legitimacy is a quality attributed to a regime 
by a population. That quality is the outcome of the government's capacity to engender 
legitimacy" (Merelernan, 1966, p. 548). 
7 To be discussed below 
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There is a notable distinction between these theorists and Weber. While the 
influence of Weber can validly be highlighted in the use of belief for defining legitimacy, 
it must be recognised that these theorists have identified the limitations of Weber's 
definition. Weber defines legitimacy as lxliefin ¼!}timary; these definitions extend beyond 
this to regard legitimacy as b!lief in the qualities that can be attributed to legitimate 
government. However, the underlying point is that such definitions illustrate the degree 
to which Weber's thoughts have been incorporated into subsequent literature. A belief-
based definition infers an acceptance of Weber's use of belief's role in legitimacy to some 
degree. Definitions set the standard for the resulting literature; belief based definitions 
result in belief-based literature, both explicit and implicit. 
Nevertheless, not all legitimacy theorists fully accept Weber's use of belief. For 
example, Hannah Pitkin (1972), Robert Grafstein (1981a) and Carl Friedrich (1963), 
Wolfgang Mommsen (1974), and John Schaar (1970) all contend that Weber's definition 
of legitimacy excludes the possibility for objective assessment of legitimacy. This, 
according to some, stems from the definition of legitimacy as the belief in legitimacy and 
intended methodology of Weber. By defining legitimacy in such a manner the 
opportunity for examination against criteria distinct from the beliefs of the public is 
excluded. 
To Pitkin, it is Weber's intention to maintain neutrality and descriptive scientific 
elements that create inherent problems in analysis. She paraphrases Weber's argument as: 
the "sociologist will regard ... a political system as legitimate precisely to the extent that 
people's actions or behaviour are 'oriented toward' ... that system" (Pitkin 1972, p. 281). 
Grafstein also argues that Weber's efforts to construct this neutral concept for empirical 
research resulted in the "essential meaning of legitimacy" being distorted (Grafstein, 
1981a, p. 456). The significant result is that Weber's concept no longer refers to the 
regime itself. For in short, "Weber virtually identifies legitimacy with stability and 
effective political power, reducing it to a routine submission to authority" (p. 46). 
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Weber's tendency as a consequence is to "conflate stable authority and legitimacy" (p. 
464). Carl Friedrich agrees with this argument. His major criticism is Weber's tendency 
to confuse, if not identify, legitimacy with authority (Friedrich, 1963, p. 235). Mommsen 
also argues this; "legitimacy, in Weber's terms, amounts to little more than an equivalent 
of the stability of the respective political system" (Mommsen, 1974, p. 84). He contends 
that this also distorts the meaning of legitimacy because "one cannot escape the 
conclusion that in the context of Weber's sociological theory of 'legitimate rule' there 
was no room for illegitimate forms of domination" (p. 83). 
The result of such methodology, to Pitkin, is that Weber's approach is that of the 
visiting anthropologist and this has resulted in defining legitimacy as whatever the 
'natives' believe it to be. (Pitkin, 1972, p. 282). The social scientist in this respect is 
relegated to the role of passive observer who is merely responsive to what is in the mind 
of the observed subjects "rather than the active seeker after independent, objective social 
reality" (p. 283). Mommsen argues that this does not allow the researcher to go further 
and find "substantive reasons why and under which conditions a system may be 
legitimate" (Mommsen, 197 4, p. 84) Pitkin considers the result of these flaws 
fundamental. She argues that "in seeking to insulate the sociologist from the context of 
judging and talring a position, Weber in effect made it incomprehensible that anyone 
might judge legitimacy and illegitimacy according to rational, objective standards" (Pitkin, 
1972, p. 283). 
With particular reference to democratic legitimacy Schaar argues that this is 
fundamentally unsound. Schaar argues that "when legitimacy is defined as consisting in 
belief alone then the investigator can examine nothing outside popular opinion" and "in 
effect this analysis dissolves legitimacy into acceptance or acquiescence, thereby 
rendering opaque whole classes of basic and recurrent political phenomena" (Schaar, 
1970, p. 284). For Schaar, legitimacy of power has in modern times, in most states, been 
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reduced to simply: "for power to become authority it must originate in 'democratic 
consent' and aim at the 'common good' or 'public interest'" (p. 288)8 
A Contemporary Theory of Legitimacy 
These criticisms highlight the fact that the Weberian idea of legitimacy, stemming merely 
from a belief in legitimacy, is not entirely acceptable for examining modern authority. 
The arguments of Pitkin and Grafstein point to the major flaw in such thinking. To base 
legitimacy purely on belief removes all elements of normative standards which can be 
applied to democratic governments. 
Robert Grafstein's extensive criticisms of Weber's theories led to his introduction 
of an alternative theory. Grafstein regards the major flaw in contemporary social science 
theories of legitimacy to be the concept that political order is psychologically based 
(Grafstein, 19816, p. 52). He argues that alternatively social science should be viewing 
political order from an institutional perspective and thus legitimacy as the property of 
political institutions rather than individual psychologies (p. 52). 
The psychological approach relies heavily on the idea that public consensus is the 
guarantor of political order. Grafstein's key problem with this approach is that the above 
idea seems to disregard the element of socialisation. He argues "common culture, in the 
form of shared values, beliefs, or conceptual schemes, does not produce the public co-
ordination of behaviour" (p. 55). To Grafstein, our political behaviour is a learned social 
pattern; we learn patterns of obedience and submission from the society around us9• 
Grafstein argues that the introduction of values is also flawed because the scientific 
8 However, it should be noted that Schaar does not entirely agree with the simplicity of this statement as 
he states that "democracy is the most prostituted word of our age, and any man who employs it in 
reference to any modern state should be suspect either of ignorance or of bad motives" and that "public 
good has not fared much better. It is widely agreed an10ng political scientists that it is more a term of 
political art than political analysis" (Schaar, 1970, p. 288). Rather Schaar is commenting on how he 
believes legitimacy in modern states is viewed in general. 
9 It can be argued that Grafstein's view of culture is incorrect. To argue that common culture does not 
produce 'public co-ordination of behaviour' is flawed if it is argued that the socialisation of 'learned 
patterns of obedience' in fact stems from the common culture. 
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connection between values and behaviour becomes vague and largely assumption based. 
T alcing social order as a sign of consensus is essentially, to Graf stein, talcing patterns of 
social behaviour as an indicator of individual values which holds no scientific proof, 
merely assumptions (p. 56). 
The alternative theory of the institutional approach to legitimacy reJects 
psychological arguments on the whole because "in the purest sense, a legitimate 
institution secures obedience to its decision by the very fact of having made them 
through appropriate institutional procedure" (p. 58). It is the appropriate procedures of 
legitimation that are of concern for the institutional researcher. These appropriate 
procedures, in Grafstein's belief, are in accordance with the ritual or regulated 
procedures of the institutions through which governments operate (p. 58)10. This leads 
to Grafstein's definition of legitimacy which contends that "a political institution is 
legitimate, in effect, when the individual as a matter of course confines his behaviour to 
some subset of institutionally relevant choices--the 'legal' ones" (p. 67).11 
However, if one is to follow the lead of Grafstein and attempt to remove belief 
from the construction of legitimacy all together the result is also flawed. To take into 
account purely the legitimacy of institutions and acquisition of power creates problems. 
This approach cannot entirely remove the social element. For institutions to function 
within set norms and power acquisition to also apply to these norms a social element still 
appears. The norms themselves are the construction of societal values. These values 
dictate the way that government is formed. Certain Western societal values result in 
10 Grafstein attempts to explain the institutional approach through an extensive game theory. In the 
course of the game theory, Graf stein argues that institutions become legitimate by limiting citizens' 
behaviour into appropriate channels. illegal choices are considered non-problematic in this game theory in 
Grafstein's view. He states that "Legitimacy means that the institution in question does not have to tal~e 
specific steps to insure that individuals confine their behaviour to legal choices. The legitimate institution's 
indifference to the existence of illegal opportunities may reflect an inherent undesirability of the illegal 
choices" (Grafstein, 19816, p. 61) 
11 The main aspect to note in Grafstein's definition is that legitimacy is with regard to institutions and he 
appears to intend this to be the equivalent to power and authority, since this is in response to the work of 
social science on the legitimacy of power and authority. 
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democratic practice. An approach which attempts to centre entirely around the 
appropnateness of procedure overlooks the interdependent relationship this has to 
values. 
Clearly, exclusively institutionalist and exclusively belief-centric views of 
legitimacy are flawed. If this is the case, then perhaps contemporary legitimacy theory 
needs to incorporate both aspects. Clearly, legality of power cannot be completely 
ignored. Yet the role of public belief is also vital to maintaining legitimate government. 
The emphasis on belief in the majority of social science literature is not without 
reason. The social scientist, according to Beetham's generalisation, is interested in the 
effect that legitimacy has on society. Their approach to legitimacy therefore ignores their 
personal belief of good governance and concentrates on the opinion of the society that 
they are studying (Beetham, 1991, p. 6). It is for this reason that most social scientists 
have accepted Weber's definition of legitimacy (p. 6). Within this context the social 
scientist does not make moral judgements like that of a philosopher. Instead they simply 
report on other people's beliefs (p. 8). Beetham notes that one would be mistaken if one 
were to suggest that the social scientist engage in evaluating a regime by independent 
normative standards, as are posed by the philosopher. However, he argues that the true 
mistake is to "divorce people's beliefs about legitimacy from their grounds or reasons for 
holding them; and these are to found precisely in the actual characteristics of regime, 
such as its conformity to their values, its ability to satisfy their interests, and so on" (p. 
11). He clarifies this by saying that the mistake of social science has been to reduce 
Weber's "explanation of beliefs to the processes and agencies of their internalisation 
rather than the analysis of the factors which give people sufficient grounds for holding 
them" (p. 11). In other words, "a given power relationship is not legitimate because 
people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their belief" (p. 
11). 
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Lipset's argument provides the basis for this view. Lipset argues that belief in 
legitimacy is relative to the values of the society. He asserts that "groups will regard a 
political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in 
with their primaiy values". (Lipset, 1959, p. 86-87). Lipset's use of belief is not therefore 
simply legitimacy from belief in legitimacy, rather legitimacy from the congruent value 
orientations of the government and society. This still slightly overstates the role of direct 
belief in legitimating authority. However, when used in conjunction with Beetham's 
argument the connections between belief, value orientation, and legitimacy are placed 
into an evaluative framework. 
When assessment of values and beliefs is re-configured in such a framework the 
role it plays in legitimacy becomes more readily identified. This results in evaluating 
legitimacy in the terms of how far authority conforms to the values and standards of the 
governed (Beetham, 1991, p. 11). This is essentially an assessment of the degree of 
congruence between the actions of the authority and the values, beliefs, and expectations 
that provide it justification (p. 11). The relationship between laws and rules of a 
government and the beliefs underpinning them becomes one key factor in legitimating 
authority (p. 12). 
It is at this juncture that capacity can be introduced into discussions of legitimacy. 
The capacity to carry out policy in the interests of the people is implicit in the ability to 
meet this aspect of legitimacy. For actions of government to be congruent with societal 
values it is implied that the government has the capacity to act in the interests of the 
people. 
Democratic governments in particular require further elements in order to be 
considered rightfully legitimate. Actual action to demonstrate that the public consents to 
the rule of the present authority is also important in legitimating government. Schaar 
explains that legitimate democratic authority must originate in democratic consent 
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(Schaar, 1970, p. 284). Thus, public demonstration of people's consent contributes to the 
legitimation of power (Beetham, 1991, p. 12). 
Beetham states that the most customaiy methods of demonstrating this consent 
are "within the conventions of the particular society" (p. 12). The conventions of 
modern democracies are commonly held to be processes of voting for representation. 
As Friedrich states "the fact that those who are being ruled have expressed a preference 
for a person through voting for him in an election has more recently been the preferred 
mode of establishing right or title to rule" (Friedrich, 1963, p. 233). This is important in 
that, to Friedrich, legitimacy is a problem of consensus revolving around the question of 
the right to rule (p. 233). 
Public consent of legitimacy can be placed in realistic democratic terms by 
grounding it "in the acceptance of general rules or laws, ideally by the general will, but 
actually by majority vote" (p. 234). This according to Friedrich, is the prevalent form of 
legitimacy in the twentieth centwy. It accepts that direct democracy is not viable in 
modern society and majority must be the measure of legitimacy in terms of consent. 
Expression of consent is therefore important to conferring legitimacy upon these 
grounds but is also connected to further factors of legitimation. 
The interdependent relationship between these factors becomes apparent when 
introducing the legal aspect. The legal acquisition of power in democracies lies in public 
consent. As Friedrich explained, public consent has in modern times been expressed 
through voting in democratic elections. The result of elections is in turn the means by 
which governments acquire their legal entitlement to rule in democracies. It is through 
this process that legitimacy is in part established. This is a clear argument for legal 
experts who identify that "power is legitimate where its acquisition and exercise conform 
to established law" (Beetham, 1991, p. 4). Although relative to the consent of the public 
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in democracies, legality is separate from belief by the public in legitimate rule. Whether 
the acquisition and exercise of power is done within the law is vital for legitimacy but 
independent from belief (p. 12). 
Therefore, it is evident that legal aspects of legitimacy cannot be disregarded 
entirely. However, it is incorrect to assume, as the legal experts do, that legal acquisition 
and exercise of power automatically legitimates authority. Friedrich noted that legality 
must not be confused with legitimacy. It is merely an element of it. He argues that 
legality can be used as a means of justifying rule but does not legitimise on its own 
(Friedrich, 1963, p. 234). Friedrich supports this in saying that perfect legality does not 
always justify rule. Nor does justified rule translate into perfect legality, for a government 
can be believed to be legitimate when the ruler is actually abusing his power12 (p. 234). 
Hence, it can be argued that the belief and values of society, the consent of the 
public to rule, and legal acquisition and exercise of power can all be factors in legitimacy. 
It is perhaps in Beetham's terms that this inter-dependent process of legitimacy is best 
explained. He summarises this incorporative argument in the context of three factors 
that contribute to legitimacy. The initial level is the legal validity of the acquisition and 
exercise of political power. Second is the justifiability of the rules for government action 
in terms of the belief and values_ current in the given society. The third factor is 
evidence of consent derived from actions. (Beetham, 1991, p. 15). In Beetham's view, 
"these factors, successively and cumulatively, are what make power legitimate" (p. 15). 
With slight alteration, taking into account the supporting arguments for such 
thoughts, Beetham's three levels become the basis for a democratic model of legitimacy. 
It is thus argued by this thesis that a government can be considered legitimate when: 
12 For example, a revolutionaiy government may come to power with support of a majority but not 
through legal means. While the nation may deem the government legitimate, fellow states may not, 
therefore legality once again allows the external observer one criterion for measuring legitimacy 
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• it acquires and exercises political power through legal means, 
• the actions of government are cong:t.uent with the values and beliefs of society, and 
• there is evidence of consent through action for the authority/power stmcture by the 
mled (public). 
These three factors together form the model of democratic legitimacy as represented in 
figure 2.1. 
Legal acquisition 
and exercise of 
political power 













It is iinportant to note that these are not alternatives, rather they must all be present to 
contribute to legitiinacy (p. 16). However, these factors need not be achieved completely; 
a majority can be sufficient. Due to the fact that eve1y society will have members who do 
not accept the norms that unde1pin the rules of power, and there will also be those 
members that refuse to express consent, examination in relative terms is necessary. 
Therefore, political authority, although measured against the ideal, must siinply meet 
these criteria by a reasonable majority. Hence, the measure of legitimacy may be 
expressed i11 the realistic terms of majority, thus allowing for some popular dissent (p. 
19). As long as this dissent does not arise in large amounts, the government will remain 
legitimate, assuming other facts are significantly present. 
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Beetham thus defines legitimacy as follows: "where power is acquired and 
exercised according to justifiable rule, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or 
legitimate" (p. 3). The model presented by Beetham incorporates insights from a range 
of legitimacy theorists. It has been argued here that it is both compelling and workable, 
and it will therefore be used to analyse questions of legitimacy as they pertain to the EU. 
As stated in Chapter One a neo-functionalist framework allows for the 
application of a state-centric theol}' to the study of the European Union. By 
constrncting an ideal model of legitimacy from the above theoretical literature, it is now 
possible to address the larger question of whether the European Union lack legitimacy 
when examined within a neo-functionalist framework. 
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Chapter Three 
Legitimacy and the European Union 
Chapter Two presents an ideal model of democratic legitimacy. Although ideal models 
remain lmachievable by their very nature they are still useful as measures for assessment. 
In this instance the model constructed in Chapter Two is presented as a means of 
measuring the relatir.£ democratic legitimacy accepting that not all criteria can be fully met. 
Rather, as previously stated, an observable majority presence of the three factors is 
necessary in order to constitute legitimate political authority. However, this model applies 
largely to the legitimacy of nation-states. How then can this model of legitimacy be 
applied to a supra-national body such as the European Union? 
Chapter One discussed the relevance of various theoretical frameworks to the 
European Union as a whole. Intergovernmentalism was discounted as a theoretical 
framework for this thesis in that neo-functionalist thought presents the most integrated 
concept of the European Union. It is this concept that presents the most challenges to 
legitimacy theory and hence requires more extensive research. This is not to mean 
however that an intergovernmental perspective should be discounted in all legitimacy 
research. It is worth understanding the concept of legitimacy from an intergovernmental 
framework and how this relates to the European Union. 
Intergovernmental Legitimacy 
As stated in Chapter One the intergovernmental framework enlists the theory of 
legitimacy for international institutions in relation to the EU. Moravcsik argues that the 
European Union can be "analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to 
manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination" and "does 
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not require a siti generis theoiy". (t\1:oravcsik, 1993, p. 474) If one accepts Moravcsik's 
argument then examination of legitimacy in the EU becomes much less complex. 
Legitimacy in this context is measured according to international relations theoiy. When 
applying JR theoiy to the particular workings of the EU, the intergovernmental model 
does not require great theoiy construction. As stated in Chapter One, an international 
institution is legitimate when its authority is recognised by the lff!}timate states that 
comprise the institution. Therefore, in the case of the Union, an intergovernmentalist 
would argue that the EU is legitimate with the recognition of its authority by member 
states. This recognition is conferred through the ratification of EU treaties (Beetham 
and Lord, 1998, p. 61). 
The legitimacy of the EU, according to this argument, can be considered 
rightfully democratic through domestic elections. For, the "elections of national 
governments, whose members then go on to serve on the European Council and Council 
of Ministers", bestows the element of democratic consent upon the Union (p. 61). The 
ratification is also argued by some to contribute to the democratisation of the EU in that 
the treaties must be ratified in each countiy according to their democratic conventions 
(i.e., parliamentaiyvote or referenda) (p. 61). Judge even argues that the frequency with 
which the treaties are updated reinforces the national power to legitimate the democratic 
workings of the Union Gudge, 1995, p. 89). 
Clearly, on the whole, the EU appears to meet the criteria presented thus far in 
the intergovernmental framework. However it is important to note the limitations of 
reliance on the Council of Ministers as a legitimating element. The Council of Ministers 
are elected individually in domestic elections rather than being given collective 
authorisation. As Beetham and Lord state "the Council of Ministers is far more than the 
24 
sum of its parts" in that it is an institution of the Union and not just a conference of 
governments (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 63). The consequence is that 'national 
authorisation' can quickly be overridden through majority voting. However, bearing in 
mind that it is impossible to reach the ideal and that this point is relatively minor, the 
elements of intergovernmental legitimacy are largely met and stand without significant 
opposition. This bodes well for the legitimacy of the European Union if this were the 
only view. However, considering there are those whose visions of Europe extend to a 
federation with even further governmental attributes, legitimacy needs to be examined 
from this perspective. 
Beyond intergovernmental legitimacy 
As explained in Chapter One the application of a comparative method to the European 
Union when working within a neo-functionalist perspective is more advantageous than 
international relations. This does not mean however that this is a perfect solution. The 
European Union is a unique institution that expands beyond the realm of present 
theoretical frameworks. As Lord states "comparisons with ideal tests, or with experience 
based on a ... different political form- the nation-state- will often be illuminating but 
can never be sufficient" (Lord, 1998, p. 15). The challenge to social scientists studying 
Europe is to conceptualise how present theoretical frameworks may be adapted in order 
to examine the institutions of the Union. While attempting to study institutions of the 
European Union it is also necessary to assess the relative application of state-centric 
frameworks. Thus, the challenge to this thesis is two-fold. Examination of EU 
legitimacy commences with the model presented for nation-states in Chapter Two. 
While assessing how the EU fulfils the criteria of the legitimacy model it will be necessary 
to also question the extent that this may be applied to the Union. Despite this need to 
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question the degree of application, the model remains the most relevant starting point 
due to the limitations of an IR model as presented in Chapter One. 
The legitimacy of the European Union has only recently come to the fore in 
discussions of integration. The question of legitimacy failed to be raised for years 
(Obradovic, 1996, p. 192) largely from a reliance on indirect legitimacy within 
an international relations paradigm. Many authors have come to question the need for, 
and consequently initiated debate regarding the role of, direct democratic legitimacy in 
the Union. Beetham and Lord argue that any legitimation of the EU must be based 
upon liberal-democratic criteria because this will be the only form of legitimacy that will 
be "able to ensure citizen support and loyalty to its authority" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, 
p. 22). As discussed previously, loyalty to authority, demonstrated through obedience, is 
connected to stability, efficiency, and effectiveness. These attributes are ultimately 
advantageous to the future of the European Union; increase in these attributes provides 
greater security for integration. Therefore, if the Union should desire these effects, then 
it is important to establish the legitimacy that fosters them. Beetham and Lord have 
stated a democratic model is vital for this reason (p. 22). 
w·allace and Smith maintain that the European Union cannot sustain legitimacy 
based on the legitimacy of member states. They argue that "the sense of indirect 
legitimacy, which characterised the early experience of integration, no longer exists" 
(Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 153). Beetham and Lord explain that indirect legitimacy is 
now problematic in that "some may begin to argue that the Union cannot pretend to 
draw its legitimacy from the very unit that it so frequently overrides" (Beetham and Lord, 
1998, p. 38). Thus, the EU "requires at least sufficient legitimation to support continuing 
acceptance of rnles imposed by majority vote over national preferences" (Wallace and 
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Smith, 1995, p. 153). Obradovic also articulates this need for legitimacy stating that "if 
the Union is to deal forcefully with issues such as monetary- Union, social policy, foreign 
policy, home affairs and justice, and constitutional reform, it will require active public 
support for political change, i.e. fully developed policy legitimacy" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 
193). Hence it is necessary to partake in deeper analysis of Union legitimacy. Using the 
model of legitimacy from Chapter Two an ideal model of legitimacy will provide the 
starting point for such assessment. 
The Ideal Model of EU Legitimacy 
Legal Legitimacy 
Legal Acquisition and Exercise of Power 
Although the European Union can, on the whole, be analysed within a state-centric 
framework, the legal aspects of the EU are not as easily transferred to theories of the 
state. The members of the European Union are still internationally recognised as 
sovereign states in their own right, regardless of any state attributes that the EU may 
exhibit. Therefore, any interaction amongst sovereign states is done within the context 
of international law, rather than intra-state law. The ideal legal acquisition of power is 
hence centred on legally binding agreements as per international law. According to the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties are legally bound by 
international law, with treaties defined as "an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation" (as cited in Klabbers, 1996, p. 41-42). These agreements are "legally 
binding by virtue of the rule pacta sunt servada" - a tradition dating back to ancient 
Greece, in which "legal bonds were deemed strengthened by the talcing of an oath" 
(Klabbers, 1996, p. 39). As a result, the initial creation of the Union must occur through 
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ratification of formal treaties. It is through treaty ratification that the EU can be 
considered legal according to international law. Power acquisition within the Union is 
bound by the regulations set out in formal treaties. Positions of authority within the 
institutions are only legally acquired as these regulations dictate. The legal exercise of 
power can be viewed as adherence to the provisions set out in these formal treaties. 
Hence, the ideal legal factor of legitimacy for the European Union is the legal ratification, 
and abiding by the provisions, of formal treaties. 
Abiding by the provisions of the formal treaties extends beyond the treaties and 
into a more comprehensive legal framework. Nugent reminds us that "an enforceable 
legal framework is the essential basis of decision-making and decision application in all 
democratic states" (Nugent, 1999, p. 242). Although the EU is not a state, Nugent 
argues that a legal framework is still necessary in the Union to ensure the possibility for 
effective EU decision-making (p. 242). While EU law originally stems form international 
treaties, the creation of European institutions and the power bestowed upon those 
institutions within these treaties has created several other sources of EU law. EU 
legislation is one primary source. These laws are constituted as secondary legislation and 
"are concerned with translating the general principles of the treaties into specific rules" 
(p. 245). 
Case law also significantly contributes to the legal framework of the EU. While 
judicial interpretation has not traditionally shaped law in many EU member states, the 
European Court of Justice has had to play a more important role in EU law (p. 257). 
This largely stems from "the comt's duty to ensure that EU law is interpreted and 
applied correctly" and "the fact that much of the EU statute law is far from clear or 
complete" (p. 257-258). This has resulted in a significant role for the court in 
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determining the laws of the Union which ultimately applies to both EU citizens and 
member states. 
This international legal framework provides a strong argument against adopting a 
purely intergovernmental view of the European Union. For it is the legal framework 
described above that is "the single most important feature distinguishing the EU from 
other international organisations. The member states do not just co-operate with one 
another on an intergovernmental basis but have developed common laws designed to 
promote uniformity" (p. 276). This is often articulated as European Constitutionalism. 
Weiler contends that a key milestone in this constitutionalism was when the EC treaties 
were transformed from "a set of legal arrangements binding only upon sovereign states" 
to agreements that rendered "individuals too, no longer only states, 'subjects of the law"' 
(Weiler, 1997, p. 98). Clearly with the introduction of constitutionalism, the EU legal 
framework gains greater scope and capacity internally. 
While all these internal laws contribute to the legal framework that must be 
adhered to for legal legitimacy the role of international law must not be forgotten. Not 
only is international law the basis for the treaty ratification which provides legal 
acq_uisition of power, international law is also present in the legal framework for legal 
exercise of power. The sovereignty of member states dictates that while the EU has its 
own legislation and internal legal framework, it is still in the eyes of the international 
community an international institution to which international law applies; the same rules 
that apply to member states as sovereign actors also applies to the EU as an institution 
(Nugent, 1999, p. 258). The consequence of this complex legal framework for legitimate 
legal exercise of power is multi-tiered. On one level the states that comprise the Union 
must exercise power within both the legislative framework of the EU but also the legal 
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rules of the international community. On the next level the EU itself must also exercise 
power within the same legal constraints. Hence this means that for the exercise of power 
to be legal and thus legitimate the EU and the member states that comprise it must act 
within the parameters of the legal framework as constructed by EU legislation and 
interpretation, as well as international law. 
Popular Legitimacy 
The application of the second and third ideal factors must concentrate on the democratic 
conditions encompassed in legitimacy. Popular or social legitimacy stems from 
government action combined with consent. The realistic terms within which this may be 
posed for observations are the three conditions of democracy that affect legitimacy as 
argued by Lord. While ultimately conditions of democracy on their own, each can be 
explained as a manifestation of popular legitimacy as well. 
Lord argues in Democracy in t:he European Union that authorisation, accountability, 
and representation are three conditions of democracy. Authorisation is the conferment 
of consent by the 'the people' (Lord, 1998, p. 17). Hence, authorisation is synonmous 
with the third factor of legitimacy. Furthermore, Lord explains that "the single act of 
voting performs a dual role" of consenting for the overall power structure and electing 
particular political leadership (p. 17); once again this reflects the discussions of consent in 
Chapter Two. 
Accountability can be described as the "political responsibility that ensures that 
the terms on which political power is authorized are duly observed" and also " the need 
for power-holders to compete for re-election" which in turn "gives them the incentive to 
be responsive to the public" (p. 80). The connection that this has to legitimacy can be 
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explained in terms of both consent and the need for actions to be in line with societal 
values. Accountability theoretically provides an incentive for the power-holders to be 
responsive to the public, or the actions of the government to be based upon the values 
of those who will re-elect them. The opportunity to re-elect representatives provides a 
means by which consent may be withdrawn (ie failure to be re-elected) if these actions 
are completely contraty to the beliefs of majority of 'the people'. 
Representation is based on the idea that "the public should rule without having 
to assume the burden of collective decisions" with the goal of the representative system 
"to put the few who do hold power under systematic pressure to anticipate the needs and 
values of the many" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 79). Beetham and Lord argue that for 
representation to be just this ideally requires three criteria to exist: 
• "1he insertion of the public's respresentatires into strare# 
positions in the political suystem'lWere -they are able to confer ar 
wthhold J_J<YWJr, ar deny resourres, such as fmanre and legislatiw 
authority, that are 1'1l!l!d«l for the eJfectire exercise of pacter. 
• Incentit.:es far representa"tir:es to link society to gawnanre by 
searching out and articulating the principal isSf,fe CMfF that 
define the interests of social groups in relation t:o the political 
system. 
• An opportunity for the public to choose betumi riwl partisan 
prc,grammes' at the 'same /ere/, of aggregation' as the political 
systemilself' 
(p. 79) 
Elected representation, with the choice between 'rival partisans', provides the public with 
the opportunity to consent to representatives that they feel will act in line with their 
values. Furthermore, the ideal conditions of representation provide the means by which 
representatives may act in accordance with these values. These values themselves may be 
articulated through the choice of representatives. 
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Government Actions Congruent with Societal Values 
If authorisation, accountability, and representation are the practical application of 
the ideal model of democratic legitimacy this can be applied to the EU through the 
presence of democratic institutions. The Commission and Council of Ministers are not 
directly elected and therefore can not under this model be labelled as democratic 
institutions. However the European Parliament is present as the representative body in 
the Union. For 'government' action to be congruent with societal values there are two 
elements that are raised in the case of the European institutions. While the Commission 
and Council of Ministers do not have to be elected representative they must still act in 
accordance with societal values. The means by which they may be held accountable, 
though, must be drawn from direct representation to meet the model. The European 
Parliament, as the representatives of 'the people', need to have the power to check the 
actions of those who are not elected representative. As those who are held directly 
accountable to the European people, the Parliament's ability to provides the checks and 
balances of democratic institutions enables indirect accountability for those who at 
present remain appointed officials. Therefore the two elements involved in this factor of 
legitimacy are the need for firstly all power-holding officials, whether appointed or 
elected (i.e. the Commission, Council of Ministers, and Parliament), to act in line with 
societal values and secondly for the elected representatives, at present the European 
Parliament, to possess authority to check the actions of non elected representatives. 
While clearly difficult to articulate societal values in the case of integration, the 
concentration of actions should, ideally, reflect the popular attitudes and beliefs regarding 
the European Union and the course of integration. 
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Evidence of Consent 
In the course of examining what factors contribute to legitimation of governmental 
power, evidence of consent was highlighted. Both Beetham and Friedrich noted that 
voting for representative government is accepted in modern democracies as a clear 
indication of public mandate. This can also be applied to the European Union. The 
European Parliament acts as the representative legislative body for the EU. Voting for 
Members of the European Parliament can thus be identified as a means by which the 
citizens of the EU are able to express their consent for the Union. 
It can also be argued that national referenda are another example of public 
consent for the EU. However, due to the fact that referenda have not been standardised 
across all member states this is, although a clearly justifiable means, not an adequate 
means to assess public consent of all citizens. One can argue that since European 
parliamentary voting is accessible in all member states this is a more adequate factor of 
assessing legitimacy. Voting for the EP is therefore presented as the ideal action of 
expressed consent within the EU. All three factors are represented in the ideal model of 
EU legitimacy (figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1: IDEAL MODEL OF EU LEGITIMACY 
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To what extent does the ideal tnodel of legitimacy actually exist in Europe? The ideal 
1nodel presents the factors of legitimacy that can legitimate the authority of the European 
Union. However, it should be noted that this is the ideal, and it is accepted that they will 
not perfectly exist. Rather, as was noted in the theoretical framework, the degree to 
which they exist is important in attaining legitimacy. As long as tl1ey have a strong 
presence, and the faction of the public who do not accept such ideas remain a sm.all 
niinority, they will act as legitimating factors for the EU. The task of assessing the extent 
to which this has arisen is the next step. 
Cardus and Estruch argue strongly that there is in fact a legitimacy problem in 
the EU. They conclude that "ahnost eve1yone agrees that at the present moment tliis 
process is very limited politcally because of the so called democratic deficit" and further 
"apart from the logical difficulties resulting from the evasiveness of the states themselves 
as they jostle for positions of strength, what is most lacking as regards tl1e process of 
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unity is legitimacy" (Cardus and Estruch, 1995, p. 351). However, such an extreme 
statement must be read with caution. Does the EU lack legitimacy as a whole or are 
there simply areas in which the legitimacy 'problem' is greater than others? Many of the 
authors who discusss the need to examine EU legitimacy identify the area of 'popular' or 
'social' legitimacy as the most important area of study. Wallace and Smith ultimately 
conclude that "the European Union can be seen as having legal legitimacy .... but still 
lacks social legitimacy" (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 152). Using the ideal model of 
legitimacy in the EU, it is necessary to examine the accuracy of such statements and 
conclude which areas in fact present legitimacy problems. 
EU Treaties 
It was concluded in the ideal type that international law dictates legal acquisition of 
power in the European Union. At each step of the process further integration has 
occurred within the framework of formal treaties. The Treaty of Rome (1957) that 
created the ECSC, was the first of the treaties. The subsequent Single European Act 
(1986/87) was the next step in extending the integration process. The most significant 
change occurred with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It is perhaps this 
treaty that presents the clearest representation of power acquisition through international 
law in that this encompasses significant gains of power jurisdiction. The power of the 
Union was further extended with the Amsterdam Treaty that completed the ratification 
process in 1999. All these treaties demonstrate that the development of the Union has 
been done within a legal framework. Thus it can be accurately stated that the European 
Union has acquired power through legal means. 
However, legal legitimacy for the EU also reqmres adherence to the legal 
framework. The creation of European law has involved the surrendering of some 
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sovereignty of member states. This is in part because they are required to "submit to a 
legal system over which they have only partial control" (Nugent, 1999, p.276). Ideally 
this submission would be uniform and consistent. While this is often the case, 
sovereignty is a highly emotive subject and institutional measures are available for 
instances of disregard for EU law. One of the three roles of the European Court of 
Justice is as an administrative court13 which provides a forum for private parties to seek 
protection against illegal executive actions of EU institutions or member states (p. 27). 
There are obvious cases in which states have challenged the frameworks of European 
Law, such as the French ban on British beef. However, these situations have always 
been resolved eventually and legitimately through this legal framework. It can in fact be 
argued that these cases demonstrate the ability to resolve conflict within European law. 
Bearing in mind that these instances are not abundant, and that the ideal of no illegal 
actions is unattainable14, the adherence to the EU legal framework is relatively stable and 
can thus be stated to meet this factor of legitimacy. 
Therefore the EU appears to possess legal legitimacy and hence supports this 
part of Wallace and Smith's statement. Yet, this does not support their statement 
regarding popular legitimacy. Are they correct? Does the European Union lack 
social/popular legitimacy? Again, the use of the ideal model allows this question to be 
addressed. 
13 The other two roles are a constitutional court and a supreme court 
14 As it remains an ideal factor 
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Authorisation, Accountability, and Representation 
As stated above, popular legitimacy, the element of legitimacy said to be most lacking, 
stems from the second and third factors of legitimacy. 'Complete'15 legitimacy is 
difficult according to Wallace and Smith due to the deliberate "journey" of integration 
"to an unlmown destination" (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 140). Such imprecision 
results in great difficulty in attracting popular suppo1t and generating popular consent (p. 
140). Deflem and Pampel note the importance of public opinion for the EU to become 
fully legitimate. They state "the success of Europe's unification depends to no small 
extent on the support it receives from the citizens of the members of the European 
Community [sic] ... the survival of democratic political systems of advanced capitalist 
societies rests on popular legitimation in the cultural sphere" (Deflem and Pampel, 1996, 
p. 120). 
The course of integration began with the elite and thus this popular consent was 
on the whole assumed to exist (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 151). Yet Wallace and Smith 
argue that this popular consent is not as significantly present as assumed. Obradovic 
supports this argument. She asserts that referenda have shown that a "deep gulf" exists 
between the perceptions of elite and general public" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 193). 
Referenda in fact, rather than demonstrating popular support, widened the credibility gap 
and aggravated the legitimacy problem in the EU (p. 193) This 'problem of popular 
legitimacy' is often connected to the democratic deficit that many claim exists in Union 
politics. 
lS Meaning both legal and popular legitimacy 
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Democractic Deficit 
As exemplified by Cardus and Estruch, many authors indicate that this 'democratic 
deficit' in the European Union is a major impediment to the integration process and 
fmther a major area of concern for legitimacy. Lord summarises one possible definition 
of the democratic deficit as "the gap between standards of democratic practice in 
national and Union politics, [which] arises when powers are transferred from 'more 
democractic' national institutions to 'less democratic' European ones" (Lord, 1998, p. 
14). Although this defintion is not entirely acceptable16, it is an indication of the view 
primarily half by nee-functionalists who desire a democratic supra-national government. 
The connection between the democratic defict and legitmacy comes under the 
second factor of actions and values plus the third factor of consent in that this deficit 
relates to the three conditions (authorisation, accountability, and representation) outlined 
by Lord. Beetham and Lord assert that the authority of the Union "can be readily shown 
to be deficient in each of these aspects of a direct democratic legitmacy" (Beetham and 
Lord, 1998, p. 26). Authorisation is lacking because neither the Council of Ministers nor 
the Commision are propularly authorised within a supra-national framework (p. 26). The 
accountability of the Commission and Council is also limited. The accountability of the 
Council of Ministers to national parliaments is highly tenuous and the accountability of 
both bodies to the European Parliament is limited by the restraints that exist on the 
powers of the Parliament (p. 27). 
16 due to the complex nature of the issue of the democratic deficit. A definition of 'democratic deficit' is 
dependent upon the initial concept of the degree to which democracy is necessary in the European Union 
which is in turn dependent upon the view one tal{es of the nature of integration- debates which are 
outside of the scope of this thesis. However, as a neo-functionalist view is the framework for this thesis 
the above definition is accepted as workable. 
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However, it should be noted that since the time that Beetham and Lord reached 
such conclusions regarding accountability, the European Parliament has demonstrated its 
ability to check the power of the Commission. In a series of moves by the EP the 
Commission was forced collectively to resign in March 1999. Accusations of fraud and 
favouritism arose, centring around two Commissioners, when the Parliament refused to 
approve the EU's accounts because of suspicions regarding mis-management. As a 
result they tabled a vote of censure (The Ecanonist, 09.01.99, p. 48). However, this "bid to 
make history collapsed: Euro-MPs voted by a margin of 162 votes for a compromise 
resolution, which called for an independent inquiry into the allegation[s]" (Tf.e Ecanonist, 
16.01.99, p. 49). Ultimately this independent investigation found the Commission "guilty 
of tolerating fraud, mismanagement or nepotism in programmes under its collective 
control", which resulted in the resignations (The Ecomnist, 27.03.99, p. 64). However, as 
Holland notes, the six cases highlighted by the enquiry were of a "comparatively minor 
nature" (Holland, 1999, p. 24). Perry concludes that the enquiry simply found what 
would be present in any democratic bureaucracy: "some corruption, rather more fraud 
and mismangement, and even more unsupported accusation"17 (Perry, 1999, p. 30). This 
did show however, that Parliamentary censure can no longer be dismissed by the 
Commission as theoretical and must be accepted as a political reality (Tf.e Ecanomist, 
30.01.99, p. 49). The Ecananist describes this increase in accountability as the Parliament 
beginning "at last to flex its flabby muscles, and to behave in the way that an elected 
overseer of an unelected body ought to" (The Econanist, 16.01.99, p. 50). 
However, this power ought not to be overstated. The resignations, while on one 
hand demonstrating some level of accountability also exposed great weaknesses on the 
17 However, it should be noted that Peny continues on to say that this should not "be read as a 
downplaying [ of] the value or significance of the expert enquiry'' as he was highly critical of the actions of 
the Commission and the need for accountability. 
39 
other. Two individual Commissioners were at the heart of this scandal, yet the vote of 
censure only has the ability to dismiss the Commission as a whole. Somewhat 
rediculously, even the Commission President does not even have the ability to dismiss 
individual Commissioners. The procedures, set up initially in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
hold "no providions for expressing either a vote of confidence in the Commission or, 
conversely, of sanctioning individual Commissioners" (Holland, 1999, p. 24). 
Commissioners remain individually accountable to their respective member states only18 
(171e Economist, 30.01.99, p. 50). Also, the vote of censure is the EP's "only instrument of 
control over the EU executive" (The Economist, 09.01.99, p. 48). Therefore, paradoxically, 
whilst this exercise demonstrated some level of accountability, it also, at the same time, 
exposed the "limited democratic accountability of the Commissioners" (Holland, 1999, 
p. 24). This further highlighted the fact that "somebody, somewhere ... needs the political 
power to sack individual commissioners" (The Economist, 30.01.99, p. 50). And according 
to the ideal model of democratic legitimacy this power should lie in the hands of elected 
representatives. 
The limited powers of the European Parliament contribute greatly to the 
represention deficit in the European Union. The European Parliament at the start of the 
decade could accurately be described as the weal(est institution in the triangle of 
Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers (Tacobs and Corbett, 1990, p. 3). 
With the ratification of Maastricht and Amsterdam came increased powers for the 
Parliament which greatly equalised this triangular relationship. However, whilst the 
European Parliament now has increased official avenues for influencing EU policy, the 
18 Who often ardently protect their Commissioner out of national pride and interest 
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realitities of EU politics still place limitations on some of this influence. Nugent 
describes five main means that the EP possesses for influencing policy: 
1. policy discussions with the Commission at the pre-proposal legislative stage 
2. EP can formally adopt ideas of its own for suggested legislation 
1. through initiative reports 
11. majority ofMEP's can request the Commission submit 
appropriate proposal 
3. appropriations by EP in annual budget 
4. indirect influence on annual legislative programme through EP committees 
5. the views of the EP must be sought prior to approval of important, 
significant, or sensitive legislation. 
(Nugent, 1999, p. 205-207) 
In reality however formal ideas of the EP are often difficult to act upon because, firstly, 
the Commission is not required to follow through initiative reports from the EP and 
secondly, poor attendance by MEP's to plenary sessions makes majority requests for 
Commission proposals difficult to achieve (p. 205-206). Further, Parliament's views are 
required before legislation may be approved, but, depending on the legislative procedure, 
it is not required that these views be enacted into policy. 
The legislative procedure significantly affects the power of the European 
Parliament. Prior to 1987, the consultation procedure, in which the EP is asked for 
simply an opinion on Commission proposals for Council legislations, was the only 
procedure for referring legislation to the Parliament Gacobs and Corbett, 1990, p. 163-
166). It is significant that parliamentary opinion must be sought for any piece of 
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legislation to be considered legal19. Yet Jacobs and Corbett re-iterate that "no matter 
how extensive the possibilities for Parliamentary involvement in the dicussion of 
Community legislation, the bottom line of being able to block proposals or impose its 
will on the other institutions was lacking" (p. 164). 
The introduction of the co-operation procedure in 1987 provided a greater 
means for pressuring the Commission and Council to take EP opinion into account 
through a second reading and absolute majority voting to amend or reject the 'common 
position' of the Council (p. 169-171). However, this does not act as a veto and the 
Commission and Council are still not obliged to include EP amendments (Nugent, 1999, 
p. 208). The potential for veto was finally introduced with the creation of the co-
decision procedure. If Parliament is able to reject a proposal through an absolute 
majority, it is referred to a conciliation committee20 provided parliament amends this 
propoal with an absolute majority. An agreeement in the conciliation committee results -
in another vote in Parliament and Council requiring majority votes for approval. Failure 
to do this means that the proposal falls and thus provides the Parliament with a potential 
means for veto (p. 208)21. The treaty article upon which the proposal is based 
determines the legislative procedure to be followed (p. 208). All three methods are still 
used. 
19 A requirement that was reinforced by the ruling of the European Court of Justice In 1980 which 
annulled a piece of Community legislation because Parliament had not yet given Its opinion O acobs and 
Corbett, 1990, p. 164). 
20 comprised of equal representation from Council and parliament 
21 There is one further procedure that provides the EP with similar power over proposal. In the assent 
procedure "the EP must consider proposals at a single reading and with no provision for amendments. In 
some circumstances the assent requires an absolute majority of Parliament's members. Again, the EP thus 
has veto powers under this procedure". {Nugent, 1999, p. 209) 
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These methods of influence on EU policy and legislative procedures demonstrate 
that no longer can the EP be described as an ineffectual insitution. Yet, although the 
Parliament is no longer ineffectual, the power to act as a representative body and check 
on non-elected insitutions can be described as insufficient for the purposes of 
legitimating the European Union. The main limitation on the power of the European 
Parliament remains the dominance of the Commission and Council of Ministers, 
althought the mediocre calbre of MEP's also contributes as a limitation. As the only 
directly elected body, the parliament is limited in their ability to fully act m a 
representative role due to these legislative procedures and political realities. The 
Commission, despite recent events, remains the "mainstay of the EU's institutional 
structure"22 (The Economist, 30.01.99, p. 49). Legislation can not always be influenced, not 
to mention vetoed, by those who are elected to act in the interests of EU citizens. This 
remains a strong institutional deficiency in the represnetation of the European public. 
Combined with this insitutional representation deficit is a traditonally poor voter 
turnout. Voter turnout for EP elections is significantly less than that of national 
elections23 . This has led many to describe the character of EP elections as 'second-
order' (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hewstone, 1986; J. Smith, 1996, p. 276; Beetham and 
Lord, 1998, p. 27,). The evidence of consent through elections consequently appears to 
be significantly lacking24• 
22 Although an intergovernmentalist would be prone to disagree with such a statement, whereas to the 
intergovernmentalist the Council of Ministers could be described as 'the hallmark' of intergovernmental 
co-operation. 
23 See Appendix Two for these figures 
2 4 This low voter turnout shall be explained and explored in greater depth in Chapter Four 
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Thus it can be demonstrated how the democratic deficit in the European Union 
leads to insufficient authorisation, accountability, and representation25. As illustrated in 
the theoretical model these three factors are largely intertwined with the popular 
legitimacy that is said to be lacking in the European Union. Although it can be noted 
that the accountability in the Union has significantly increased, authorisation and 
representation (with respect to low voter turnout and a non-elected Commission and 
Council) are still partially lacking under a democratic governmental framework. When 
tested against the ideal model of legitimacy, the EU appears wanting. The second factor 
concludes that the Council, Commission, and Parliament must act in accordance with the 
values and beliefs of the society they govern and for the European Parliement, as the 
elected representatives, to possess authority to check the actions of non-elected 
representatives. With claims of a lack of popular support for deepening of the Union, 
and difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, it would appear that whether the 
actions of the EU elite are congruent with society's values and beliefs is questionable. 
However, as previously noted, societal values are difficult to define. Therfore more 
accurate conclusions regarding this measure may only be reached after deeper analysis26. 
Accountability to the EP has notably increased with the resignation of the Commission, 
but overall accountability is still limited. Individual Commissioners and the Council of 
Minsters are only answerable to their nation-states; the EP has the power only to dismiss 
the Commission as a whole27. Lastly, the third element of ideal EU legitimacy 
25 Re-iterating again that this deficit is only present when viewed from the supra-national view. An 
intergovernmentalist could justifiably argue that the EU is 'democratic' within an International Relations 
paradigm. 
26 To be addressed in Chapter Four. 
27 However, it is important to note that a new Commission is subject to the appruwl of the Parliament 
through the investiture procedure created under the Maastricht Treaty (Holland, 1999, p. 24). 
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states that voting for the European Parliament constitues evidence of consent. Yet, this 
democratic consent can not be resoundly claimed when voter turnout has decreased each 
year. 
According to the analysis provided by the ideal model of legitimacy in the 
European Union it appears that indeed a legitimacy problem does exist. In agreement 
with the statement of Wallace and Smith it is the area of popular legitimacy that is shown 
to be the weakest according to this model. However, returning to the argument that 
application of state-centric theory needs to be closely scrutinised before reaching 
conclusions, the validity of this apparent lack of legitimacy must be further questioned. 
Does the EU in fact lack popular legitimacy or rather does this legitimacy exist but a state 
centric focus is too narrow to measure legitimacy at the supra-national level? With 
closer examination of the state of, and elements contributing towards, popular legitimacy 
in Europe it will become possible to assess whether this initial conclusion is correct. 
While on one level assessing the legitimacy of the European Union, the remainder of this 




EU Popular Legitimacy 
The theoretical framework for the discussion of legitimacy noted the importance of 'the 
people' in legitimating government. It has been recognised that the involvement of the 
public is most important for the aspect of popular legitimacy that has now become the 
primaiy focus of discussion. The perception that the governed are able to act as a 
legitimating force is relatively recent. Although the roots of the idea that 'the people' 
were able to legitimate government can be traced to Ancient Greece and Rome, this 
concept became most pervasive in the early modern era (Calhoun, 1997, p. 70). 
Increasing political participation saw culmination of the concept in the revolutions of the 
age, namely the English Civil War and the American and French revolutions (p. 71). It is 
from this period onward the legitimacy was seen to ascend from the general population; 
"'the people' constituted a unified force, capable not only of rising en masse against an 
illegitimate state, but capable of bestowing legitimacy on a state that properly fitted with, 
and served the interests of, its people" (p. 69). 
Consequently, there is an important role for 'the people' in the legitimation of the 
European Union28 • It has arguably been demonstrated that the European Union 
sufficiently meets the criteria presented for legal legitimacy, yet popular legitimacy is still 
lacking within the ideal model constructed from the theoretical literature. Therefore, the 
values and beliefs of 'the people' of Europe must now come under scrutiny; it is the 
people who may ultimately dictate the future of the European Union. The following two 
chapters will address the issue of the true nature of public attitudes towards the EU. 
With research into popular attitudes and voting behaviour it will be possible to assess 
whether initial conclusions regarding the legitimacy crisis in the EU are correct or 
28 Again, re-iterating that this is purely within an intergovernmental framework. The legitimacy of the 
European Union within an international relations paradigm centres around the role of the state; the people 
are only involved in bestowing legitimacy upon the state that thus in turn can bestow legitimacy upon the 
international organisation. 
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whether the theoretical framework requires modification for application to a supra-
national body. 
Research Method 
In 1986 Miles Hewstone published a study entitled Understanding Attitudes to the European 
G»nmunity. Hewstone identified the need to compile research that identified trends in 
popular attitudes. The primaty source for his research was the Eurobarometre public 
opinion surveys conducted by the European Commission. These surveys are carried out 
twice yearly in each member state. As Reif and Inglehart explain "no other region of the 
world has produced a social research program [sic] that is comparable in cross-national 
scope or in the regularity with which these measures are conducted" (Reif and Inglehart, 
1991, p.1). This comprehensive nature of the Eurobarrmetre research ultimately enabled 
Hewstone to cany out extensive analysis of popular attitudes towards integration. 
Kohler states that public opinion surveys are limited due to the fact that "they 
have to operate with straightforward questions in order to get unequivocal answers 
which necessarily give only a simplified picture of a complex and differentiated reality" 
(Kohler, 1984, p. 445). However, when dealing with human belief, research methods are 
always limited. Polls still yield a more accurate picture of public opinion than can be 
obtained from sources such as newspapers and informal interviews (Hewstone, 1986, p. 
17). Furthermore, the Eurobarometre remains one of the most preferable public opinion 
surveys for two reasons. Firstly, the same questions are carefully translated and posed 
simultaneously in all member states of the Union. Secondly, key questions are repeated 
on several occasions creating a time series that can chart short and long term trends in 
public opinion (p. 22). This allows the social scientist to examine the results of the 
Eurobarometre with the full confidence that consideration has been given to overcoming 
difficulties of surveys. 
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In examining the deeper implications of the popular legitimacy of the European 
Union public opinion is key. Based on the initial work of Hewstone, the Eurobarometre 
will be used for this investigation of public opinion throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. Once the initial analysis of popular attitudes is complete a comparison with the 
conclusions of Hewstone will be carried out, allowing further insight in the trends that 
become apparent. In order to gain a clearer view of this public opinion the case studies 
for comparison are limited to ten member states29 • These are: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom. All these states have participated in every election for the European 
Parliament (with the exception of Greece who first voted in 1981 upon joining the 
Community). By choosing these states it allows for exploration of trends over a twenty-
year period in both voting and public opinion. This will in turn facilitate the 
identification of relationships, or lack thereof, between popular attitudes and voting 
behaviour. 
This method will also allow the testing of several hypotheses regarding. Firstly, 
the overall hypothesis of this chapter is that 'based on the review of legitimacy literature, 
there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union'. Two subsequent hypotheses, which 
ultimately enable testing of the aforementioned hypothesis, are 'the decline in popular 
support for unification is a reaction against some level of actions which were perceived 
to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of society' and ' voter turnout is an 
inadequate measure of consent at the supra-national level. 
Several questions from the Eurobarometre have been chosen in order to compile a 
data set of public opinion since April 197930• Most questions reflect various attitudes 
29 This differs from Hewstone's method. Hewstone used four member states only: France, Germany, 
Italy., and the United Kingdom. 
3°Complete data tables available in Appendix One 
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towards the Union while others reflect attitudes towards life in general. While all 
questions have some level of 'trend' analysis available this varies per question. The 
variation is due to the fact that, although the majority of questions have been asked 
throughout the twenty-year period, this is not always the case. In other instances there 
are gaps in the data where the questions may have been omitted from the surveys during 
some years. However, major trends are the focus here and these minor absences of data 
should not distort this analysis. 
Relationship between EU elite actions and public values and beliefs 
In Chapter Three the ratification of Maastricht was presented as one possible example of 
disjtmction between elite actions and societal values and beliefs. The Maastricht Treaty 
was hailed as marking the "new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe" (Duff, 1994, p. 19). Yet the road to realising the Union 
was not without problems. One of the most significant problems for ratification came 
on 2 June 1992 when the Treaty was rejected by the Danish public in a referendum vote 
of 50.7% to 49.3% (Corbett, 1993, p. 65). As Vanhoonacker describes this rejection was 
serious because "the reticence of the Danes woke up many European citizens who until 
then had been merely indifferent with regard to the Treaty and stimulated them to have a 
closer and more critical look at the implications of further European integration" 
(Vanhoonacker, 1994, p. 5). This criticism, furthermore, was not "confined 
to ... traditionally Eurosceptic countries" (p. 5). For example, increased debate in Ireland 
followed the Danish rejection and opposition appeared to be gaining support (Corbett, 
1993, p. 66). Some of the most rigorous debate about ratification took place in France, 
one of the traditional "motors of the European integration process" (y anhoonacker, 
1994, p. 6). Ratification was barely approved in France in a referendum with a margin of 
51 % to 49% (p. 6). Corbett describes the ratification procedure in the United Kingdom 
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as a 'rollercoaster' (Corbett, 1993, p. 68). "After prolonged and acrimonious debate" 
(Pryce, 1994, p. 3) the Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified in all of these countries, 
allowing the formation of the new Union31 . Such difficulties seemed to highlight the 
extensive opposition to moves towards a federated Europe. As Pryce explains "the treaty 
which was designed to take Europe further along the road to 'and over closer union' has 
itself proved to be source of controversy" (p. 3). 
The significance of these difficulties relates closely to the second and third 
factors of legitimacy. If the public is in fact opposed to further integration32 then 
attempts at deepening and widening the Union can arguably be described as contrary to 
societal values and beliefs. Further, marginal majority votes for ratification can be 
analysed as undermining evidence of consent necessary to legitimate the authority of the 
Union. Thus, Obradovic (1996) has argued that the ratification process highlighted the 
legitimacy problem that is said to exist in the EU. 
However Franklin et al argue that the difficulty in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty 
may in fact be less of a reflection of attitudes towards European integration and more a 
matter of attitudes towards national governments. Rather than voting based upon their 
feelings regarding Europe, it has been proposed that voters may in fact have used this 
forum for voicing dissatisfaction with national governments (Franklin et al, 1995, p. 102). 
They argue that "referenda conducted in the context of national party politics, with the 
government of the day urging ratification of a treaty they have themselves negotiated, will 
inevitably be contaminated by popular feelings about the government" (p. 102). In this 
31 As described in Corbett 1993: The Irish referendum ended with 69% voting in favour of Maastricht (p. 
66). The United Kingdom passed the bill that incorporates Maastricht into UK law by a majority of 244 
during the second reading in the House of Commons. (p. 68). The House of Lords approved the 
Maastricht Bill 141 to 29 on the final vote, with the Royal Assent given the same day. (p. 75) The Danes 
held a second referendum after negotiating a 'national compromise' which saw 56.8% of people voting in 
favour of ratification (p. 73). See text for the results of the referendum in France. For a full description of 
ratification procedures in the member states see Corbett 1993: 64-76 or Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1994. 
32as some would conclude from the referenda results 
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context voting for referenda could actually be viewed as a response to immediate 
circumstances rather than deep-rooted beliefs regarding integration (p. 105). The 
empirical data presented by Franklin et al appears to support the hypothesis that the 
difficulties of ratification in France, Denmark, and Ireland33 were connected to ill feelings 
regarding their national governments. Consequently, it would appear that any definitive 
conclusions regarding public attitudes towards European integration as a result of the 
Maastricht referenda should be presented with caution (p. 114-115). 
These conflicting interpretations call for further investigation into the beliefs the 
public hold. The values and beliefs of the public towards the European Union and the 
integration process can be approached through a study of public attitudes, as they are 
ultimately underpinned by values and beliefs. An interesting trend appears in the EU as a 
whole with EU citizens were asked about their feelings of overall support for the 
attempts at unification. The predominant response has consistently been support to 
some extent for unification. The notable trend is that the percentage of citizens who are 
'very much for' integration has steadily declined in the 1990's while those that are 'to 
some extent against' and 'vety much against' has increased slightly during this period (see 
graph 4.1). 
33 It is important to note that the ratification in Ireland was not as contentious as the other two examples, 
but still included serious debate and opposition. It is included in this list, rather than the United Kingdom, 
because it was used as a case study by Franklin et al in their empirical research 
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Graph 4.1: Support for unification amongst all member states 
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This overall trend is apparent in most of the ten member states. However, there 
are some notable exceptions. Greece was the only country in which those that were 'very 
much for' outnumbered (significantly in 1989-1991) those that 'were to some extent for'. 
One contmon trend, however, is the waning of strong support for unification. Eight out of 
the ten member states, including Greece, all saw a decline in the number of people who 
responded 'vety much for' unification34 from around 1992 onward. Significantly, this 
corresponds with debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. During 
this period Belgium, France, and Germany have the most marked rise in opposition at 
the expense of strong support. However, moderate support remains high in most 
member states. Rather than opposing unification, it would appear that most citizens now 
simply choose to view integration more cautiously. Overall support for unification 
remained in the majority. The responses within most nations were similar percentages. 
The Danes, however, possess attitudes opposite to these trends. Opposition to 
unification was higher in Denmark than any of the other ten states. Strong opposition 
surpassed those who 'very much' supported unification in the 1980's. The 1990's saw an 
34 One of the notable exceptions sees Luxembourg with a temporary increase again in 1995. The lowest 
point for Luxembourg was actually 1989, followed by a relatively consistent response of around 30% 
(except for 1995). This however is significantly lower than their average of 45% in the 1980's. 
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mcrease ill those that 've1y much' supported unification; such an mcrease was only 
marginally higher than the strong opposition at the end of the 1990's. (see graph 4.2). 
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The interesting trend to note in Denmark is a decline during the 1990's (particularly 
1991-1992) of opposition in comparison to the large percentage of the citizens opposed 
to integration in the late 1980's. During the period of ratification Denmark was one of 
the few countries that saw a decline in this opposition, yet ratification was a highly 
contentious issue. This could at the outset support the idea that the Danes were instead 
voicing opposition to national government as argued by Franklin. However, before 
making such a conclusion it should be noted that approximately 30% of the population 
in the 1990's were still responding either 'to some extent against' and 'very much against' 
unification. Although this is lower than other periods in Denmark, this remains a higher 
percentage than the majority of any other member states studied35. 
General attitudes towards membership in the European Union seem to follow a 
very similar trend as support for Unification (see graph 4.3). 
35 Opposition in Germany peaked in April 1993 at just over 30%, but this was a significant increase in 
comparison to all other surveys. The United Kingdom consistently averages around 20-25% against 
unification to varying degrees. 
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Graph 4.3: Attitudes towards EU membership in all member states 
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The percentage of people in the EU who believe membership is a 'good thing' peaked in 
April of 1991 at 72% but had dropped to 49% in April 1999. Again, the steady decline 
can be traced from the time of the Maastricht Treaty. In response to this decline was an 
increase in the percentage of people who feel that membership was neither good nor 
bad. So this trend does not result in a significant rise in negative attitudes, but rather a 
move towards indifference. 
Ireland was the country most opposite to this trend with a steady increase of 
nearly 30% in positive attitudes towards membership in the EU. Denmark and Greece 
broke with the trend slightly by showing an increase in positive attitudes over the 20 year 
period36, but they both also showed a decline since the Maastricht Treaty. Half of the 
countries showed similar feelings towards EU membership with a general average of 
around 60% of citizens responding that membership is a good thing37. Three countties, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, showed greater support, with averages of 72.4, 
77.1%, and 79.3% respectively. The United Kingdom was the country with the fewest 
citizens who believed EU membership is a good thing, with on average, just 39.8% of the 
36 This question in Greece in fact spans 18 years, as Greece did not join the EU until 1981. 
37 For a more comprehensive breakdown of these averages please see the data tables in Appendix One. 
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British population viewing membership positively38. 
A question regarding the feeling of whether one's own state had benefited from 
membership in the EU was also asked. The response was consistent with the previous 
trends (see graph 4.3), but with a lower average than the question regarding EU 
membership as a 'good thing'39 (see graph 4.4). 
Graph 4.4: Belief in whether EU membership is beneficial 
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Again there is a decline in positive attitudes after 1992. This, however, was not the 
feeling amongst all member states. Notably, Ireland, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands 
were amongst the states t.li.at felt that membership had been most beneficial. Greek 
citizens also began to express these views in the 1990's- representing a significant 
increase from the 1980's. Italy's view, although initially high, dropped by nearly 20% 
s111ce 1983, representing the most significant decline and almost the largest deviation 
from feelings regarding membership on the whole. 
38 Denmark also falls significantly below the general average with only 45.5% of people believing that EU 
memberships is a good thing. It should be noted that this average has not been very consistent. This 
question has a standard deviation of 11. Responses to this question have varied greatly over this period 
with the highest level of positive responses appearing in Sept 1992 ( 68%) and the lowest positive responses 
recorded in April 1985 (29%). 
39 The EU average for membership as a 'good thing' was 57.8%. The EU average for whether or not 
membership had been beneficial was 49.9%. 
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The results of such questions present two significant and consistent trends. 
Firstly, attitudes on the whole are positive. Although not always a significant majority, 
the number of EU citizens who appeared to have positive attitudes towards integration 
and membership in the European Union outweighed the percentage of citizens with 
negative feelings. Secondly, these positive attitudes appeared to be largely moderate. 
The decline in strong positive answers in the first two questions is not present amongst 
the moderate attitudes which constitute a noticeable majority in most member states. 
This is noteworthy. Although attitudes appeared to have altered since the creation of 
the 'Union' as opposed to 'Community', this should not be interpreted as a shift against 
integration altogether. Rather one analysis could conclude that the public appear to 
support the Union as a concept, but have reacted against the swift nature with which 
extensive integration has been furthered since the end of the Cold W ar4°. 
To summarise, the responses by national categories display several trends. 
Firstly, only a few countries demonstrated consistently strong support for both 
integration and membership in the Union. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and The 
Netherlands all showed high levels of positive attitudes. Ireland consistently responded 
more positively in the 1990's than in the 1980's. Interestingly, two of the countries that 
dominate European politics and integration, France and Germany, performed relatively 
in line with the European average. One might have expected that these countries, as 
pioneers of integration, might have responded on average higher. Conversely, the United 
Kingdom was, by far, the most negative towards integration and membership. Lastly, 
Denmark stands out as an intriguing case. A large percentage of the Danes appeared to 
be opposed to integration and membership (although not a majority, they did represent a 
large minority). Yet a vast majority actually felt that EU membership has benefited 
Denmark- a response that appears inconsistent when compared to responses to the first 
two questions. 
40 An argument that will be explored with more evidence below. 
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The results portray a relatively positive impression of public opinion regarding 
the EU in most member states. However, this does not in its own right define the 
parametres for actions on the part of the Union elite41 . If the public appear to hold 
moderate/ centre views, the actions ot officials should ultimately reflect these beliefs. 
The possible reaction against the extensive deepening of the Union as a result of the 
Maastdcht Treaty can be taken to imply a problem with elite actions. Thus it is 
hypothesised that the public were in fact reacting against some level of actions which 
were perceived to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of society. 
A Reaction Against Maastricht? 
The percentage of the population that would have voted to ratify Maastricht in 1992 and 
1994 (during four sutveys) were consistently the majority in most member states (see 
graph 4.5). Only the United Kingdom possessed a majority that was opposed to ratifying 
the Maastricht Treaty in all three sutveys. Danish citizens initially responded against 
ratifying Maastricht, but this turned into a reasonable majority by the end of 1993. 
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Graph 4.5: Average percentage in favour of ratification 
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41 As relates to the second factor of legitimacy. 
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This initially appears to discredit the hypothesis that people appear to believe that the 
actions of the EU elite through Maastricht are not congruent with their beliefs and 
values. Yet this answer is too simplistic. The Maastricht Treaty encompasses many 
aspects of European politics. Therefore, with an exploration of one of the major policy 
issues of encompassed in the Treaty it may be possible to gain insight in to the more 
complex nature of the issue. 
Economic Monetary Union (EMU) is one highly contentious policy that was 
included in the Maastricht Treaty. Described by some as the main achievement of the 
IGC, the objectives, timetable, and conditions for the achievement of monetary union 
were set out in the Treaty (Duff, 1994, p. 20). The significance of EMU as a case study is 
that it is a classic illustration of the European debate. From a federalist perspective 
monetary U111on signifies great strides towards deeper integration. For 
intergovernmentalists however, EMU represents a significant loss of national 
sovereignty. Hence, monetary Union presents an area in which public opinion allows 
permits understanding of attitudes towards integration as a whole. 
From the time of the Intergovernmental Conference which first saw the creation 
of the Treaty on European Union, the Eurobarometre has asked questions concerning the 
major policy areas to be included in the Treaty. In all years except 1997, a moderate 
majority of European citizens responded that they were in favour of a single currency 
(see graph 4.6). 
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Yet, there was still a strong dissenting minority opposed to moneta1y union. This 
opposition was concentrated specifically in Denmark, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom42. Germany's opposition stands out as unusual; the traditionally pan-European 
leader of integration was to be found agreeing with the Euro-sceptic nations. This 
German dissent is in part due to the consistent worry of "inflationary consequences of 
European moneta1y institutions" (I(altenthaler, 1997, p. 91) and "an emotional 
attachment to the D-mark" (The Economist, 25.01.97, p. 45). As stated in The Economist 
"Germans loathe the prospect oflosing their beloved D-mark" (The Economist, 13.12.97, 
p. 51). This disapproval was not helped by the problems centring on the Central Bank in 
1997-a debate surrounding "France's wish to have the Euro managed in the 'political' 
French manner rather than the independent German one" (The Econontist, 25.01.97, p. 
45). However, despite the lack of public support the public did accept moneta1y Union 
as inevitable (The Economist, 25.01.97, p. 45; The Economist, 13.12.97, p. 51). 
The strongest support for EMU could be found in Belgium, France, Greece, 
Ireland, and Italy. Luxembourg, which traditionally responded with strong pro-
European views did not have high levels of support until 1997. The result of this divide 
42 The Denmark and the United Kingdom both possessed a strong majority of citizens that were opposed 
to EMU. Germany citizens appeared to be relatively divided evenly on the issue. The mid 1990's saw the 
opponents to El'vIU in the majority, but the proponents became the majority from 1998 onward. 
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between strong support and strong opposition results in a misleading EU average. The 
strong dissenting minority increased due to the concentration of opposition, particularly 
in Denmark and the United Kingdom, a trend that is largely in line with other responses 
to Eurobarornetre questions. Therefore, with the exclusion of these two countries and 
Germany, a high level of support is evident amongst the remaining member states. This 
indicates thus far that the European public, as a whole, were not reacting against the 
major policies in the Maastricht Treaty (such as EMU), but rather a few traditionally 
'Euro-sceptic' countries were namely responsible for negative responses to Union elite. 
Another area in which support for Maastricht may have been concentrated is the 
desire for greater democracy in the EU. The Maastricht Treaty presented possible 
remedies to the democratic deficit that is argued to exist in the Union. The problems of 
representation and accountability were addressed through such measures as the increased 
role of the European Parliament and European Court of Justice43 • Attitudes towards the 
workings of democracy within the EU may in fact provide insight to this issue. 
Within the European Union as a whole, the percentage of those who were fairly 
satisfied with democracy in the EU was nearly on par with those that appear to be not 
ve1y satisfied (see graph 4.7). 
43 See Duff, 1994, p. 19-35 for an outline of the major reforms encompassed in the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Graph 4.7: Satisfaction with democracy in the EU 
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Further, those who were not at all satisfied surpass those who are very satisfied with 
democracy in the Union. On the whole when these figures are conflated into satisfied 
and not satisfied this shows an overall dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in 
the European Union (see graph 4.8). 
Graph 4.8: Satisfaction with democracy in the EU (conflated) 
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The relationship between the public's attitudes towards democracy and the actual 
democratic reforms made under Maastricht are interesting. It has already been noted 
that the ratification of Maastricht meant that several steps were taken to rectify the 
democratic deficit. Yet, from the time of these reforms there was a decline in the 
satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. There are two plausible 
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explanations for this. Firstly, it is possible that the public were dissatisfied with these 
reforms and therefore became further disillusioned with the democratic workings of the 
Union. However, the second explanation is that this decline was an emotive response, 
not one based on knowledge of the reforms. The opposition to Maastricht that created 
difficulties in the ratification process was well publicised. The consequence of such 
publicity may well have been a misunderstanding of the true issues and reforms in 
Maastricht resulting in an ill-informed public that continued to hold negative images of 
Union democracy. In the last Eumbaranetre the trend was reversed, however. This can 
perhaps be attributed to the resignation of the Commission that demonstrated the 
increased accountability to Parliament. 
In the overall analysis no significant majority could be observed that was satisfied 
with democracy in the European Union. This is important to the analysis of legitimacy. 
It was established in Chapter Three that the democratic deficit undermines the second 
factor of legitimacy and that a sizeable dissenting minority also undermines any claims of 
consent. Therefore, the effects of such dissatisfaction with democracy in the European 
Union are significant in this analysis. However, this must be read with caution. 
Franklin et al argued that feelings towards national governments affect views of 
the European Union. In analysing attitudes towards democracy this trend appears in the 
majority of member states. Respondents were asked separately their satisfaction levels 
with democracy in their own countries. In more than half the countries the results to 
this question and the question of democracy in the EU are similar. This in turn means 
that while dissatisfaction with democracy is indeed important to address, the issue is 
slightly more complex. Hence, yet again this means that the effects on the analysis of 
legitimacy are telling, but not complete. At this juncture, it is apparent that citizens 
identify some level of deficit in the workings of democracy. The ideal model noted the 
potential for the European Parliament to rectify this problem, as elected representatives 
the Parliament may provide greater means for accountability, authorisation and 
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representation. Hence, in order to assess whether this negativity towards democratic 
workings is detrimental to the EU' s legitimacy it is necessary to understand the public's 
attitudes44 towards the European Parliament as well. 
Accountability to the European Parliament 
The ideal model of legitimacy for the European Union stipulates that accountability is a 
necessary element for EU legitimacy to be considered democratic. As there is only one 
elected body, the European Parliament, it was concluded that non-elected representatives 
should be accountable to those officials who were chosen as representatives, the MEPs, 
by the European public. However, while this is the ideal for the democratic 
governmental model of legitimacy in the EU, is this truly favoured by the public? It has 
been reported that the European Parliament has a less than favourable reputation. For 
example, 1he Economist has described the Parliament as "a body that rivals the 
Commission when it comes to sleaze and waste" and MEPs as "hardly models of 
financial rectitude" (1he Econcmist, 16.01.99, p. 49-50). If the public holds a view of the 
Parliament that is in line with such a reputation, can the EP claim to truly represent the 
public? And if this is the case, should the EP possess further powers to act as a check on 
the EU executive? Furthermore, does the European public actually desire a greater role 
for the European Parliament (which would be necessary to check executive powers 
adequately)? If it does not, this could sufficiently call into question this element of the 
second factor of ideal European legitimacy. 
The first question asked in the Eurobarometre regarding the European Parliament 
concerned awareness. When the public were asked whether they had "in recent times 
read or heard anything about" the European Parliament, the trend, not surprisingly, 
reflects increased exposure of the EP in election years (see graph 4.9). 
44 Which is different to real knowledge of the workings of parliament and democracy in general in the 
European Union. 
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Graph 4.9: Percentage of people who have heard of the European 
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The peak responses of the percentage of citizens who had heard of the Parliament 
appeared during election years45 . In between elections, the number of people who 
responded no was often the majority. Interestingly, Italy and Luxembourg, two 
countries with relatively strong public support for the EU, showed the greatest awareness 
of the EP. The more telling aspect of this question was the impression of the Parliament 
held by those that had heard of it. 
The majority of the EU citizens from 1986 onward had a favourable impression 
of the Parliament. Unfortunately, this question was not asked after 1993 and it is 
difficult to therefore assess the impression of the EP in the post-Maastricht era46 (see 
graph 4.10). 
45 \v'ith the exception of 1994. There is a steady increase of yes response in 1994, but these actually reach 
their peak in the year following the election, 1995. 
46 As well, it is difficult to see any cotrelation between elections and impressions due to the years the 
question was asked. 
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Graph 4.10: Impression of the European Parliament amongst all member states 
80 
70 ---i-------------------------1,------~1 




20 favourabe or 
1 O unfavourable 




This average though is misleading in some regard as there are great variations ill 
individual national responses, but similarities amongst some countries are still evident. 
Until the late 1980's/ early 1990's, those that had a favourable impression of the EP were 
in fact in the minority in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. However, in most instances the countries now all have a majority, 
although slim in some instances, that hold a favourable impression of the EP47• 
National media can often influence impressions and awareness and therefore, 
although insightful, these results should be accepted with caution. The overall 
information to be taken from these questions is the general trend towards more 
favourable impressions of the EP in all member states, despite national variations48. 
Beyond impressions of the Parliament, desired role for the EP is also enlightening and 
aids understanding of the public's attitude towards their elected European 
representatives. 
47 Denmark has had extremely close responses in the 1990's. A slim majority held favourable impressions 
in 1990 and April 1991. From October 1991 onward Denmark remained the only country in which the 
majority held an unfavourable impression. 
48 Greece, Ireland, and Italy all possess significantly higher levels of positive impressions of the EP than 
other member states. 
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Consistently the public response has been a desire for a more important role for 
the European Parliament (see graph 4.11). This opinion peaked in 1991 and declined 
steadily after this time. 
Graph 4.11: Desired role for the EP amongst all member states 
80 ----------- ----------·--··-···-------·------------------, 
70 -+---------111111---------------lll!II 
GI 60 ~r---ilc--:---:--------j..,,_..-,-----------J 
Cl f 50 
Gl40-+---------------~-.F-~ 
t:! 8, 30 
10 ~cio:,&.,.....~..=;;;~~'fi~cr:;a 
o-+--~-~-~--~-~-~-~--
Apr- Apr- Apr- Apr- Apr- Apr- Apr- Apr- Apr-











An interesting trend to note is the affect that elections appear to have on the desired role 
for the Parliament. There is a consistent decline amongst those who desire a more 
important role for the EP during election years, with generally an increase in the desire 
for the role to be about the same. It is possible that the increased exposure that result 
from elections have an affect on the impress.ion of the role of Parliament. Hence, it is 
plausible that if the Parliament was consistently a prominent figure to the public the 
desired role for the Parliament may change. 
One explanation regarding the decline in opinion after 1991 may lie in the 
increased role that the EP gained under both the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. It 
is possible that this increased role was satisfacto1y for a percentage of the population and 
contributes to a slight overall increase in those who felt the role should remain about the 
same. However, there was also a slight increase in the percentage of the people who 
would prefer to see a less important role for the Parliament during the mid 1990's. This 
66 
returned to previous percentages during the last few surveys. Another possible 
explanation may lie with media exposure. It was noted that elections affect the desired 
role of Parliament and this may be a consequence of media exposure. Thus, it is possible 
that the EP has had greater exposure in the 1990's and this instigated a decline in the 
desire for a greater role. Yet, this is a highly tentative explanation as there is not a 
significant increase in the percentage of people who 'have heard of the parliament' during 
this period (refer back to graph 4.9). Nonetheless, a majority of people feel that the 
Parliament deserves an increased role. ln combination with the feeling of dissatisfaction 
with the way democracy works in the EU, it would perhaps be fair to say that the 
European people are calling for greater accountability, authorisation, and representation 
in the Union. 
This does not however explain the overall decline in support for the European 
Union in the 1990's. The hypothesis that 'the decline in popular support for unification 
is a reaction against some level of actions which were perceived to be not in accordance 
with the values and beliefs of society' has not yet been fully explored. It is clear that the 
Maastricht Treaty is not the cause of this decline. The democratic deficit does appear to 
be of concern to European citizens, but this was present before the decline. Therefore, 
while the view of democracy most probably is reflected in the declining opinion, it is 
necessary to understand if there are many other areas which may have contributed to the 
incremental loss of public support as well49 • 
As a result of the above examination it appears that the EU is indeed failing to 
meet the criteria of the second factor of the ideal model of legitimacy for Europe in 
some regards. While attitudes towards integration are positive, attitudes towards 
democracy and the EP indicate that some disjunction exists between the actions of the 
EU elite and the beliefs of the European people. The evaluation of EMU appeared to 
49 The actions of the European Union in Bosnia and Kosovo were publicised failures of EU foreign policy 
and could be one an example of one such issue which contributed to declining public support. 
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demonstrate that the explanation that this disjunction is in reaction to Maastricht is too 
simplistic and misguided. Two conclusions regarding the second factor of legitimacy can 
therefore be reached at this stage. Firstly, while most member states are positive towards 
integration and major policy directions, there is a concentration of opposition in a few 
member states that affects the overall congruency between elite actions and the values 
and beliefs of the European public. As this opposition indeed represents large majorities 
in individual states, it is arguable that whole nations opposed to elements of elite action 
undermine this factor of legitimacy50. Secondly, the apparent belief in a need for a more 
representative democratic Union also undermines the second factor of legitimacy, in 
which it was noted that authorisation, accountability, and representation were important 
for a legitimate democratic government. Therefore, while in many ways the Union can 
demonstrate apparent congruence between elite action and societal values and beliefs, 
these two conclusions prevent one from arguing that there is net a legitimacy crisis in the 
European Union. 
A Comparison with Hewstone 
The study undertaken by Hewstone m 1986 analysed several similar questions. A 
comparison between his conclusions and those reached above may provide further 
insight into the issue of popular attitudes and thus the status of popular legitimacy in the 
European Union. Despite the length of time between the research, such a comparison is 
useful; this length of time can be viewed as beneficial in some regard. The conclusions 
of this thesis will ultimately be re-enforced and strengthened if Hewstone identifies 
similar attitudes. Comparing results with Hewstone will also facilitate analysis of any 
significant shifts in attitudes. Identification of past changes of attitude trends enables the 
formulation of substantive predictions about attitudes that affect legitimacy. 
so It has consistently been accepted that minority opposition is acceptable, if not expected, amongst the 
overall population and therefore should not be considered detrimental to legitimacy. However, since the 
European Union remains an amalgamation of many different citizeruy, whole nations showing opposition 
is to be considered a significant dissenting minority that has the potential to undermine legitimacy. 
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Hewstone's Eurobaromet:re analysis begins with the same question as this chapter: 
'In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?'. In 
accordance with the conclusion above, he construes that the results "reveal a vast level of 
broad popular support for a united Europe" (Hewstone, 1986, p. 24). He also notes that 
the United Kingdom is distinct due to their lower levels of support, yet there is still "net 
support" which(p. 24). Hewstone describes that "although the British may be negative 
about the Common Market [sic], they cannot accurately be described as non- or anti-
European" (p.24). 
However, this question has dealt with the general idea of integration and more 
specific questions reveal a slightly less positive outlook. Hewstone next examined the 
responses to the question regarding Community membership as a 'good' or 'bad thing' 
and states that "support for this more specific form of European polity is not as high as 
that for a the general idea of European unification" (p.28). Again, a similar conclusion 
was reached in the analysis here. 
Hewstone's preliminaiy conclusion that he made at this juncture is worth noting 
for comparison. He asserts that the "picture is not as bleak as has sometime been 
painted" (p. 26). The overall trend was positive, but not exceedingly so. This supports 
the findings of this thesis after the same questions, meaning that there has been little 
change in the trend- neither in a positive direction nor negative. 
Hewstone also examines attitudes towards the European Parliament. During this 
he notes that it can "be seen as the most-supra-national and democratic of the 
Community's institutions, as well as the one closest to the citizens" and is therefore has 
been an important area of study in the Eurobaromet:re (p. 35). The results 'reveal a strong 
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backing for this institution' (p.35). However, this is qualified by Hewstone when he notes 
that a high proportion (but not necessarily majority) of citizens in each state expect 
MEP's to support national interests 'whether or not they are good for Europe' (p. 35-36). 
However, there was still a majority in all countries examined, except the UK, that felt 
MEP's should act in the best interest of Europe (p. 36). 
The overall conclusions that Hewstone reached from his study of the 
Eurobarometre are also in accordance with those made thus far in this thesis. Firstly he 
states that there is a "broad consensus on several issues- most importantly, the 
unification of European and support for Community [sic] membership" (p. 37). 
However, "if support for the Community [sic] is tangible, it must be kept in perspective" 
(p. 37). Through the use of some questions which were not included above51 
Hewstone ascertained that while "support for Europe may be evident and 
stable ... Europe and the Community [sic] are not psychologically salient52" (p. 37). The 
overall impression left from the analysis is, again, the same as presented here: 
"respondents are characterised neither by enthusiasm nor hostility" (p. 37). In summary, 
"public opinion is less pro-European than the integrationist might like, but not as hostile 
as they may fear" (p. 37). 
51 Although one of Hewstone's questions is used in Chapter Five. Some of the remaining questions were 
not asked in the 1990's and therefore not included in the primary research of this thesis. 
52 Hewstone also suggests Handley 1981 for further discussion of this point. 
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As for the concentration of opposition as discussed above, the same observation 
is made by Hewstone as well. While Hewstone did not include Denmark in his study, he 
notes the uniqueness of British attitudes. He comments that "public opinion in the UK 
is, and always has been, less positive than in ... other ... countries .... opinion in the UK is 
obviously much more capricious" (p. 28). Hewstone makes the important point that 
this is not overall disapproval of integration because the British "do support the loose 
notion of European unification, but they appear unsure or unconvinced that the 
Common Market (as they like to call it) is the best means of bringing it about" (p. 38). 
Consequently, "the British are not anti-European, but they are net pro-Community [sic]" 
(p. 38). 
It is clear that the conclusions reached thus far in this thesis are in accordance 
with the findings of Hewstone in 1986. The implication of this for future patterns of 
public opinion can be seen as significant. There has been little change in the overall 
conclusions that can be reached from the Eurobarometre in fifteen years. Supporters of 
integration would have hoped for an increase in the enthusiasm of the public. Yet, the 
public do not appear any more enthusiastic at the turn of the century than they did 
before the end of the cold war, despite vast deepening and widening of the Union. Yet, 
this is not entirely negative. The speed with which integration has progressed in the 
1990's could have incited an extreme reaction. This is clearly not the case. Although 
there has been a decline of support to some extent, the overall trend of what appears to 
be indifference continues amongst most of the European public. This does however beg 
the question as to why such indifference remains despite vast attempts to become more 
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accessible to the public (through such measures as voting for the Parliament, creation of 
symbols such as a flag and anthem, funded EP campaigns to promote the EU, etc.)53. 
This is continued indifference is significant for the future of legitimacy. It is 
difficult to credibly state that the Union can expect any rise in public support in the near 
future as a result of such findings. Consequently, if it is ultimately concluded that there is 
a legitimacy crisis in the European Union, than there is little evidence that this will be 
rectified in the foreseeable future. However, such a conclusion cannot be reached until 
all aspects of the popular legitimacy have been examined. Thus it is necessary to now 
turn to voter turnout to complete the examination of the state of legitimacy in the 
European Union. 
Voter Turnout 
The final factor of legitimacy lies with evidence of consent. The ideal model of 
legitimacy for the European Union states that elections for the European Parliament 
provide an adequate forum for the expression of consent by European citizens. Voting 
for the European Parliament began in 1979. Since this time voter turnout has decreased 
each year. The gradual decline is presented in Graph 4.12, shown below. Upon initial 
viewing, this decline appears ominous for the examination of legitimacy. The 'consent' 
seems to be declining. However, to talce the figures at face value would be misguided. 
Given the positive attitudes towards integration discussed above, it is one further 
hypothesis of this thesis that voting is an inadequate measure of consent at the supra-
national level. 
53 A question that will be addressed to some degree throughout the remainder of this thesis. To tty and 
answer the question entirely would detract for the larger question of legitimacy and therefore will remain 
an implicit argument throughout. 
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Graph 4.12: EU voter turnout 
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A breakdown of voting statistics in individual countries demonstrates that this 
trend of declining voter turnout is not uniform amongst all member states54. Of the ten 
original voting member states Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg have all had a fairly 
consistent voter turnout since 197955. Voting in Ireland and The Netherlands is 
characterised instead by volatility56 during the same period. Beyond stability, actual 
percentage of voter turnout varies significantly between member states. Belgium voter 
turnout is the highest average at 90.8%57. On the opposite end the United Kingdom has 
the lowest voter turnout with only 27.8% participation on average (see graph 4.13 for 
examples of these comparisons). Clearly these variations demonstrate that 
generalisations about the voting patterns in the European Union are flawed. 
54 A comparison of European voting to national voting which will provide some further insight into this 
variation will be explored below. 
55Defined for the purposes of this paper as a standard deviation of less than or equal to 3. 
56Ireland has a standard deviation of 10.6 and The Netherlands is the highest of the ten states with a 
standard deviation of 11.2. 
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These variations in voter turnout appear problematic in examining consent at the 
European level. One of the initial examples that supports this is the high level of voter 
turnout in Belgium and Luxembourg. At the outset the average turnout of 90.8% for 
Belgium and 87.4% for Luxembourg indicates popular consent. However, this portrayal 
is significantly called into question by the fact that both Belgium and Luxembourg have 
mandatmy voting58• Compare this to the attitudes of these nations to unification and 
EU membership and voter turnout is even further questionable (see graphs 4.14 and 
4.15). 
Graph 4.14: Relationship between voter turnout and 
attitudes towards integration in Belgium 

















--11111-- "°ter turnout 
--- ~---~------------------------









Graph 4.15: Relationship between voter turnout and 
attitudes towards integration in Luxembourg 
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_.... voter turnout 
Whilst the voter turnout in Luxembourg is in line with the belief that 
membership in the European Union is good, Belgium is less consistent. Therefore, it 
presents the question of whether the mandatory voter turnout in Belgium has more of an 
influence over voting than actual attitudes towards the Union. During the 1995 national 
elections a "growing apathy towards the obligato1-y vote" appeared amongst the Belgian 
electorate (Down, 1996, p. 171). Two in five voters reported that they would not vote if 
it were not required by law (p. 171). If it can be assumed that this apathy extends to 
European elections as well, then the evidence of consent is in fact undermined and in 
fact falsely represented through voter turnout. 
On the opposite end of the spectrnm is The Netherlands. The Netherlands 
remains exceedingly high in response to questions regarding EU membership as a good 
thing, almost on par "vith Luxembourg. However their voter turnout reached a 
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significantly low level in 1999 of 29.9%, surpassed only by the traditionally low turnout 
of the United Kingdom (see graph 4.16). 
Graph 4.16: Relationship between voter turnout and 
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--- v0ter turnout 
Such examples demonstrate that any correlation between attitudes and voter 
turnout is tentative at best. As highlighted in the case of Belgium, external influences, 
such as national voting policy, may account for greater influence in voting behaviour 
than public opinion. In fact national issues have typically dominated European elections 
since 1979 (T. Smith, 1996, p. 276). This national tendency arises due to "the fact that 
European elections [do] not directly lead to a change in government nor to major 
changes of direction in policy making, and the perception of the EP as a powerless 
institution [makes] it difficult to mobilise voters by campaigning on 'European' themes" 
(p. 276). The breakdown of the 1999 election results reflects this strong tendency for 
national attitudes to dominate at the European level. One of the key striking features of 
this election was a general swing to the centre-right. Greece saw their ruling party 
decline in percentage of the vote as a protest to Greek governmental support for NA TO 
bombing of Kosovo. In many other countries voting also could be analysed as protest 
votes against "the way EU governments were running things at home" in that centre-left 
76 
mling parties were 'punished' with votes for the centre-right (The Economist, 19.06.99, p. 
53). Hence, the voting public was using the European fomm to send messages to their 
national governments. 
It is also important to recognise the connection (or lack there of in some cases) 
between voter turnout for national elections and European elections; this may again re-
enforce the idea that national agendas dominate European elections. In the case of 
Belgium, for example it has been argued that mandatoiy voting has the biggest influence 
on voter turnout. This was supported with the evidence that there is little correlation 
between attitudes and turnout. A comparison between voter turnout at national 
elections and European elections also supports this as voter turnout is relatively on par 
(see graph 4.17). This differs from other countries in which there is no mandato1y 
voting in that national voter turnout is often far higher than for European elections59. 
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Graph 4.17: Voter Turnout in Belgium 
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The Netherlands was also highlighted as an interesting case study of voter 
turnout. Above it was shown that there appears to be little correlation between the 
relatively positive opinions on integration and the declining voter turnout. When 
59 See the Appendix Two for turnout levels in various countries 
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comparing this turnout to turnout for national elections the results are interesting (see 
graph 4.18). 
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While the voter turnout is significantly lower for EP elections than national ones, there is 
still an observable similarity in the declining levels of electoral participation. This is 
noteworthy. Although the levels are clearly not reflective of a national trend, the decline 
does appear to be. It can thus be argued that while the low turnout does not necessarily 
reflect national trends the decline may do so. The United Kingdom also shows a similar 
correlation in trends ( see graph 4.19). This further supports the argument that voter 
turnout is dominated by national tendencies. 
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Graph 4.19: Voter Turnout in the United Kingdom 
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Fui-ther, EP elections have been described as second order elections, namely 
from their tendency to more closely resemble local rather than national elections (Reif 
and Schmitt, 1980; Hewstone, 1986; J. Smith, 1996, p. 276; Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 
27). The idea that there is less at stake in EP elections than in national general elections 
meant that citizens are "both less inclined to vote and when they [do] vote, more prone 
to cast protest votes" Q". Smith, 1996, p. 276). Statements and analyses such as these 
stem from the assumption that this low voter turnout is of concern. However there are 
others who would argue differently. 
Elections in the United States are typically characterised by extremely low voter 
tui-nout60 (Lipset 1960). However, on the whole the majority of the population rarely 
attacks the government of the United States as illegitimate. It has been argued that one 
reason for this is a lack of dissatisfaction with the way government operates; it is a 
possibility that non-voting in such Western democracies is actually a reflection of 
stability61 and a response to the decline of major social conflict (p. 217). This is an 
extension of the argument that a radical change to society or direct effect of government 
60 It is accepted that difference political cultures work in different ways-an argument that will be 
highlighted below. 
61 As high levels of voter turnout can be destabilising in some instances 
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policy on individuals ~e government employees) ferments electoral mobilisation (p. 180-
186). Hence a lack of this need to mobilise is reflected in lower voter turnout and thus 
portrays a society that is relatively content with government. 
This is not an argument accepted by all. There are those that still assert that 
democracy is best served by increased participation in that this portrays the consent that 
is desperately needed for democratic government to claim legitimate authority. 
According to this argument "a state in which a large part of the population is apathetic, 
uninterested, and unaware is one in which consent cannot be talcen for granted and in 
which consensus may actually be wealc" (p. 216). The conclusion that Lipset ultimately 
reaches is that democratic societies are actually able to exist with differing levels of 
participation62 • While voting can be a valid form of evidence of consent, Lipset argues 
that it is underlying attitudes that are more important. Understandably, political culture 
can also dictate voting (such as compulsory voting in Belgium) rather than a desire to 
consent to a government and thus the underlying attitudes become equally important. 
He argues that "thus neither high nor low rates of participation and voting are in 
themselves good or bad for democracy; the extent and nature of that participation reflect 
other factors which determine far more decisively the system's chances to develop or 
survive" (p. 219). 
A combination of these arguments ultimately appears to support the hypothesis 
that voter turnout is an inadequate measure of consent. There are several possible 
reasons for this. Firstly, those who would argue that low participation signifies 
satisfaction would theorise that the general population is not overly dissatisfied with the 
working of the Union and therefore does not feel the need to voice European political 
sentiment. However, it has already be shown that there are elements of the Union in 
which the public would like to see reforms, such as the democratic deficit. This 
therefore wealcens this argument. 
62 Including the fact that it is possible to have too much participation 
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A second, more plausible, argument stems from a possible belief in the lack of 
importance of voting for the European Parliament. Since these votes do not influence 
policy, as national votes have the potential to, EU citizens may not be inclined to 
mobilise in support of the Union. There is, after all, no EU government being elected. 
In other words, the public may view the connection between voting and consent as wealt 
in this context. This argument can account for countries in which there is little 
correlation in attitudes and voter turnout, such as The Netherlands. However, it 
excludes countries in which it could be argued that a correlation exits; the United 
Kingdom has the lowest voter turnout and the most negative attitudes towards 
unification. Also, although attitudes remain on the whole positive, there has been an 
observable decline in the 1990's. Thus, this decline could quite possibly have contributed 
to lower voter turnouts in the past two elections. Still, this constant decline of voter 
turnout does not on the whole follow the same patterns as attitudes towards the Union. 
Hence, both arguments are problematic with no clear answers apparent. 
A further problem in considering the role of voting as consent in the European 
Union has been introduced above: the fact of a lack of elected government. The role 
that voting plays within the state framework is more definitive. Elections serve to create 
government. In the case of the European Union this is not the case as there is no 
'government' per se. There are legislative institutions, but intergovernmental co-
operation (which is still strong in the Union) prevents the creation of an independent 
European government. This consequently alters the importance of voting at the supra-
national level. Such lack of importance requires consideration of the role that voting 
should have in the legitimation of the authority of the EU. 
There is, however, too much evidence to the contrary to argue that voter turnout 
1s an accurate representation of public views towards the EU. National issues (and 
national voter turnout in some cases) dominate European elections- an important point 
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that can influence the motivations behind votes. Also, the process of voting varies in 
each country. It has already been put forth that mandatory voting in Belgium effects 
voter turnout. Lastly, voting patterns appear largely inconsistent with public attitudes in 
various countries. This affects the connection to consent, particularly when voter 
turnout is below levels of support. The implication for legitimacy is complex as a result. 
Based on the model constructed from the theoretical literature, sufficient eudence of 
consent cannot be attained. Thus the examination must focus on whether any evidence 
of consent beyond the theoretical framework may be observed. The result of opinion 
surveys would suggest that some level of consent exists in most member states63 . Hence, 
can a form of consent other than voting apply in the EU, or this assumption wrong? 
Does the European public simply not consent to the authority of the European Union? 
The implication for EU legitimacy 
Contemporary views of the legitimacy crisis in the European Union are problematic. 
Descriptions of a lack of popular support appear to be overstated. Such arguments rely 
on difficulties in treaty ratification and low voter turnout. Yet these examples are argued 
to have been influenced by issues beyond public opinion, namely national policy. 
Furthermore, a relatively positive attitude towards the European Union appears to be 
expressed throughout relevant Eurobarometre questions. Rather the opposition described 
by legitimacy critics appears to be concentrated in a minority of member states (i.e. 
Denmark and the United Kingdom). It has been consistently argued that low levels of 
opposition can not be viewed as serious threats to legitimacy because unanimous support 
remains an unattainable ideal. As long as these opponents remain a small minority any 
threats to legitimacy are thwarted. However, opposition by whole nations constitutes a 
larger force than minority opposition. As a result, the hypothesis that 'based on the 
review of legitimacy literature, there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union' is not 
supported. However, while the legitimacy crisis has been overstated, there are still 
elements in which legitimacy problems do exist. The task for the European elite is to 
63 The United Kingdom is certainly an exception to this. 
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identify why vast concentrations of opposition lie within a few member states when 
other member states report exceptionally high levels of support. Any further problems 
in this area can certainly result in a legitimacy crisis in the EU. A key element of legitimacy 
is that government actions must be congruent with the values and beliefs of society. If 
the evidence portrays that some sections of the public are beginning to question this due 
to the extensive deepening of the Union legitimacy seems to demand that the elite curb 
the speed towards elements of a neo-functional Europe or discover a means by which 
the public will not find this speed threatening to their values and beliefs. Since 
accountability and representation contribute to the congruence of actions, responsiveness 
to the public's desire for a greater role for the EP may be a means of achieving this. 
This will not, however, entirely resolve this problem of the EU claiming 
legitimate authority, as there is a lack of evidence of consent. If there is simply a lack of 
consent for integration, a legitimate Union can never be claimed. However, public 
opinion would indicate that this is most unlikely. Instead the task for both the EU and 
social scientists studying its legitimacy is to understand what evidence may be used to 
adequately represent consent. Clearly the state-centric framework is too limiting for this 
element of legitimacy. Although evidence of consent is still necessary in some regard the 
state centric evidence, such as voting, is inadequate due to dissimilar contexts64. Thus it 
is necessary to extend conceptions of consent beyond state models. 
The deeper examination of popular legitimacy that has been carried out thus far 
has enabled several hypotheses to be addressed. The outcome has resulted in several 
remaining problems for the legitimacy of the European Union. The focus of analysis 
must now turn to possible solutions for the problems of finding para.metres for elite 
actions and evidence of consent. 




In the previous chapters common notions of popular legitimacy within the European 
Union have been called into question. The problems that still face the EU in fulfilling 
the requirements for democratic legitimacy within a neo-functionalist framework are in 
large part connected to the values and beliefs of the European Public. Many argue that 
the solutions to such problems lie within the realm of identity. It is not enough to feel 
that European membership is a 'good thing'; rather, these theorists argue, that 
identification with Europe would provide a much stronger base for legitimation of the 
Union65. 
Identity and Legitimacy 
The role for identity in legitimating political power stems largely from the concept of 'the 
people'. In Chapter Four the role of 'the people' in the process of legitimation was 
explored. As the authority of the people in bestowing legitimacy arose, the notion that 
these people be socially unified began to appear in force: "whether expressed as 'nation' 
or 'people', reference to some recognisably bounded and internally integrated population 
was integral to the modern notion of popular will and public opinion ... it was important 
that the 'people' be (or at least be seen as) socially integrated" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 71). 
Habermas' argument can be used to further support this connection when he states "the 
claim to legitimacy is related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively 
determined social identity. Legitimations serve to make good this claim, that is to show 
how and why existing ( or recommended) institutions are fit to employ political power in 
such a way that the values constitutive for the identity of the society will be realised" 
65The need to examine the role of identity in legitimating the EU only becomes necessary when dealing 
largely within a neo-functionalist framework. It has already been noted that in an intergovernmental 
framework the EU and its authority can rightfully be considered legitimate. Hence the appeal to an 
identity is unnecessary within this context. Furthermore, a European identity is and should remain 
secondary to an intergovernrnentalist whereas the nation-state, and with this the national identity, are 
paramount. 
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(H:abermas, 1979, p. 182-183). Popular support is thus a reciprocal relationship. When 
the collective will of the identity unit is satisfied by the actions of government the 
government thus attains the popular support needed to carry out policy. 
Such popular support ultimately lies at the heart of any analysis of legitimacy 
because legitimacy essentially "focuses on the question of whether people feel a sense of 
obligation to an order" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 194). Appeal to a collective identity is an 
appeal to this sense of obligation. In practical terms, any sense of obligation to a 
government can translate into obedience. The collective identity is important to this 
obedience because "procedures of democratic decision making, especially that of 
majority decision, require sufficient trust between citizens for them to accept that being 
out-voted does not constitute a threat to· their identity or essential interests" (Beetham 
and Lord, 1998, p. 33). This trust is a greater likelihood within a collective identity than 
within a fragmented society. Weiler describes the rationale in this argument in that "a 
minority will/ should accept the legitimacy of a majority decision because both majority 
and minority are part of the same demos, the same people" (Weiler, 1997, p. 116). 
Consequently, it is clear that a collective identity contributes greatly to the 
legitimation of government. A government that acts in accordance with values of the 
identity will meet the second factor of legitimacy. Popular support can thus be expected, 
as articulated above, consequently providing consent that meets the third factor of 
legitimacy. Hence, if a government has legally acquired power and represents a cohesive 
collective identity it should ultimately become legitimate. 
The 'nation' as 'the people' 
The 'nation' did not originally appear in the above concepts as the only collective identity 
able to legitimate authority. Originally nations "in the ~lassie usage ... are communities of 
people of the same descent, who are integrated geographically, in the form of settlements 
or neighbourhoods, and culturally by their common language, customs and traditions, 
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but who are not yet politically integrated in the form of state organisation" (Habermas, 
1992, p. 3). However, "with rise of claims to popular sovereignty and republican rule, 
the notions of nation and people were increasingly intertwined" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 74). 
As the nation came to be more closely associated with justifiable political rule nationalists 
emerged asserting that this was the only legitimate form of political rule. The result was 
the emergence of a form of nationalism, described by Gellner as "primarily a political 
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" 
(Gellner, 1983, p. 1). 
state: 
It is important to note however, that this emergence was distinct from that of the 
"nations and states are not the same conting:ncy. Nationalism 
holds that they u:ere destined for each other; that either without 
the odJer is incomplete, and constitutes a tragxly .... [but] their 
emeiwzce mis independent and continwit The state has 
certainly emerwl, without the hdp of the nation. Some nations 
hare certainly emergxi without the blessings of their mm state. " 
(Gellner, 1983, p. 6) 
As Smith reminds us, despite the need for states to be legitimated by the nation in 
modern times, the focus and content of the two remain quite distinct (A. Smith, 1991, p. 
5). 
But as nationalism became "a theoiy of political legitimacy, which requires that 
ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1), the nation 
became the means by which the people could claim the right of self-determination and 
government in their interests (Calhoun, 1997, p. 75). To Calhoun, "a crucial thread in 
the development of nationalism was the idea- and eventually the tal(en-for-granted, gut 
level conviction- that political power could only be legitimate when it reflected the will, 
or at least served the interests, of the peoples subject to it" (p. 69). Thus the classic 
usage of the term nation no longer applied and "changed from designating a pre-political 
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entity to something that was supposed to play a constitutive role in defining the political 
identity of the citizen within a democratic polity" (Habermas, 1992, p. 3). 
Identification with the nation has thus become a primary mode of identification 
used to legitimate government. This national identity politically appears to act as the 
base for the state and its institutions (A. Smith, 1991, p. 16). Smith argues that "the most 
salient political function of national identity is its legitimation of the common legal rights 
and duties of legal institutions, which define the peculiar values and character of the 
nation66 ••• • The appeal to national identity has become the main legitimation for social 
order and solidarity today" (p. 16). As stated by Obradovic, a nation will thus support a 
government "when the government process displays a commitment to and actively 
guarantees values that are part of the particular national identity, i.e. of the general 
political culture of the people" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 195). 
For the European Union, the problems of legitimacy that have been exposed 
throughout this thesis may benefit from the existence of a European 'national' identity. It 
has been asserted throughout this thesis that democratic legitimacy requires the consent 
of the people, and it has been shown above that this has traditionally arisen through 
identification with a nation. Hence, it has been recognised by some authors that a 
European identity could aid the legitimation of the authority of the European Union. 
Llobera explicitly argues that "the success of The European Union will require the 
development of European identity" (Llobera, 1993, p. 78). Deflem and Pampel explain 
that some view "the growth of postnational identity as reducing national self-interest in 
determining views of European unification" (Deflem and Pampel, 1996, p. 120-121). 
Also, Habermas argues that a European identity is necessary for successful integration 
because this may enable national interests to be overcome by creating a sense of 
obligation to the Union. (Habermas, 1992, p.8-9) 
66 These values and characteristics of the nation will remain undefined at present. Discussion of vaiying 
views of the nation, which tal~e these elements into account will be discussed below. 
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The idea of a European nation 
The reduction of national self-interest as described above is key to the concept of 
European unification. It is well documented that the creation of the ECSC was, in part, 
reaction to the perceived terrors of nationalism Federalists, such as Monnet, who had 
significant influence on the initial shape of integration, were strong opponents of the 
negative power of the nation. Nationalism was identified as the cause of the World Wars 
and considered to be an ongoing threat to peace (H:olland, 1993, p. 6). Monnet himself 
equated nationalism with a 'spirit of domination' (p. 9). Some argued that by creating a 
new centre of loyalty the damaging effects of nationalism could be overridden. Under 
the original functionalist theoty" "individuals are gradually weaned away from their 
allegedly irrational nationalistic impulses toward a self-reinforcing ethos of co-operation" 
(Pentland cited in Holland, 1993, p. 6). The extension of this 'ethos of co-operation' 
becomes the basis of a homogenous European collective67. Arguably, through the 
categorisation as a 'European' above all else, the nations of Europe could unite as one 
and eradicate nationalism as a threat to peace. 
To formulate an idea of a European nation to replace the nations and 
nationalism that brought war to the continent during the Twentieth Centuty" requires 
some understanding of what constitutes a nation. However, a literal understanding of 
'the nation' is not reached easily and without debate. For example, Seton-Watson was 
"driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised; yet 
the phenomenon has existed and exists" (Seton-Watson, 1977 ,p. 5). Thus, such an 
intellectual debate will not be undertal~en here as this would detract from the initial 
purpose of discussing the nation. Rather, various interpretations of the components of a 
nation will be presented as foundations for the concept of a European nation. 
67This should not be taken to mean that functionalist theorists by definition would argue for the creation 
of a European nation. Rather, the functionalist argument was a catalyst for early pioneers who argued for 
supranational identity. 
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To some authors ethnicity is a key component of a nation. Walker Connor 
argues that many uses of the term nation are incorrect because nation should refer solely 
to "a kinship group" with "shared blood" and not a shared state68 (Connor, 1978, p. 
380). Ethnicity, Connor argues, is thus ultimately important to nationhood; a nation is a 
self-aware ethnic group in his view (p.388). Smith also presents an argument regarding 
the relationship betvveen ethnicity and nation, although differing from Connor. In 
Smith's view, an ethnie precedes the nation and it is the various processes that the etl:nie 
goes through that ultimately leads to the development of the nation. Processes such as 
politicisation of the ethnie, the secularisation of society, autarchy and territorialisation, 
mobilisation and inclusion, and the manner in which the nation is imagined contribute to 
this development. (A. Smith, 1986, p. 153-173). Therefore, while ethnicity is important 
to the creation of nation, an ethnie does not automatically constitute a nation. Further, a 
nation stems from factors other than just ethnicity. Smith hence argues that ideas of a 
nation are fundamentally cultural and social. This identity refers to cultural and political 
bonds that united the community, a community of shared myths, memories, symbols 
and traditions (A. Smith, 1992, p. 62). 
Calhoun also attributes the creation of a nation to many things69 • He states that 
"nations are made by internal processes of struggle, communication, political 
participation, road building, education, history writing and economic development as 
well as by campaigns against external enemies" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 75). 
One of the other elements of a nation discussed in literature is the type of 
community. The concept of nations as imagined communities arises in Smith's 
discussion but originates in the work of Benedict Anderson. Anderson argues that the 
nation is "an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited 
and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). The term imagined sterns from the fact that even 
68 for example he argues that International Relations should in fact be Interstate Relation, etc 
69 although this should not be taken to mean that Calhoun agrees with Smith 
89 
the "smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 6). This 
community is limited because even the largest nation will have a finite, although at times 
elastic, boundary, beyond which other nations lie (p. 6). A nation is a community 
because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (p. 7). 
Culture is also discussed in nationalism literature as a vital component of the 
nation. Gellner specifically states that "two men are of the same nation if and only if 
they share the same culture". (Gellner, 1983, p. 7). He elaborates upon this argument 
when he states that nationalism is a "consequence of a new form of social organisation, 
based on deeply internalised education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its 
own state" (48). He argues that the cultural roots of a nation stem from the general 
imposition of a high culture on society. This "local high Qiterate, specialist transmitted) 
culture" will have some links to the "earlier local folk styles and dialects" with symbolism 
"drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants" (p. 57). Consequently, 
the nationalist belief that nationalism "conquers in the name of putative folk culture" can 
be perpetuated (p. 57). 
Clearly, nationalism literature, of which the above is only a selection, has 
encompassed many different arguments about what constitutes a nation. For the 
purposes of this discussion a 'nation' is understood as a 'synthesis' of a number of 
perspectives "incorporat[ing] political and cultural dimensions" (Hutchinson and Smith, 
1994, p. 4). 
The existence of a European nation based upon such theoretical ideas leads to 
the picture of a community of Europeans which would be the basis for overcoming 
individual nations within Europe. Such a nation thus would ultimately be built upon a 
shared culture, an imagined European community (which would implore a distinctively 
90 
European folklore, etc), and a belief in some ethnic commonality70 . Smith presents three 
questions in order to assess the potential foundation for a European nation: 
1. "Is Europe merely the sum t:otal of its various national identities and 
communities? 
2. If Europe is more than a sum t:otal, "uh::tt exactly are those characteristics and 
qualides that distinfJ,fish EuroJX! from anything or anyone else?" 
3. «Can ue find in the histmy and cultures of this continent something or things 
that are not replicated elsrokre, and that shaped W?at migpt Ix callRd 
specifically 'European experiences?" 
A. Smith, 1992, p. 67-68 
Smith argues that there are some shared traditions amongst the cultures of Europe which 
can act as a basis for this European nation. These shared traditions include Roman Law, 
political democracy, the Judaeo-Christian ethic, and cultural heritages (such as 
Renaissance humanism, rationalism, and empiricism as well as romanticism and 
classicism); "together they constitute ... a 'family of cultures' made up of a syndrome of 
partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages" (A. Smith, 1992, p. 70). 
Smith notes however, that a 'European nation' appears to still be lacking the 
ritual and ceremony of collective identity held by individual nations in such observances 
as Bastille or Armistice Day (p. 73). Still, as Laffan et al argue "Since the 1980's 
political actors and Union institutions have sought to lever traditional nation-building 
strategies, in the form of a European flag [see figure 5.1], passport, driving licence, a 
European anthem and European sporting events to create deliberately a sense of 
identification with the European project" (Laffan et al, 2000, p. 97). 
70 Ethnicity is perhaps the most contentious element of such a European nation. Clearly Europe 
encompasses many different ethnic groups. However, it can be argued that, in much the same way that a 
common culture is imagined, some ethnic link may be imagined amongst the people of Europe. 
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Figure 5.1: The European Flag 
All these images are symbolic of the common values and ideas encompassed in 
integration. Arguably they could be used for the construction of a European nation. 
Problems with a European nation 
The image of a 'European' encompassed in this 'family of cultures' has undoubtedly in 
the twentieth century been built upon the area of Western Europe. The Cold War 
precluded an inclusion of Eastern Europe in defining what a 'European' is within the 
scope of integration. Wolff argues that this self-categorisational divide in fact predates 
the Cold War (Wolff, 1994, p.3). Psychologically, according to Wolff, a divide has 
existed for many centuries amongst the continent's nations. Through attempts to define 
themselves as civilised, intellectual elites in north-west Europe externalised an 'other' for 
comparison. The result of this comparison was a regionalisation of those in the east of 
Europe (previously not labelled together). The need to define against the 'opposite' led 
to the classification of 'the East' (both European and Asian) as barbaric in order to 
const1uct a 'civilised' Western Europe. (Wolff 1994). Borneman and Fowler in their 
anthropological study of Europeanisation also noted this historical tendency of creating 
negative identities of 'other' to achieve a 'European self-consciousness' (Borneman and 
Fowler, 1997, p. 489). They note that "European coherence has always been tied to 
some externality, some hypothesised other, for example the infidel, the orient, or the 
east" (p. 490). Today, the cultural, economic, and political definitions coincide even less 
92 
with geographical Europe. 'Europe' and 'European' have come to include the EU 
member states as in-group and exclude peripheral nations as other (Garcia, 1993, p. 2-3). 
The emergence of a homogenous European identity dependent upon an 
externalisation of a negative other has potentially destructive effects for the 'ethos of co-
operation' upon which integration is built. In recent years a notable increase of racism in 
Europe has been identified (McDonogh, 1993, p. 144). Such xenophobia, while 
reinforcing an image of a dangerous other as part of social identity, contributes to the 
rise of a fascist leaning right71 (McDonogh, 1993, p. 144; Tix Economist, 15.10.94, p. 67-
68). 'White, Judaeo-Christian' Europeans have come to overlook distinctions amongst 
the 'colours' of Europe with repmts that third generation 'coloured' Europeans are 
becoming victims of racial crimes despite the fact that they themselves identify as 
European (McDonogh, 1993, 147). 
An example of the rise of right wing parties can be seen in the Austrian elections 
of 1999. The October 3rd elections saw Joerg Haider's Freedom Party gain 27.2% of the 
vote- second to the Austrian Social Democratic Party (Rippert and Alder, 1999, p.1). 
On February 1 2000, it was announced that the Freedom Party would form part of the 
Government coalition (ADL, 2000, p. 1). The Freedom Party has been described as a 
political party that "openly advocates racism and xenophobia" (Rippert and Alder, 1999, 
p. 1). Criticism has also been aimed at Haider; the Anti-Defamation League, for 
example, cites critics who have called Haider a "yuppie fascist" and "Austrian David 
Dulte"72 (ADL, 2000, p.1). 
71However, it has also been suggested by many theorists that this racism is in fact a reaction to 
globalisation and in particular Europeanisation which is a perceived threat to nations. This argument will 
be mentioned in greater detail below 
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Despite these negative effects, the idea of a European nation relies upon the 
basic tenets of the in-group/ out-group dichotomy. Heater argues that no "project for 
voluntary political integration would be at all credible unless the putative member states 
shared some cultural and political traditions and values" (Heater, 1992, p. 180). As part 
of this he argues that in-groups and out-groups are necessary. The inward looking 
identity needs to recognise common characteristics amongst member states, while when 
looking outward must recognise a distinctiveness and incompatibility of those outside the 
Union (p. 180). However, Garcia argues that it is "difficult to define a model of 
'European society' into which all national societies in Europe fit while those outside do 
not" (Garcia, 1993, p. 10). Kaplinski highlights that historical attempts at 'nation-
building' demonstrate the negative effects of such moves. He argues that there are three 
methods used to achieve cultural homogeneity: assimilation, deportation, and genocide 
(Kaplinski, 1993, p. 113). The nations that exist within Europe at the moment have been 
created "at the cost of weal~er nations who were assimilated or exterrninated"73 (p. 113). 
Clearly, the duplication of such methods in the attempt of creating a European identity is 
undesirable to both the nations of Europe and the European Union. 
Another predominant and potentially negative effect of creating a European 
nation is the perceived threat to existing nations. Llobera argues that the "process of the 
European Union generates a real fear of losing territory, personality, and the power to 
control one's own affairs; in a word, there arises a crisis of identity which expresses itself 
in a reactive nationalism, often accompanied by chauvinistic and jingoistic 
manifestations" (Llobera, 1993, p. 77). It is clear that in the 1990's the world has 
witnessed the growth of a new kind of national (and ethnic) spirit within European 
countries (Iivonen, 1993, p. 6). Furthermore, this is strongly racist and directed against 
72 A reference to the Klu Klux Klan member who entered politics in the US during the 1990's 
73 He notes that the ethnic cleansing that has taken place in Yugoslavia are the steps that Western Europe 
took several centuries ago; examples include the Jews and Moors in Spain as well as the Celtics and 
Basques (Kaplinski 1993: 113). 
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foreigners (p. 6). It is highly probable that this is a reaction to the idea of a homogenous 
European nation. Kaplinski argues that the desire for a homogenous Europe is indeed a 
real threat to nations, although not explicitly. He foresees that the creation of a supra-
nation-state, with its own European nationalism, would result in the formal preservation 
and even EU support of local languages and cultures, but their basis would be seriously 
weal{ened by the standardisation required for a European nation (Kaplinski, 1993, p. 
115). Hence, while it is "not at all improbable that the national cultures will survive in a 
united Europe", this is most likely to be as "something secondary, as decoration" if 
Europe is to "become more and more homogenous" (p. 115). 
It has become readily accepted as a result of these negative effects that the idea of 
a European nation must be curbed to a less destructive and threatening identity that is 
still able to legitimate the European Union. The EU itself has recognised this need with 
the emphasis on 'unity in diversity' as the slogan that represents the 'ethos of co-
operation'. 
Unity in Diversity 
Many authors, realising that attempts at creating a European nation were futile in the face 
of persistent nationalism, have explored notions of a distinct European identity. Rather 
than basing the legitimating identity on the model of the nation presented above, is there 
another collective identity that would recognise the authority of the European Union 
sufficiently74? Most European citizens identify with a number of culturally defined 
groups and do not appear to feel that these identities are incompatible (Wilson, 1993, p. 
17). Therefore, is it possible that the addition of a strong European identity could easily 
74 This argument is built upon the common understanding of multiple identities apparent in recent identity 
literature. For example, Augoustinos and Walker argue that an individual has a vast number of social 
identifications and only some of these are "primed or activated or salient at any one time" allowing for the 
co-existence of these identities and that these are selected to suit the social context the individual finds 
themselves in (Augoustinos and Wallcer, 1995, p. 109). 
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be included in these multiple layers of identification without threatening present 
identities but also create the loyalty require to legitimate EU government? 
Weiler in particular has explored this idea extensively. He argues that "Europe is 
not meant to be about nation-building, or a melting pot" in that the creation of a truly 
European 'demos' would seem to negate the objectives75 of integration (Weiler, 1997, p. 
117). He argues that instead it is possible to define the European polity in civic non-
organic-cultural terms (p. 118) The basis of a collective identity should be a "coming 
together on the basis not of shared ethnos and/ or organic culture, but a coming together 
on the basis of shared values, a shared understanding of rights and society duties and 
shared rational intellectual culture which transcend organic-national culture (p. 118). 
Habermas presents a similar argument in that the potential for the 'European experience' 
stems from "a common political culture and the branching of national traditions of art 
and literature, historiography, philosophy, etc" (Habermas, 1992, p. 12). He continues 
on to say that the cultural elite and the mass media play an important role in fostering the 
focus on these shared traditions and that ultimately a European constitutional patriotism 
will need to grow out of "interpretations of the same universalist rights and 
constitutional principles which are marked by the context of different national histories" 
(p. 12). Fells and Niznik argue that the common history- required for social identity can 
be interpreted in the broader sense allowing for the inclusion of values which are 
minimally threatening to individual nations (Fells and Niznik, 1992, p. 206). The 
common values in the artistic, political, and social sense are again pointed to in order to 
fill this role. Primarily, values such as civil liberties, democracy, and tolerance, which are 
75 notably, the objective of interg:nemmental co-operation for peace 
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considered amongst the most important achievements of Europe, contribute to a 
European identity separate from individual European nations (p. 206). 
However is this 'civic' identity76 sufficient for the purposes of legitimating the 
EU? In theory- these common values have been present for generations, yet Europe has 
repeatedly engaged in war within the continent. Furthermore, since the beginning of the 
integration process these common values and traditions have appeared to remain 
secondary- to the nation on several occasions; notable examples include the Luxembourg 
Compromise. Smith argues that to date each member state has consistently placed 
perceived national interests and self-images above a concerted European policy based on 
a single presumed European interest and self-image (A. Smith, 1992, p. 56). 
The true nature of such a civic identity though pre-empts further investigation of 
such debate. For example, an interesting point that results from the arguments of these 
authors is the similarity between this civic identity and Smith's European 'family of 
cultures'. The above identity encompasses many of the examples that Smith cites in his 
family of cultures such as Roman law and the Judaeo-Christian ethic. Many would argue, 
however, that there is a theoretical distinction between the two views, namely, the ability 
for the civic identity to co-exist with present national identities. The focus would remain 
on those ideals that brought the countries of Europe together in integration, rather than 
replacing individual nations. However this 'distinction' ignores many aspects that 
undermine the argument for a civic identity. 
76 As described by Weiler 1997 
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Firstly, returning to Habermas' claim that such an identity is based on rational 
intellectual culture, the distinction between the basis for this identity and that of a 
European nation is problematic. The civic values and ideas can, as exemplified 
throughout the quotes used above, be described as 'culture'. The 'distinction' merely 
stems from one's definition of culture. It could be argued that the intellectual ideas 
encompassed in the civic identity in fact are the imposition of high culture in accordance 
with Gellner's argument described above. 
The result of this is that it is plausible to argue that this civic identity is does not 
differ greatly from the concept of the European nation discussed above. Both are based 
to some extent on cultural homogeneity and thus essentially one in the same. If this 
argument is accepted, then it can be further argued that this does eliminate the problems 
that a civic identity is meant to rectify. However, if the argument of definitions of 
cultures is overlooked there are still further problems with the concept of this identity. 
A second, and perhaps more important, problems is that there are many authors 
that would argue that this is not a civic 'identity', but rather a dffferent /mm of the nation. 
The difference is much the same as the argument that Habermas uses to argue against a 
European nation- a divide between the rational, intellectual, and the organic. 
Hutchinson argues that this is ultimately a difference between a cultural and political 
nationalism. The nation described above would be classified as cultural. Alternatively, to 
the political nationalist the "ideal is a civic polity of educated citizens united by common 
laws and mores" - reminiscent of the European 'civic' identity proposed above 
(Hutchinson, 1994, p. 122). To Hutchinson this view is of a "nation that looks forward 
ultimately to a common humanity transcending cultural differences" (p. 122). Kohn also 
identifies a divide between political and cultural nationalism. However, to Kohn this is 
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also a divide between Western and Eastern nationalism. Kohn sees that in the West the 
creation of a nation was in the political reality and struggles of the time77. It was 
therefore, at its origin, less concerned with cultural definitions and "connected with the 
concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth 
centuty" and was thus the product of rational societal conception- again reminiscent of 
a European 'civic' identity (Kohn, 1945, p. 330). 
Hobsbawm in fact argues that the cultural and ethnic nationalism that arose from 
1880 was preceded by a 'radical-democratic' approach to the nation. Hobsbawm argues 
that "the primaiy meaning of 'nation' ... was political" whereas it "equated 'the people' 
and the state in the manner of the American and French revolutions" (Hobsbawm, 1990, 
p. 18). Therefore, defining a nation in ethnic and cultural terms (as is the case with 
organic nationalism) is incorrect in the initial sense of the word because "if 'the nation' 
had anything in common from the popular-revolutionaty point of view, it was not in any 
fundamental sense, ethnicity, language and the like" (p. 20). Rather, a nation was based 
upon mass participation and choice and the desire to be under the same government (p. 
19). For example, "it was not the native use of the French language that made a person 
French ... but the willingness to acquire this, among the other liberties, laws and common 
characteristics of the free people of France" (p. 21). Hence, the idea of a European civic 
identity could fit within the idea of a 'radical-democratic' approach to the nation as this 
civic identity is based on the choice, acceptance, and desire to embrace the common 
characteristics of a 'European'. 
Consequently, it is apparent that while the concept of a European civic identity 
may be distinct from the concept of a European nation in organic sense, is can be still be 
77 Which could be viewed as an instance of the pattern Wolff describes in Imenting Eastem Europe 
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seen to fit within other concepts of the nation. Therefore, it can justifiably be argued 
within such terms that this concept is not simply an identity but rather a variation on the 
idea of the 'liberal/political' nation. Hence, similar problems arise as with the European 
nation described above. While the problems of racism may not be as apparent under 
this national identity, problems of in-group/ out-group formation can still arise. Rather 
than ethnicity being the basis of this, the 'rational intellectual culture' of shared values 
and traditions becomes the basis for believing in the superiority of Europeans. 
Ultimately it is difficult to escape the conclusion that however a 'European 
identity' is theoretically discussed it will to some extent be modelled on the nation as this 
is remains the modern link between the state and the people. While this can clearly be 
seen to be problematic, as discussed above, it cannot be disregarded purely due to its 
negative effects. Whatever the effects, an European identity is still held to be a means by 
which the European Union may address problems of legitimacy. 
Evidence of a European Identity 
Although the theoretical discussion of a European identity introduced many negative 
aspects of this identity, the need to further explore the idea must not be forgotten. 
Wilson explains that the issue has arisen because integration is transforming aspects of 
society and culture at every level (Wilson, 1993, p. 3). As integration as become more 
extensive it has resulted in a need for the European public to question "basic tenets of 
their socio-political lives" (p. 3). McDonogh argues that "the dismantling of Europe's 
economic and cultural internal boundaries raises questions about the definition of 
identity and exclusion" (M:cDonogh, 1993, p. 145). Hence it is necessary to understand 
whether any form of a European collective that was theoretically explored exists in 
relativity. 
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Fells and Niznik state that there can be little doubt that a European identity does 
in fact exist, it is simply difficult to define (Fells and Niznik, 1992, p. 205-206)78• As 
Wintle describes, "attempts to isolate and define European identity ... make it clear that it 
is elusive and equivocal" (Wintle, 1996, p. 1). However, the true test of the existence of a 
European identity comes with the belief of the general public. The Eurobarometre, 
identifying the increasing focus on the need for a European identity, asked citizens about 
their identification with Europe. Hewstone included this aspect in his Eurobarom1:re 
analysis in 1986. 
Hewstone on identity 
Based on two questions from the Eurobarometre in the 1980's, worded slightly differently 
than those of the 1990's, Hewstone recognised that few people identified strongly with 
'Europe'. A large number 'sometimes' thought of themselves as European, but an 
almost equally large group 'never' thought of themselves as European. The conclusion 
that Hewstone reaches is that "the emergence of a cosmopolitan European identity 
within the Community ... cannot yet be hailed" and that if "a nation can be defined as a 
body of people who feel they are a nation, then there is little support for the idea of a 
European nation in the psychological sense" (H:ewstone, 1986, p.33). Further he argues 
that such results "give only limited support to the functionalist notion of a shift in public 
loyalties from national to supra-national institutions" (p. 33). 
78 this conclusion was reached through their attempts at defining Europe in their paper "Ccndusion: What is 
Europe" 
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The Eurobarometre after Hewstone 
Beginning in December 1994, the Et11vbarometre again explored the concept of identity79. 
When asked whether they see themselves as their nation, nation plus European, 
European plus nation, or European only in the near future, there was a fairly close divide 
amongst the respondents between nation and nation plus European (see graph 5.1). 
Graph 5.1: Identification with nation and/ or Europe amongst all member states 
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The most interesting trend to note is the decline (and then slight increase) in those who 
identify with their nation then Europe and the consequent increase (and then slight 
decrease) in those who identified with their nation only. By the end of 1998 these 
responses were equal. Also there was a gradual decline in those who saw themselves as 
European only, which was accompanied by an overall decrease in those who consider 
themselves European and then national. Hence, in the European Union overall there 
would appear to be a resurgence in the identification with the nation. Although this 
resurgence isn't stark, all trends appear to support a stronger identification with the 
nation than with Europe. 
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Not smprisingly, the United Kingdom and Denmark are amongst the countries 
that appear to possess the highest level of identification with the nation. What is 
smprising is the high level of identification with only the nation in Greece, a country 
which appears as one of this countries with the strong support for integration. In fact, 
the United Kingdom possesses a larger number of people who identify as "European 
only" than in Greece80-again a statistic that seems contrary to the findings of Chapter 
Four. 
Those who possess the strongest identification with Europe are found ill 









Graph 5.2: A comparison between levels of identification 
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79 With the understanding of multiple identities as discussed by Augoustinos and Walker (1995). 
BO Although the difference between the two is not very large-around 3-5% greater in Greece than in the 
United Kingdom. 
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Graph 5.3: A comparison between levels of identification 
























































While Luxembourg and Italy are traditionally pan-European in most of their 
responses to the Et✓robarometre and even their policy action in the EU, France's 
identification is unexpected. The response of the French to Et1robaro111etre questions 
analysed in Chapter Four were marked by their moderate standing. Further, the actions 
of French representative in European politics has often been characterised by strong 
nationalist policies; de Gaulle was a notable example of letting French nationalism 
influence EU politics. This is perhaps a strong example of elite action not entirely 
reflecting the standing of the public81 . Or perhaps it can otherwise be concluded that 
France has successfully dominated the EU to the extent that identifying with the EU is 
not a threat to national identity. 
The available data therefore paints a dark picture for the European identity. The 
evidence supports the claims of a resurgence of nationalism. Identification with the 
nation is still prevalent and appears in fact to be gaining strength. Overall, the 
consistency between these findings and those of Hewstone demonstrates that the 
evidence to support the growth of a strong European identity is minimal. The only 
81 Although it is also accepted that the view of the French public may have changed from nationalist 
standings to a more pan-European view in the time since de Gaulle represented France. 
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promising evidence for Europe is the high number of people who identify themselves as 
European at some level. It appears though that this will remain primarily secondary to 
the nation. 
Implications for Integration and Legitimacy 
Identity and Integration 
Taking theoretical literature and public opinion into account, the presence of a European 
identity is troubling in many regards. Firstly, many negative undesirable effects can be 
associated with the presence of a European nation. In response to in-group/ out-group 
formations, or perhaps threats to the nation, increased racism poses serious challenges to 
the EU's 'ethos of co-operation'. Further, the often violent and turbulent environments 
created by asserted nationalism undermine the desire for peace that has strongly 
influenced the process of integration throughout the centtuy. The belief that this is 
undesirable can be seen in the reaction (to cease bi-lateral relations with Austria) by 
European Union member states to the rise of the extreme right wing Freedom Party in 
Austria. This belief has thus led to a revised concept of a European identity. 
This revised concept, however is also problematic. Firstly it could be argued that 
this great resembles a nation as well, which again would bring with it negative effects. 
Secondly, it can be argued that the notion of 'unity in diversity' is an elite concept. The 
public response of strengthening nationalism refutes attempts at embracing unity by re-
emphasising diversity. Scholars and elite may recognise the similar cultural and historical 
traditions for a common social identity, whether or not it is accepted that this is distinct 
from a nation, but a large part of European society appears to prefer to recognise 
individual differences. The result is that 'unity in diversity' will at present remain a 
105 
phrase coined by the European Union rather than the description of a European 
collective. 
Future widening of the EU stands out as one further problem with the concept 
of a European identity. A European identity undoubtedly requires definitions of 
European and other. For this identity to legitimate the authority of the EU this 
definition of European should undoubtedly coincide with Union borders to a large 
degree. However as Borneman and Fowler argue, "Europe's peripheral nations test the 
ability to integrate marginal peoples into the EU. This integration process displays not 
only the limitations on the resolve to unify Europe but also the willingness of nations to 
Europeanise" (Borneman and Fowler, 1997, p. 496). Such limitations are significantly 
called into question with an increased number of candidate member states, particularly 
with the inclusion of states such as Turkey- a country- lacking in the common traditions 
stated above. 
Legitimacy 
The problematic nature of European identity has several consequences for the legitimacy 
of the European Union. Chapter Four highlighted problems in the area of popular 
legitimacy which ultimately led to the conclusion that the Union needs to focus on 
finding a means of capturing the loyalty and consent of the European public. This 
brought the examination to identit'y. The link between identity and legitimacy was 
described above and it was explained that the nation has been the primary- social group 
used for social and political legitimation of government in the modern era. Yet, the brief 
exploration of the notion of a European nation demonstrated that this is undesirable due 
primarily to the negative effects of such nationalism. This however, presents the 
problem of finding a new social identity that still is able to convey the loyalty of the 
people to any given government. 
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The concept of 'Unity in Diversity' acts as the foundations of the desired social 
identification and an identity that is acceptable within the ideology of peace and co-
operation inherent in integration. Yet, as already summarised above, the dominance of 
the nation stunts the potential for diversity to be truly embraced in order to unify the 
European public. As Beetham and Lord conclude, any development of a "European 
identity and loyalty is embryonic at best among the European electorate" (Beetham and 
Lord, 1998, p. 29). Therefore, with a lack of strong European identity it is highly 
probable that any further deepening of the Union82 will result in a further heightening of 
nationalism in European member states. As long as the integration process is a threat to 
the individual nations this reaction is inevitable. The integration process will remain a 
threat as long as there is an element of neo-functionalist thought involved in the 
integration process. The consequence is that the Union is at a cross-roads with the issue 
of an identity which would aide the legitimation of federated political power. Methods of 
strengthening the attachment to 'Europe' are encompassed in the deepening of the 
Union83 • Yet, any future deepening of the Union may cause even further reactive 
nationalism to grow, which ultimately undermines attempts at creating a European 
identity. Consequently, the Union elite are again left to find alternative solutions to the 
problems of popular legitimacy in the EU. 
82 According to the neo-functionalist model 
83 Previous measures such as symbols (flag, anthem, etc), citizenship, and representation of people as 




Throughout the course of this thesis the legitimacy of the European Union has been 
examined within a neo-functionalist framework. Within this neo-functionalist framework 
the primary question of whether the EU lacks legitimacy was addressed. The focus upon 
a neo-functionalist framework was necessaiy due to the differing nature of theories of 
legitimacy between neo-functionalism and intergovernmental.ism. 
According to the intergovernmental framework, EU claims to legitimate 
authority are valid. The exploration of Union legitimacy within an international relations 
paradigm demonstrated how the Union can be considered legitimate to 
intergovernmentalists. However, neo-functional elements of the European Union 
challenge the use of international relations as the EU becomes a more state-like actor. 
This also consequently challenges claims to legitimacy. As a result it became necessary to 
examine legitimacy according to a neo-functional framework based upon the state model 
as argued by f-Iix84. 
This opposition between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism remains 
the backdrop for all studies of the European Union. However, this problem is not 
confined to just theoretical discussions. The integration process itself has experienced the 
conflict between these competing frameworks, as was evident in the contentious drafting 
and consequent ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The intergovernmental pillars 
alongside the Community are evidence of the struggle between the intergovernmentalists, 
such as the British government, who "fought for these as a way of heading off a federal 
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Europe" and the federalists, who "accepted them only with reluctance" (Pryce, 1994, p. 
3). As P1yce describes, the Maastricht Treaty can be described as an "uneasy truce 
between the two sides" (p. 3). The consequence is that the path of integration is paved 
with uncertainty. Theoretical literature, including in this thesis, is therefore limited by the 
same uncertainty. 
Further constraints were imposed upon this thesis by the use of the Eurobarometre. 
Although this was the most appropriate and valuable research tool accessible at the time, 
it presented several problems. The questions it used were generally broad and vague in 
their content. Survey questions that were more detailed and pertained directly to the 
issues examined within the thesis would have provided more insightful results and thus 
allowed for more affirmative conclusions. Consequently, conclusions drawn from this 
Eurobaromet:re research are made tentatively and with the understanding that different 
interpretations are inevitably possible. 
Hewstone also addressed the broad nature of the Eurobarometre. He discusses that 
even the authors of Eurobarrmetre 15 identified the tendency for some questions to 
measure "a sentiment as vague as it is diffuse" (as cited in Hewstone, 1986, p. 24). 
Unfortunately in order to adequately attain time-series statistical trends these questions 
can not be altered. In order to address this problem, and support the findings of the 
Eurobarometre, Hewstone conducted his own survey of four member states. 
Supplementary surveys thus prove to be beneficial in interpreting the responses to 
Eurobarometre questions. Due to obvious resource and access limitations, this was not 
feasible within this thesis. However, it serves to highlight that limitations of the 
Eurobarometre questions can be overcome. 
84 See Chapter One for this argument. 
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However, despite these constraints the Eurobarometre was still able to provide 
insights into European public opinion that can influence the social legitimation of the 
European Union. Resource and accessibility limitations also meant that alternative 
research tools were not feasible. Without the Eurobaranetre, it would not have been 
possible to reach important conclusions regarding the legitimacy of the EU. 
Despite difficulties in method and constraints of theoretical frameworks, a 
comprehensive investigation of the legitimacy of the European Union has been carried 
out. This was done on two different levels by first examining the legitimacy of the EU 
according to the state model constructed in Chapter Two, and secondly by then 
questioning the relevance of this state model. 
Legitimacy in the EU according to the state model 
The theoretical discussion in Chapter Two culminated with the presentation of a 
theoretical model that was used for the discussion of legitimacy as it pertained to the 
European Union. As part of this model it was argued that a democratic government can 
be considered rightfully legitimate when: 
• it acquires and exercises political power through legal means, 
• the actions of government are congruent with the values and beliefs of society, and 
• there is evidence of consent through action for the authority/power structure by the 
ruled (public). 
This comprehensive framework provided a basis from which the examination of 
legitimacy in the EU could commence. Chapter Three utilised this model to concentrate 
on the over all concept of legitimacy within the integration process. The foundation for 
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this was the constrnction of an ideal model of legitimacy for the European Union 
(presented below) which stipulated the conditions necessaty for the Union to be 
legitimate in accordance with the state model. 
Figure 6.1: IDEAL MODEL OF EU LEGITIMACY 
Ratification of formal 
treaties and EU and 
member states act 
according to legal 
framework 
Commission, Council of 
Ministers, and Parliament's 
actions congruent with societal 
values and accountability of 
other bodies to Parliament (as 
elected representatives) 
Voting for EU 
Parliament 
During the course of this construction several issues were presented that posed 
problems for the legitimation process of the European Union. It was concluded that the 
first factor of legitimacy, termed legal legitimacy for the purpose of this thesis, was largely 
met. Clearly, the European Union as an institution was legally sound. The area of 
popular legitimacy was shown to be more problematic. These problems of legiti.1.nacy 
that the European Union is facing were examined through further exploration of the 
ideal .1.nodel. 
The ideal .1.nodel of legitimacy for the European Union included the democratic 
elei-nents of authorisation, accountability, and representation as part of the second and 
third factors of legiti.1.nacy. During the examination of the presence of the ideal .1.nodel 
these elements were shown to be problematic. One source of these problems is the 
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democratic deficit that has been readily described in the European Union. The 
representation and accountability deficit was described in detail with particular reference 
to limitation of powers of the European Parliament. Chapter Four explored the public 
opinion surrounding such issues. With questions regarding democracy and the European 
Parliament the public appeared to voice opinions that support the idea of the democratic 
deficit. There was clearly dissatisfaction with democracy in the European Union. 
Combined with this was the desire to see a larger role for the European Parliament. 
Hence, it was concluded that a possible means of acting in accordance to the beliefs of 
the European public was to be more responsive to these opinions. 
The logical solution to this problem resides in an increase to the power of the EP 
and limits to the power of the Commission and Council. However, this 'logical' answer 
is fraught with danger. One key objection to increased parliamentary powers is the 
continued struggle between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Although 
such measures would partially rectify the democratic deficit, this would also severely limit 
the role of the Council in the policy process. This would be a welcomed move by the 
neo-functionalists; to the intergovernmentalist this would be largely unacceptable. The 
Council is the main forum for intergovernmental co-operation. Limitation of this forum, 
in the eyes of the intergovernmentalist, would bestow too much power upon the Union 
institutions by removing far too much power from the member states. 
Some authors have discussed other problems associated with an increase in the 
role of the Parliament in order decrease the democratic deficit. Beetham and Lord argue 
that the extension of parliamentary powers raises several issues. Firstly, an extension of 
power would be needed to address the accountability deficit (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 
27). One of the first problems that would arise would be addressing which form of 
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representation is most appropriate. At present methods of election and representation 
vary according to the frameworks within individual member states. A more 
representative Parliament, though, to be just, would need a level of uniformity that 
ensured fair representation across the whole Union (p. 28). Secondly, the low levels of 
voter participation, and the second-order characteristics of these elections, raises 
questions as to the level of support needed to legitimate a more empowered Parliament 
(p. 27-28). Dehousse argues that such measures would in fact be counter-productive; 
"strengthening of the European Parliament and of European parties, far from solving the 
current legitimacy crisis, as if often alleged, might in some respects aggravate it" 
(Dehousse, 1995, p. 119). The reason for this aggravation, according to Dehousse, is 
that negative features of majoritarian parliamentary systems are likely to be accentuated 
in a divided power system such as the Union (p. 119). With particular relevance to 
addressing the accountability deficit, 1he Economist argues that "giving the parliament the 
power to sack individual commissioners would mal~e it more the master of the 
Commission than the Commission president" and that the Parliament is not ready for 
this role (1he Economist, 30.01.99, p. 50). 
Beetham and Lord also argue that the authorisation deficit may be rectified in 
part, and at least, through the election rather than appointment of the Commission 
president. They assert that through either direct elections, or election by the Parliament, 
an elected president would counter-act the national appointments of the Council and 
Commission (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 26). However, this would again incite 
disagreement amongst neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists, as this would 
remove the role of member state governments in the selection of the Commission 
president. This role is arguably important to intergovernmentalists in order to tty and 
prevent appointment of a president who holds strong views of a federated Europe. 
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It was also noted in the discussion of the ideal model that this model will never 
be completely attainable. As it is an ideal, there will always be those that disagree with 
the majority. It was therefore concluded that the European Union could be considered 
rightfully legitimate if this opposition remains a small minority. During the course of the 
empirical research opposition became apparent. It also became apparent that this 
opposition was highly concentrated amongst a few member states. Such concentration of 
opposition can not be considered insignificant and therefore does effect the legitimation 
of the European Union. It was concluded that the European elite must understand why 
some member states strongly support integration and others are so significantly opposed. 
This led to the discussion of identity. 
Many authors have acknowledged the role of identity in legitimating authority. It 
was hypothesised that if a common identity was found and proven to be strong enough 
this could be the means by which this opposition could be transformed. However, two 
problems arose with the discussion of a European identity. Firstly, the modern identity 
used for the purpose of legitimating government is the nation, yet the idea of a European 
nation was shown to be undesirable and contrary to the goals of integration. This leaves 
the Union with the task for finding an identity that could still legitimate government yet 
be less emotive than the nation. The result was the highly discussed idea of a civic 
identity based on common traditions of philosophy and values (such as human rights, 
civil liberties, etc). However, it was also argued that this can be viewed as an alternative 
form of the nation. Upon further examination of identity, another problem arose. While 
civic values may indeed provide a basis of collectivity for the European people, despite 
the negative aspects, any presence was shown to be minimal; as expressed by Beetham 
and Lord a European identity is emb1yonic at present. The empirical evidence appeared 
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to support this in the respect that the nation is still clearly the dominant form of 
identification and many member states have large numbers of citizens that refuse to 
identify as European. 
The final factor of legitimacy, evidence of consent, was also examined extensively 
within this thesis. In modern democratic states, voting for government is taken to be an 
adequate measure and evidence of consent. In the case of the European Union, elections 
for Members of the European Parliament have been held since 1979. Since this time 
voter turnout has declined each year. Yet, the empirical evidence shows that voting in 
member states is sometimes contrary to public opinion regarding integration. For this 
reason the qualitative research that suggests that voting is in fact dominated by national 
issues and political parties can not be ignored. The resulting conclusion was that voting 
appears to be an inaccurate measure of consent in the European Union. Consequently, 
alternative evidence of consent must be found in order for the European Union to 
sufficiently meet this factor of legitimacy. However, throughout the theoretical literature 
alternatives do not appear to be given within the confines of a democratic state. Mere 
obedience and lack of voiced dissent can not substitute as satisfactory evidence as these 
actions may be motivated out of apathy or fear. 
The final conclusions regarding the state of legitimacy in the European that may 
be drawn from this exploration are not promising. Many problematic areas were 
highlighted throughout the thesis. Possible solutions were presented which could rectify 
the legitimacy deficit. Yet, these are not also without problems. Consequently, one is 
left to conclude that within a neo-functionalist framework the European Union has a 
legitimacy problem. However, this does not affirm the hypothesis that the European 
Union has a legitimacy crisis. Althqugh many authors have argued that a crisis does in 
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fact exist, this has been overstated. While there are areas that are indeed impoverished, 
many elements that contribute to the legitimation of the EU can be found. This does 
not rule out a legitimacy crisis in future. If the current difficulties that exist are not 
addressed, any further deepening or widening of the Union could exacerbate the present 
legitimacy problems. 
117 
Figure 6.2: CONCLUDING MODEL OF PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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The question that must be asked as a result of such findings focuses on the 
relevance of the state-model. There are apparent problems with the legitimation of the 
European Union according to the ideal model. Furthermore, the solutions put forth are 
also problematic. Yet it must be examined whether this is truly reflective of the state of 
legitimacy in the European Union or rather whether this is evidence of limitations of the 
ideal model, particularly when proposed solutions are also problematic. 
Relevance of the state model to the European Union 
The use of the state model constructed in Chapter Two allowed this thesis to examine 
the legitimacy of the European Union within a democratic theoretical model. It has also, 
however, allowed this thesis to address a question which surrounds various neo-
functionalist examinations of the European Union: is the state model appropriate for the 
study of the EU or rather does the state model provide limitations that cannot be placed 
upon EU studies? 
The state model was used for several reasons. Firstly, as the European Union 
taltes on more state-like attributes political theories of the state must be tested in this new 
context. More importantly, as integration progresses the Union is evolving into a truly 
unique institution which defies classification in contemporary political frameworks. Still, 
a study of the EU must have a conceptual starting point. It was demonstrated that for 
various reasons, but namely the increasing scope of Union policy and law, that an 
international relations paradigm was too narrow. Of the competing frameworks, the 
state-model was talten, for the purpose of this thesis, to be the most appropriate for a 
study of legitimacy. 
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Several aspects of the examination that has been carried out through the course 
of this thesis indicate that perhaps the state-model limits the study of the European 
Union. Although, it remained the most appropriate theoiy, a state-centric focus excludes 
the aspects of the European Union which remain characteristic of an international 
institution; the continuing struggle between integration theories ultimately affects 
frameworks as well. The use of the state framework in this thesis exemplifies this. While, 
it was the most appropriate of existing frameworks, there are still several examples of this 
limitations of its use. 
The most prevalent of these points is the third factor of legitimacy. For the 
Union to be legitimate according to the state model evidence of consent is required. Yet, 
voter turnout is not sufficient. However, when elections such as those of the EP are of 
minimal consequence to the policy process of the whole institution, votes are an 
inadequate measure of consent overall. EP votes are for one element of one pillar of the 
EU. They can hardly be tal~en to be consent for the Union as a whole. The state model 
though, provides few alternatives that could apply to the structure of the Union- a clear 
example of an inappropriate application of the state model. An international relations 
framework does not provide alternatives either, as consent of national government would 
be tal~en to mean consent for the EU. However, the Union has the ability to override 
national law and create policy that affects citizens directly; these powers extend beyond 
that of an average international institution and consequently require direct consent to be 
legitimate. 
Another point that illustrates the limitations brought upon the study of the 
European Union is the proposed solution of increased power for the European 
Parliament. While in a state context this would address a democratic deficit, the 
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complicated strncture of the European Union prevents this measure from being 
adequate. Again, one reason for this is the strnggle between intergovernmentalism and 
neo-functionalism, as described above. But a further problem is the legislative process 
itself. The Parliament is not the primary body for the creation and ratification of 
legislation. To increase Parliamentary powers so they are more representative would 
require restrncturing of the legislative procedure to a state-model. Although, this is 
undoubtedly assumed by many who argue for a more powerful Parliament, the 
repercussion of such an action have not been adequately addressed by these proponents. 
Restrncturing would remove elements of the legislative procedure tailored to the unique 
situation of European Law. Yet, the state .model would require such action in order for 
the EU to be considered rightfully legitimate within this context. So again, the state 
model cannot account for the unique procedures that European integration necessitates. 
This ultimately leads to the conclusions that there are indeed instances where the 
state model has placed limitations of the study of the European Union. Banchoff and 
Smith argue that present conceptual frameworks limit explorations of legitimacy. They 
identified that analysis driven from "the experience of the nation-state" does not 
"capture the dynamics of recognition and representation in the EU" (Banchoff and 
Smith, 1999, p. 2). In an effort to "conceptualise the legitimacy issue in terms that better 
fit the reality of the EU as a contested and evolving polity" (p. 3), Banchoff and Smith 
present an alternative framework for analysis from a multi-level approach. They argue 
that this approach redirects attention "to new patterns of political activity that contribute 
to legitimacy" (p. 12). This is but one example of a model that could be used to examine 
legitimacy in the future. 
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This conclusion is not to say that all analysis within this framework is null and 
void. The conclusions reached by this thesis are beneficial to the study of the EU. It is 
evident that there are in fact problems in the area of democracy and direct public 
affiliation with 'Europe'. These points, within a state framework, lead to the conclusion 
that there is legitimacy problem in the European Union. When examined after a critique 
of the state framework these points are still beneficial. Although a state framework is at 
present inappropriate for EU studies, it provides insight into the areas that will ultimately 
need to addressed if the Union moves towards a true federation. Also, discovery of 
problems within present frameworks ultimately contributes towards the creation of a 
new framework, such as the one presented by Banchoff and Smith, in which the 
questions and problems explored in this thesis may one day be more thoroughly 
analysed. Although the scope of this thesis does not allow the construction of this new 
framework, it is a starting point for future analysis. With increased literature and 
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Eurobarometre Data::• 1:• 1:• ::•::•::• 
Question one: In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? 
If for, are you very much for or to some extent for? If against, are you very much against or to 
some extent against? 
a. very much for 
b. to some extent for 
c. to some extent against 
d. very much against 
e. no reply 
!Belgium 
Nov-92 17 53 16 4 10 
Apr-93 20 58 13 2 7 
Oct-93 19 55 15 3 8 
a. b. c. d. e. Dec-94 18 59 12 4 6 
Apr-79 27 44 6 1 22 Apr-95 19 60 10 2 8 
Nov-79 23 46 6 2 23 Sep-95 18 53 14 7 9 
Apr-80 20 47 5 2 26 Apr-96 15 53 19 6 6 
Oct-80 25 40 8 2 25 
Apr-81 18 42 6 3 31 
Oct-81 27 43 5 2 23 
Mar-82 20 49 8 2 21 
Oct-82 17 43 8 2 30 
Apr-83 27 41 6 1 25 
Oct-83 23 48 7 3 19 
Apr-84 20 47 9 3 21 
Oct-84 29 51 6 1 13 
Apr-85 30 54 4 1 11 
Oct-85 19 59 6 2 14 
Mar-86 27 47 6 2 18 
Oct-86 29 51 7 1 12 
Apr-87 32 48 7 1 12 
Oct-87 29 46 5 1 19 
Apr-88 25 48 6 1 20 
Oct-88 25 58 8 2 7 
Apr-89 31 55 3 1 10 
Jul-89 17 52 8 2 21 
Oct-89 31 54 6 1 8 
Apr-90 29 54 6 3 8 
Oct-90 23 57 8 2 10 
Apr-91 25 57 8 1 9 
Oct-91 26 55 8 1 10 
Apr-92 23 57 10 2 8 




a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 14 35 18 13 20 Apr-79 25 47 8 2 18 
Nov-79 13 33 18 20 16 Nov-79 24 51 7 3 15 
Apr-80 12 27 19 21 21 Apr-80 19 56 9 2 14 
Oct-80 16 31 19 14 20 Oct-80 17 52 9 2 20 
Apr-81 17 29 16 18 20 Apr-81 16 56 9 3 16 
Oct-81 12 32 22 17 18 Oct-81 26 54 6 1 13 
Mar-82 13 29 22 20 16 Mar-82 24 54 8 2 12 
Oct-82 12 28 19 18 23 Oct-82 28 54 7 1 10 
Apr-83 13 32 19 18 18 Apr-83 25 50 5 1 19 
Oct-83 11 27 20 23 19 Oct-83 29 50 7 2 12 
Apr-84 11 25 20 23 21 Apr-84 29 52 6 2 11 
Oct-84 8 30 23 20 1 f) Oct-84 28 52 6 1 13 
Apr-85 9 25 21 23 22 Apr-85 38 47 5 1 9 
Oct-85 13 24 19 28 16 Oct-85 28 55 7 1 9 
Mar-86 15 35 17 22 13 Mar-86 31 51 7 1 10 
Oct-86 13 32 19 20 16 Oct-86 36 50 5 1 8 
Apr-87 12 27 20 27 14 Apr-87 39 46 5 2 8 
Oct-87 14 34 22 21 9 Oct-87 34 50 4 1 11 
Apr-88 9 34 24 24 9 Apr-88 29 56 6 1 8 
Oct-88 15 37 20 23 5 Oct-88 34 52 6 2 6 
Apr-89 19 37 18 17 9 Apr-89 32 54 7 1 6 
Jul-89 17 33 15 14 21 Jul-89 28 54 7 2 9 
Oct-89 24 36 19 14 7 Oct-89 29 50 7 2 12 
Apr-90 25 38 19 12 6 Apr-90 27 53 8 3 9 
Oct-90 23 42 17 12 6 Oct-90 24 56 9 2 9 
Apr-91 22 43 20 10 5 Apr-91 24 55 7 3 11 
Oct-91 22 44 20 10 4 Oct-91 24 55 9 3 9 
Apr-92 23 38 21 14 4 Apr-92 19 56 10 6 9 
Sep-92 28 37 17 15 3 Sep-92 24 49 14 6 7 
Nov-92 26 39 17 15 3 Nov-92 23 47 15 6 9 
Apr-93 24 40 19 14 3 Apr-93 20 52 14 6 8 
Oct-93 24 38 19 16 3 Oct-93 20 53 15 3 9 
Dec-94 21 37 22 17 3 Dec-94 19 53 14 5 9 
Apr-95 21 40 21 15 3 Apr-95 19 52 16 6 8 
Sep-95 21 41 18 16 4 Sep-95 21 52 13 6 9 
Apr-96 20 44 19 14 3 Apr-96 18 52 15 7 8 
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Question One 
!Germany I Greece 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 36 46 6 1 11 Oct-80 33 26 12 11 18 
Nov-79 37 44 6 1 12 Apr-81 30 30 12 13 15 
Apr-80 36 44 6 1 13 Oct-81 36 29 7 8 20 
Oct-80 38 40 7 2 13 Mar-82 29 29 10 7 25 
Apr-81 31 39 9 4 17 Oct-82 36 27 8 7 22 
Oct-81 38 37 11 1 13 Apr-83 31 30 6 6 27 
Mar-82 33 45 7 3 12 Oct-83 40 29 5 5 21 
Oct-82 28 42 11 5 14 Apr-84 28 29 11 9 23 
Apr-83 36 49 5 1 9 Oct-84 32 35 9 7 17 
Oct-83 34 42 6 2 16 Apr-85 34 28 9 6 23 
Apr-84 27 45 10 3 15 Oct-85 27 26 15 8 24 
Oct-84 36 44 9 2 9 Mar-86 35 21 14 4 26 
Apr-85 37 40 6 3 14 Oct-86 38 33 11 3 15 
Oct-85 32 42 13 3 10 Apr-87 35 29 14 6 16 
Mar-86 41 41 7 1 10 Oct-87 37 32 9 5 17 
Oct-86 43 39 7 2 9 Apr-88 33 32 9 5 21 
Apr-87 38 37 10 3 12 Oct-88 44 34 6 2 14 
Oct-87 28 49 10 3 10 Apr-89 40 38 8 2 12 
Apr-88 27 43 14 3 13 Jul-89 44 31 5 2 18 
Oct-88 27 51 10 4 8 Oct-89 54 28 3 3 12 
Apr-89 26 49 12 5 8 Apr-90 57 24 5 3 11 
Jul-89 27 45 13 4 11 Oct-90 48 32 5 3 12 
Oct-89 42 37 8 2 10 Apr-91 42 37 7 3 11 
Apr-90 37 43 10 2 8 Oct-91 47 35 5 2 11 
Oct-90 37 45 8 2 8 Apr-92 48 36 6 2 8 
Apr-91 35 46 10 3 6 Sep-92 42 39 6 5 8 
Oct-91 32 48 11 2 7 Nov-92 44 36 7 4 9 
Apr-92 29 44 15 6 6 Apr-93 41 38 7 5 9 
Sep-92 26 45 15 8 6 Oct-93 49 36 4 3 8 
Nov-92 23 44 18 9 6 Dec-94 36 45 7 3 8 
Apr-93 25 48 15 5 7 Apr-95 34 40 11 5 10 
Oct-93 23 48 15 8 6 Sep-95 32 43 10 7 9 
Dec-94 26 44 15 6 8 Apr-96 29 49 10 6 6 
Apr-95 27 45 14 7 7 
Sep-95 22 45 17 8 7 
Apr-96 18 43 21 10 7 
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Question One 
jireland I Italy 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 19 45 9 2 25 Apr-79 39 48 3 1 9 
Nov-79 25 43 9 5 18 Nov-79 40 45 4 1 10 
Apr-80 19 41 10 2 28 Apr-80 35 48 4 1 12 
Oct-80 19 39 10 7 25 Oct-80 39 42 6 1 12 
Apr-81 20 39 15 8 18 Apr-81 36 46 8 3 7 
Oct-81 21 41 11 5 22 Oct-81 40 42 5 2 11 
Mar-82 15 40 12 5 28 Mar-82 32 47 6 1 14 
Oct-82 16 41 12 5 26 Oct-82 28 47 6 2 17 
Apr-83 16 39 9 4 32 Apr-83 36 44 5 1 14 
Oct-83 21 41 7 4 27 Oct-83 35 45 5 2 13 
Apr-84 17 41 9 4 29 Apr-84 28 49 7 1 15 
Oct-84 18 42 8 5 27 Oct-84 32 53 5 1 9 
Apr-85 24 37 9 6 24 Apr-85 39 45 4 1 11 
Oct-85 18 41 11 4 26 Oct-85 32 52 4 1 11 
Mar-86 20 41 9 4 26 Mar-86 31 51 3 1 14 
Oct-86 22 44 11 3 20 Oct-86 43 48 4 0 5 
Apr-87 26 36 8 4 26 Apr-87 47 38 4 1 10 
Oct-87 22 39 10 3 26 Oct-87 41 45 4 1 9 
Apr-88 21 42 11 4 22 Apr-88 32 51 5 1 10 
Oct-88 24 51 7 4 14 Oct-88 37 53 3 1 6 
Apr-89 26 48 6 2 18 Apr-89 37 52 3 0 8 
Jul-89 24 45 4 1 26 Jul-89 38 50 4 1 7 
Oct-89 38 33 4 3 22 Oct-89 44 42 4 1 9 
Apr-90 39 36 5 3 17 Apr-90 47 42 3 1 7 
Oct-90 37 45 5 1 12 Oct"90 43 44 4 1 8 
Apr-91 41 37 7 2 13 Apr-91 43 45 4 1 7 
Oct-91 44 35 5 4 12 Oct-91 42 46 4 1 7 
Apr-92 36 45 5 2 12 Apr-92 41 46 6 2 5 
Sep-92 33 41 9 4 13 Sep-92 31 52 8 2 7 
Nov-92 36 39 7 4 14 Nov-92 34 48 7 3 8 
Apr-93 31 45 7 3 14 Apr-93 32 52 6 2 8 
Oct-93 30 46 8 3 13 Oct-93 37 47 6 2 8 
Dec-94 27 50 7 3 13 Oec-94 31 54 4 2 9 
Apr-95 36 44 5 3 12 Apr-95 34 51 5 2 7 
Sep-95 36 42 6 2 14 Sep-95 34 52 4 2 8 
Apr-96 32 49 6 2 11 Apr-96 31 54 6 2 7 
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Question One 
I Luxembourg !The Netherlands 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 47 42 5 2 4 Apr-79 37 47 5 3 8 
Nov-79 48 40 7 1 4 Nov-79 34 48 8 3 7 
Apr-80 48 38 6 3 5 Apr-80 28 48 10 4 10 
Oct-80 46 39 9 1 5 Oct-80 35 44 3 3 10 
Apr-81 45 42 6 1 6 Apr-81 30 50 8 5 7 
Oct-81 45 38 11 3 3 Oct-81 28 46 10 7 9 
Mar-82 40 42 5 3 10 Mar-82 24 52 9 4 11 
Oct-82 37 41 9 2 11 Oct-82 27 48 9 6 10 
Apr-83 39 39 8 3 11 Apr-83 29 46 10 5 10 
Oct-83 47 32 9 3 9 Oct-83 33 39 9 6 13 
Apr-84 43 39 6 2 10 Apr-84 30 51 7 3 9 
Oct-84 44 38 9 4 5 Oct-84 30 52 7 3 8 
Apr-85 56 31 4 2 7 Apr-85 33 46 6 4 11 
Oct-85 41 35 11 3 10 Oct-85 28 48 9 5 10 
Mar-86 47 37 5 3 8 Mar-86 35 45 7 4 9 
Oct-86 46 35 8 5 6 Oct-86 30 45 12 5 8 
Apr-87 40 37 10 4 9 Apr-87 36 44 8 4 8 
Oct-87 43 39 6 2 10 Oct-87 32 46 8 3 11 
Apr-88 34 42 10 3 11 Apr-88 26 50 10 4 10 
Oct-88 32 46 10 3 9 Oct-88 27 53 8 4 8 
Apr-89 25 48 14 1 12 Apr-89 27 53 10 4 6 
Jul-89 18 51 15 3 13 Jul-89 22 54 11 5 8 
Oct-89 32 42 14 4 8 Oct-89 26 50 11 5 8 
Apr-90 29 40 14 5 12 Apr-90 26 52 11 3 8 
Oct-90 34 43 10 3 10 Oct-90 24 53 11 4 8 
Apr-91 28 43 14 4 11 Apr-91 24 53 13 4 6 
Oct-91 26 48 13 5 8 Oct-91 23 53 12 6 6 
Apr-92 24 49 15 3 9 Apr-92 22 55 13 4 6 
Sep-92 29 50 11 5 5 Sep-92 24 52 13 6 5 
Nov-92 33 41 14 5 7 Nov-92 20 52 15 7 6 
Apr-93 25 50 14 5 6 Apr-93 19 55 16 5 5 
Oct-93 30 40 17 6 7 Oct-93 22 53 11 7 7 
Dec-94 38 39 14 2 7 Dec-94 18 58 12 5 7 
Apr-95 47 32 14 4 3 Apr-95 22 53 15 4 6 
Sep-95 36 44 11 3 6 Sep-95 24 53 13 4 7 
Apr-96 32 50 10 3 5 Apr-96 21 56 14 5 4 
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Question One 
!United Kingdom !European Union 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 21 40 14 6 19 Apr-79 30 45 6 4 15 
Nov-79 20 41 15 8 16 Nov-79 30 45 8 4 13 
Apr-80 21 38 16 10 15 Apr-80 27 46 9 4 14 
Oct-80 23 40 14 8 15 Oct-80 29 43 9 4 15 
Apr-81 17 35 14 15 19 Apr-81 26 43 10 6 15 
Oct-81 20 44 13 8 15 Oct-81 31 43 9 4 13 
Mar-82 17 39 19 12 13 Mar-82 26 45 10 5 14 
Oct-82 21 40 15 6 18 Oct-82 26 44 10 4 16 
Apr-83 20 40 15 5 20 Apr-83 29 45 8 3 15 
Oct-83 29 41 9 5 16 Oct-83 31 44 7 3 15 
Apr-84 17 45 16 7 15 Apr-84 25 46 10 4 15 
Oct-84 25 44 11 4 16 Oct-84 30 47 8 3 12 
Apr-85 30 38 11 4 17 Apr-85 35 42 7 3 13 
Oct-85 24 43 12 7 14 Oct-85 29 45 9 3 14 
Mar-86 22 45 11 5 17 Mar-86 33 44 7 2 14 
Oct-86 26 43 13 6 12 Oct-86 37 42 7 3 11 
Apr-87 29 42 10 6 13 Apr-87 38 39 7 3 13 
Oct-87 24 45 11 7 13 Oct-87 33 44 7 3 13 
Apr-88 20 40 18 7 15 Apr-88 28 45 10 4 13 
Oct-88 16 45 15 12 12 Oct-88 29 49 8 4 10 
Apr-89 21 49 13 5 12 Apr-89 30 50 8 3 9 
Jul-89 24 43 12 4 17 Jul-89 29 46 8 3 14 
Oct-89 27 42 12 5 14 Oct-89 37 41 7 3 12 
Apr-90 27 44 11 6 12 Apr-90 36 44 8 3 9 
Oct-90 26 48 10 5 11 Oct-90 34 47 8 2 9 
Apr-91 27 46 14 5 8 Apr-91 34 47 8 3 8 
Oct-91 27 41 12 9 11 Oct-91 33 46 9 3 9 
Apr-92 24 46 13 6 11 Apr-92 30 46 11 5 8 
Sep-92 17 40 19 13 11 Sep-92 27 46 13 6 8 
Nov-92 16 43 18 12 11 Nov-92 26 45 13 7 9 
Apr-93 19 43 19 10 9 Apr-93 26 48 13 5 8 
Oct-93 17 42 18 12 11 Oct-93 26 47 12 6 9 
Dec-94 16 44 18 11 12 Dec-94 24 49 12 6 9 
Apr-95 14 42 19 15 10 Apr-95 23 47 14 7 9 
Sep-95 16 41 18 14 12 Sep-95 23 47 13 8 10 
Apr-96 14 41 21 14 10 Apr-96 21 48 16 8 8 
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Question Two 
Question Two: Generally speaking, do you think (your countiy's) membership of the 
European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
a. good thing 
6. bad thing 
c. neither good nor bad 
d. no reply 
Apr-96 54 15 29 3 
!Belgium Oct-96 45 15 31 9 
Apr-97 41 19 30 9 
a. b. c. d. Oct-97 42 18 31 9 
Apr-79 65 2 20 13 Apr-98 45 12 33 10 
Nov-79 56 3 25 16 Oct-98 47 9 36 7 
Apr-80 57 2 25 16 Apr-99 47 8 35 10 
Oct-80 54 4 24 18 
Apr-81 49 6 27 18 
Oct-81 55 5 26 14 
Mar-82 57 6 23 13 
Oct-82 41 9 30 20 
Apr-83 62 3 19 16 
Oct-83 62 5 19 14 
Apr-84 59 7 25 9 
Oct-84 65 5 25 5 
Apr-85 64 6 24 6 
Oct-85 64 4 27 5 
Mar-86 64 3 22 11 
Oct-86 70 4 23 3 
Apr-87 69 4 19 8 
Oct-87 70 4 19 7 
Apr-88 64 5 22 9 
Oct-88 70 4 23 3 
Apr-89 73 3 18 6 
Jul-89 53 7 25 15 
Oct-89 71 6 17 6 
Apr-90 69 5 20 6 
Oct-90 73 4 17 6 
Apr-91 75 4 17 4 
Oct-91 70 4 21 5 
Apr-92 69 6 22 3 
Sep-92 63 7 25 5 
Nov-92 59 9 27 5 
Apr-93 64 7 24 5 
Oct-93 59 9 26 6 
Apr-94 56 10 30 4 
Dec-94 61 7 28 3 
Apr-95 67 9 22 3 




a. b. c. d. a. b. C. d. 
Apr-79 37 25 26 12 Apr-79 56 8 28 8 
Nov-79 39 27 24 10 Nov-79 58 6 26 10 
Apr-80 33 29 28 10 Apr-80 51 9 32 8 
Oct-80 32 29 30 9 Oct-80 48 10 31 11 
Apr-81 30 31 30 9 Apr-81 50 11 32 7 
Oct-81 31 29 29 11 Oct-81 53 7 33 7 
Mar-82 33 30 27 10 Mar-82 55 7 30 8 
Oct-82 35 28 28 9 Oct-82 57 9 29 5 
Apr-83 35 24 30 11 Apr-83 53 7 30 10 
Oct-83 35 26 28 11 Oct-83 55 9 29 7 
Apr-84 31 29 30 10 Apr-84 62 4 27 7 
Oct-84 33 28 29 10 Oct-84 63 5 27 5 
Apr-85 29 31 27 13 Apr-85 68 6 21 5 
Oct-85 35 27 27 11 Oct-85 66 7 24 3 
Mar-86 51 21 20 8 Mar-86 69 5 21 5 
Oct-86 39 23 28 10 Oct-86 66 6 24 0 
Apr-87 37 29 26 8 Apr-87 72 7 16 0 
Oct-87 39 29 28 4 Oct-87 74 4 19 0 
Apr-88 37 29 28 6 Apr-88 67 7 23 0 
Oct-88 47 24 25 4 Oct-88 69 5 22 4 
Apr-89 42 23 29 6 Apr-89 68 5 23 4 
Jul-89 46 24 24 6 Jul-89 63 6 26 5 
Oct-89 42 28 26 4 Oct-89 66 7 23 4 
Apr-90 49 25 23 3 Apr-90 63 7 25 5 
Oct-90 59 19 20 3 Oct-90 66 7 23 4 
Apr-91 61 18 19 2 Apr-91 70 7 19 4 
Oct-91 61 20 16 3 Oct-91 63 9 24 4 
Apr-92 56 21 19 4 Apr-92 59 12 25 4 
Sep-92 68 14 16 2 Sep-92 57 12 27 4 
Nov-92 65 18 16 1 Nov-92 55 14 27 4 
Apr-93 61 17 20 2 Apr-93 56 13 27 4 
Oct-93 58 23 17 2 Oct-93 55 14 26 5 
Apr-94 53 26 18 3 Apr-94 50 13 33 5 
Dec-94 53 22 23 2 Dec-94 58 12 27 3 
Apr-95 54 21 23 2 Apr-95 53 12 30 4 
Sep-95 52 23 23 3 Sep-95 56 15 25 4 
Apr-96 53 21 23 3 Apr-96 53 13 29 5 
Oct-96 44 31 22 4 Oct-96 46 19 31 4 
Apr-97 50 25 23 3 Apr-97 47 13 37 4 
Oct-97 53 22 21 4 Oct-97 48 14 33 5 
Apr-98 53 19 24 5 Apr-98 50 13 30 7 
Oct-98 56 20 22 3 Oct-98 52 12 30 6 
Apr-99 51 23 22 4 Apr-99 47 14 31 9 
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Question Two 
Gennany ! Greece 
a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d, 
Apr-79 66 5 20 9 Apr-81 42 22 26 10 
Nov-79 64 3 25 8 Oct-81 38 21 26 15 
Apr-80 65 6 18 11 Mar-82 33 15 37 15 
Oct-80 62 6 22 10 Oct-82 45 13 30 12 
Apr-81 49 9 28 14 Apr-83 42 12 29 17 
Oct-81 59 6 26 10 Oct-83 47 12 30 11 
Mar-82 54 8 31 7 Apr-84 38 18 35 9 
Oct-82 51 9 34 6 Oct-84 45 16 29 10 
Apr-83 61 5 26 8 Apr-85 45 17 26 12 
Oct-83 57 9 24 10 Oct-85 39 23 26 12 
Apr-84 53 5 31 11 Mar-86 44 16 26 14 
Oct-84 57 5 33 5 Oct-86 51 11 28 10 
Apr-85 54 7 30 9 Apr-87 48 14 27 11 
Oct-85 61 8 24 7 Oct-87 58 12 21 9 
Mar-86 64 6 22 8 Apr-88 51 11 24 14 
Oct-86 58 7 28 7 Oct-88 66 8 17 9 
Apr-87 51 12 28 9 Apr-89 67 6 18 9 
Oct-87 62 5 24 9 Jul-89 70 5 10 15 
Apr-88 49 11 33 7 Oct-89 74 6 12 8 
Oct-88 59 9 26 6 Apr-90 75 5 14 6 
Apr-89 55 9 30 6 Oct-90 75 6 13 6 
Jul-89 58 8 26 8 Apr-91 76 6 12 6 
Oct-89 63 7 22 8 Oct-91 73 6 15 6 
Apr-90 62 7 25 6 Apr-92 74 6 14 6 
Oct-90 73 5 17 5 Sep-92 71 8 14 7 
Apr-91 71 6 17 6 Nov-92 71 6 17 6 
Oct-91 69 6 18 7 Apr-93 68 8 18 6 
Apr-92 63 11 21 5 Oct-93 73 4 15 8 
Sep-92 60 10 24 6 Apr-94 64 9 20 7 
Nov-92 57 13 25 5 Dec-94 65 8 22 5 
Apr-93 59 10 26 5 Apr-95 63 9 24 5 
Oct-93 53 12 30 5 Sep-95 57 13 25 5 
Apr-94 50 12 33 5 Apr-96 58 8 30 3 
Dec-94 61 10 25 5 Oct-96 57 11 26 7 
Apr-95 57 11 25 7 Apr-97 61 8 24 7 
Sep-95 51 10 32 7 Oct-97 60 8 27 5 
Apr-96 46 13 35 7 Apr-98 59 9 25 7 
Oct-96 39 16 37 8 Oct-98 67 9 23 2 
Apr-97 36 15 38 11 Apr-99 54 11 29 6 
Oct-97 38 15 37 10 
Apr-98 41 13 36 10 
Oct-98 48 11 30 10 




a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d. 
Apr-79 54 14 24 8 Apr-79 78 2 14 6 
Nov-79 58 12 25 5 Nov-79 75 2 17 6 
Apr-80 52 19 22 7 Apr-80 74 3 16 7 
Oct-80 47 26 21 6 Oct-80 71 5 17 7 
Apr-81 46 22 27 5 Apr-81 73 5 19 3 
Oct-81 49 19 27 5 Oct-81 70 5 20 5 
Mar-82 44 18 29 9 Mar-82 68 3 20 9 
Oct-82 47 21 27 5 Oct-82 64 5 21 10 
Apr-83 45 20 28 7 Apr-83 70 4 18 8 
Oct-83 42 25 26 7 Oct-83 70 6 16 8 
Apr-84 43 23 27 7 Apr-84 70 3 20 7 
Oct-84 47 20 27 6 Oct-84 72 2 20 6 
Apr-85 53 20 21 6 Apr-85 72 4 18 6 
Oct-85 55 18 22 5 Oct-85 78 3 15 4 
Mar-86 59 16 18 7 Mar-86 74 3 16 7 
Oct-86 58 14 21 7 Oct-86 79 2 16 3 
Apr-87 55 13 22 10 Apr-87 73 3 18 6 
Oct-87 64 9 21 6 Oct-87 79 3 15 3 
Apr-88 63 11 20 6 Apr-88 73 4 20 3 
Oct-88 72 8 17 3 Oct-88 83 2 12 3 
Apr-89 76 5 12 7 Apr-89 79 2 14 5 
Jul-89 70 6 14 10 Jul-89 79 2 14 5 
Oct-89 69 7 14 10 Oct-89 75 4 13 8 
Apr-90 74 8 12 6 Apr-90 75 3 13 9 
Oct-90 76 7 14 3 Oct-90 77 3 14 6 
Apr-91 78 5 13 4 Apr-91 79 2 13 6 
Oct-91 76 7 13 4 Oct-91 79 4 12 5 
Apr-92 75 6 14 5 Apr-92 77 5 13 5 
Sep-92 70 9 16 5 Sep-92 71 7 16 6 
Nov-92 73 10 13 4 Nov-92 69 7 16 8 
Apr-93 75 7 13 5 Apr-93 71 6 16 7 
Oct-93 73 8 15 4 Oct-93 68 7 18 7 
Apr-94 72 7 16 5 Apr-94 68 5 20 7 
Dec-94 82 5 10 3 Dec-94 70 5 17 8 
Apr-95 79 5 11 5 Apr-95 73 6 15 7 
Sep-95 77 6 13 5 Sep-95 69 6 16 9 
Apr-96 77 4 14 5 Apr-96 69 6 17 8 
Oct-96 76 5 11 8 Oct-96 68 8 18 7 
Apr-97 80 3 10 7 Apr-97 62 8 21 9 
Oct-97 83 3 8 6 Oct-97 69 6 19 7 
Apr-98 80 4 10 6 Apr-98 69 5 18 9 
Oct-98 79 4 10 7 Oct-98 68 5 17 9 
Apr-99 78 3 12 8 Apr-99 62 5 22 12 
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Question Two 
jLuxembourg jThe Netherlands 
a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d. 
Apr-79 83 3 12 2 Apr-79 84 2 10 4 
Nov-79 86 3 10 1 Nov-79 78 3 15 4 
Apr-80 84 3 10 3 Apr-80 75 3 16 6 
Oct-80 73 3 22 2 Oct-80 75 5 14 6 
Apr-81 79 3 15 3 Apr-81 76 6 14 4 
Oct-81 76 5 17 2 Oct-81 75 3 15 7 
Mar-82 73 2 19 6 Mar-82 74 4 16 6 
Oct-82 72 4 21 3 Oct-82 74 5 15 6 
Apr-83 72 5 18 5 Apr-83 77 4 15 4 
Oct-83 76 5 17 2 Oct-83 80 4 10 6 
Apr-84 80 3 14 3 Apr-84 80 3 13 4 
Oct-84 80 4 15 1 Oct-84 79 4 13 4 
Apr-85 84 2 10 4 Apr-85 77 5 11 7 
Oct-85 80 3 14 3 Oct-85 84 3 10 3 
Mar-86 81 2 14 3 Mar-86 83 2 11 4 
Oct-86 81 2 16 1 Oct-86 77 2 14 7 
Apr-87 76 2 18 4 Apr-87 82 3 12 3 
Oct-87 87 1 9 3 Oct-87 83 3 10 4 
Apr-88 78 7 10 5 Apr-88 77 3 16 4 
Oct-88 79 3 15 3 Oct-88 79 3 12 6 
Apr-89 77 5 16 2 Apr-89 84 2 11 3 
Jul-89 66 5 23 6 Jul-89 79 4 13 4 
Oct-89 78 5 13 4 Oct-89 82 3 10 5 
Apr-90 72 8 16 4 Apr-90 82 3 10 5 
Oct-90 76 3 18 3 Oct-90 82 3 11 4 
Apr-91 83 4 10 3 Apr-91 89 2 7 2 
Oct-91 79 3 15 3 Oct-91 88 3 7 2 
Apr-92 78 5 16 1 Apr-92 85 4 8 3 
Sep-92 78 5 14 3 Sep-92 85 3 9 3 
Nov-92 76 6 15 3 Nov-92 82 4 11 3 
Apr-93 76 5 16 3 Apr-93 83 3 11 3 
Oct-93 72 6 19 3 Oct-93 80 5 12 3 
Apr-94 71 9 17 3 Apr-94 77 5 16 2 
Dec-94 80 5 13 2 Dec-94 77 4 15 4 
Apr-95 80 5 13 3 Apr-95 79 6 12 3 
Sep-95 74 5 18 3 Sep-95 80 5 13 3 
Apr-96 73 7 18 2 Apr-96 78 6 14 3 
Oct-96 73 7 16 3 Oct-96 74 5 15 5 
Apr-97 77 6 15 2 Apr-97 72 6 16 6 
Oct-97 71 10 16 3 Oct-97 76 9 12 3 
Apr-98 71 6 19 4 Apr-98 77 5 14 5 
Oct-98 77 6 15 3 Oct-98 75 6 16 3 
Apr-99 77 3 17 3 Apr-99 73 5 18 4 
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Question Two 
jUnited Kingdom !European Union 
a. b. c. d. a. b. c. cl 
Apr-79 33 34 26 7 Apr-79 59 12 21 8 
Nov-79 29 41 25 5 Nov-79 58 12 23 7 
Apr-80 23 49 22 6 Apr-80 55 15 22 8 
Oct-80 24 49 24 3 Oct-80 53 16 23 8 
Apr-81 24 48 24 4 Apr-81 50 17 25 8 
Oct-81 27 41 27 5 Oct-81 53 14 26 7 
Mar-82 27 43 24 6 Mar-82 53 14 26 8 
Oct-82 29 40 26 5 Oct-82 51 15 27 7 
Apr-83 28 36 29 7 Apr-83 54 13 25 8 
Oct-83 36 28 30 6 Oct-83 55 13 24 8 
Apr-84 34 30 30 6 Apr-84 55 11 27 7 
Oct-84 38 33 25 4 Oct-84 58 11 26 5 
Apr-85 37 30 28 5 Apr-85 57 12 24 7 
Oct-85 38 30 28 4 Oct-85 60 11 22 7 
Mar-86 37 29 28 6 Apr-86 62 9 20 9 
Oct-86 42 27 26 5 Oct-86 62 9 22 7 
Apr-87 43 26 25 6 Apr-87 60 11 21 8 
Oct-87 46 24 25 5 Oct-87 65 8 20 7 
Apr-88 37 29 29 5 Apr-88 58 11 25 6 
Oct-88 48 21 27 4 Oct-88 66 8 21 5 
Apr-89 48 21 26 5 Apr-89 65 8 21 6 
Jul-89 53 14 23 10 Jul-89 63 7 21 9 
Oct-89 52 17 25 6 Oct-89 65 8 20 7 
Apr-90 52 19 24 5 Apr-90 65 8 21 6 
Oct-90 53 16 24 7 Oct-90 69 7 18 6 
Apr-91 57 13 26 4 Apr-91 72 6 17 5 
Oct-91 57 16 21 6 Oct-91 69 8 17 6 
Apr-92 54 13 25 8 Apr-92 65 10 19 6 
Sep-92 43 25 24 8 Sep-92 60 12 23 5 
Nov-92 44 23 26 7 Nov-92 58 13 24 5 
Apr-93 48 22 25 5 Apr-93 60 12 23 5 
Oct-93 43 22 30 5 Oct-93 57 13 25 5 
Apr-94 43 22 29 7 Apr-94 54 13 27 5 
Dec-94 43 22 28 7 Dec-94 59 12 24 5 
Apr-95 43 24 26 7 Apr-95 56 14 24 6 
Sep-95 42 24 29 6 Sep-95 54 14 26 6 
Apr-96 41 21 30 8 Apr-96 53 14 28 6 
Oct-96 36 28 26 11 Oct-96 48 17 28 8 
Apr-97 36 26 27 12 Apr-97 46 15 30 9 
Oct-97 36 23 29 13 Oct-97 49 14 28 9 
Apr-98 41 19 30 11 Apr-98 51 12 28 9 
Oct-98 37 22 29 12 Oct-98 54 12 26 8 
Apr-99 31 23 26 20 Apr-99 49 12 27 12 
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Question Three 
Question Three: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your countty) 
has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community? 
a. benefited 
b. not benefited 
c. no reply 
!Belgium !Denmark !France 
a. b. c. a. b. c. a. b. C. 
Apr-83 59 6 35 Apr-83 51 31 18 Apr-83 54 21 25 
Apr-84 49 22 29 Apr-84 42 34 24 Apr-84 50 24 26 
Oct-84 48 28 24 Oct-84 44 34 22 Oct-84 47 28 25 
Apr-85 52 24 24 Apr-85 44 34 22 Apr-85 53 26 21 
Oct-85 56 23 21 Oct-85 49 29 22 Oct-85 53 26 21 
Mar-86 55 17 28 Mar-86 61 22 17 Mar-86 50 24 26 
Oct-86 70 15 15 Oct-86 56 27 17 Oct-86 53 25 22 
Apr-87 65 15 20 Apr-87 54 29 17 Apr-87 60 18 22 
Oct-87 64 17 19 Oct-87 53 29 18 Oct-87 59 21 20 
Apr-88 58 14 28 Apr-88 51 32 17 Apr-88 56 23 21 
Oct-88 64 18 18 Oct-88 54 32 14 Oct-88 58 25 17 
Apr-89 67 11 22 Apr-89 52 30 18 Apr-89 59 22 19 
Jul-89 53 15 32 Jul-89 53 29 18 Jul-89 50 23 27 
Oct-89 70 15 15 Oct-89 53 33 14 Oct-89 58 21 21 
Apr-90 67 14 19 Apr-90 58 28 14 Apr-90 57 24 19 
Oct-90 69 13 18 Oct-90 64 25 11 Oct-90 57 23 20 
Apr-91 68 13 19 Apr-91 69 21 10 Apr-91 57 25 18 
Oct-91 63 15 22 Oct-91 66 24 10 Oct-91 51 29 20 
Apr-92 61 16 23 Apr-92 67 21 12 Apr-92 49 32 19 
Sep-92 57 19 24 Sep-92 73 16 11 Sep-92 48 31 21 
Nov-92 56 24 20 Nov-92 70 21 9 Nov-92 45 33 22 
Apr-93 58 22 20 Apr-93 66 24 10 Apr-93 45 36 19 
Oct-93 48 29 23 Oct-93 65 25 10 Oct-93 40 39 21 
Apr-94 49 27 24 Apr-94 64 26 10 Apr-94 39 40 22 
Dec-94 51 25 23 Dec-94 61 27 12 Dec-94 42 36 22 
Apr-95 57 22 21 Apr-95 63 26 11 Apr-95 44 38 18 
Sep-95 45 35 21 Sep-95 59 29 12 Sep-95 39 39 22 
Apr-96 41 36 23 Apr-96 60 26 14 Apr-96 41 36 23 
Oct-96 40 35 26 Oct-96 55 32 13 Oct-96 44 35 21 
Apr-97 36 40 24 Apr-97 61 26 13 Apr-97 44 35 21 
Oct-97 36 41 23 Oct-97 67 22 11 Oct-97 44 37 20 
Apr-98 44 32 24 Apr-98 65 19 16 Apr-98 46 31 23 
Oct-98 44 32 24 Oct-98 70 20 10 Oct-98 53 27 21 
Apr-99 44 32 24 Apr-99 62 23 15 Apr-99 44 27 28 
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Question Three 
!Germany !Greece !Ireland 
a. b. C. a. b. c. a. b. C. 
Apr-83 49 15 36 Apr-83 44 25 31 Apr-83 56 28 16 
Apr-84 39 24 37 Apr-84 44 35 21 Apr-84 59 29 12 
Oct-84 46 35 19 Oct-84 51 28 21 Oct-84 61 28 11 
Apr-85 45 35 18 Apr-85 49 26 25 Apr-85 62 27 11 
Oct-85 53 31 16 Oct-85 42 34 24 Oct-85 67 24 9 
Mar-86 53 25 22 Mar-86 50 23 27 Mar-86 66 22 12 
Oct-86 52 29 19 Oct-86 60 20 20 Oct-86 71 20 9 
Apr-87 46 37 17 Apr-87 58 29 13 Apr-87 65 19 16 
Oct-87 54 27 19 Oct-87 64 19 17 Oct-87 79 12 9 
Apr-88 52 31 17 Apr-88 55 20 25 Apr-88 74 16 10 
Oct-88 55 28 17 Oct-88 68 15 17 Oct-88 79 14 7 
Apr-89 48 35 17 Apr-89 72 11 17 Apr-89 82 9 9 
Jul-89 49 33 18 Jul-89 73 8 19 Jul-89 76 10 14 
Oct-89 56 26 18 Oct-89 76 10 14 Oct-89 75 14 11 
Apr-90 53 29 18 Apr-90 79 10 11 Apr-90 80 12 8 
Oct-90 61 21 18 Oct-90 78 9 13 Oct-90 85 10 5 
Apr-91 55 29 16 Apr-91 76 12 12 Apr-91 83 11 6 
Oct-91 52 30 18 Oct-91 73 14 13 Oct-91 80 13 7 
Apr-92 48 35 17 Apr-92 73 13 14 Apr-92 81 12 7 
Sep-92 47 37 16 Sep-92 70 17 13 Sep-92 77 15 8 
Nov-92 46 36 18 Nov-92 73 15 12 Nov-92 80 13 7 
Apr-93 45 38 17 Apr-93 72 17 11 Apr-93 82 11 7 
Oct-93 42 39 19 Oct-93 79 9 12 Oct-93 80 13 7 
Apr-94 41 38 21 Apr-94 69 18 14 Apr-94 81 11 8 
Dec-94 50 31 20 Dec-94 72 17 11 Dec-94 89 5 5 
Apr-95 47 34 19 Apr-95 72 19 10 Apr-95 87 7 7 
Sep-95 40 36 25 Sep-95 72 18 11 Sep-95 80 7 13 
Apr-96 38 41 21 Apr-96 65 24 11 Apr-96 85 5 9 
Oct-96 33 43 24 Oct-96 66 21 14 Oct-96 86 5 9 
Apr-97 34 43 23 Apr-97 68 19 13 Apr-97 88 3 9 
Oct-97 33 44 22 Oct-97 70 17 13 Oct-97 88 4 8 
Apr-98 68 19 13 Apr-98 68 19 13 Apr-98 85 5 10 
Oct-98 39 36 25 Oct-98 76 17 7 Oct-98 85 5 10 
Apr-99 35 39 26 Apr-99 67 18 15 Apr-99 86 3 11 
145 
Question Three 
I Luxembourg !The Netherlands 
a. b. c. a. b. C. a. b. c. 
Apr-83 69 14 17 Apr-83 74 12 14 Apr-83 78 11 11 
Apr-84 58 20 22 Apr-84 73 14 13 Apr-84 67 17 16 
Oct-84 63 23 14 Oct-84 72 16 12 Oct-84 64 19 17 
Apr-85 65 19 16 Apr-85 73 13 14 Apr-85 63 18 19 
Oct-85 70 16 14 Oct-85 69 15 16 Oct-85 67 15 18 
Mar-86 63 15 22 Mar-86 74 10 16 Mar-86 68 14 18 
Oct-86 69 17 14 Oct-86 71 18 11 Oct-86 67 19 14 
Apr-87 64 17 19 Apr-87 67 17 16 Apr-87 69 15 16 
Oct-87 72 13 15 Oct-87 84 6 10 Oct-87 74 12 14 
Apr-88 73 14 13 Apr-88 68 15 17 Apr-88 63 16 21 
Oct-88 75 12 13 Oct-88 67 16 17 Oct-88 68 14 18 
Apr-89 72 12 16 Apr-89 73 14 13 Apr-89 74 12 14 
Jul-89 68 13 19 Jul-89 61 20 19 Jul-89 69 13 18 
Oct-89 67 12 21 Oct-89 71 15 14 Oct-89 74 10 16 
Apr-90 69 11 20 Apr-90 68 19 13 Apr-90 72 13 15 
Oct-90 65 15 20 Oct-90 71 16 13 Oct-90 75 13 12 
Apr-91 64 14 22 Apr-91 73 12 15 Apr-91 77 10 13 
Oct-91 60 16 24 Oct-91 73 16 11 Oct-91 74 12 14 
Apr-92 61 16 23 Apr-92 72 14 14 Apr-92 72 14 14 
Sep-92 54 24 22 Sep-92 67 18 15 Sep-92 72 11 17 
Nov-92 56 23 21 Nov-92 69 17 14 Nov-92 70 14 16 
Apr-93 53 24 23 Apr-93 69 19 12 Apr-93 70 16 14 
Oct-93 52 23 25 Oct-93 69 22 9 Oct-93 68 17 15 
Apr-94 55 23 22 Apr-94 67 19 14 Apr-94 71 13 17 
Dec-94 54 18 28 Dec-94 72 18 11 Dec-94 69 17 14 
Apr-95 52 24 24 Apr-95 73 16 11 Apr-95 68 16 16 
Sep-95 52 22 26 Sep-95 66 19 15 Sep-95 66 20 15 
Apr-96 49 25 26 Apr-96 63 18 18 Apr-96 64 20 16 
Oct-96 51 28 22 Oct-96 64 21 16 Oct-96 69 16 15 
Apr-97 41 35 24 Apr-97 70 16 14 Apr-97 69 17 15 
Oct-97 54 22 25 Oct-97 65 19 16 Oct-97 64 25 11 
Apr-98 57 17 26 Apr-98 63 23 14 Apr-98 67 16 17 
Oct-98 51 27 22 Oct-98 69 14 18 Oct-98 67 22 12 
Apr-99 51 19 30 Apr-99 65 15 20 Apr-99 67 19 14 
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Question Three 
jUnited Kingdom I European Union 
a. b. c. a. b. C. 
Apr-83 32 57 11 Apr-83 52 25 23 
Apr-84 32 56 12 Apr-84 46 30 24 
Oct-84 32 57 11 Oct-84 48 34 18 
Apr-85 31 55 11 Apr-85 50 32 18 
Oct-85 34 53 13 Oct-85 53 30 17 
Mar-86 33 50 17 Apr-86 46 32 22 
Oct-86 36 48 16 Oct-86 51 31 18 
Apr-87 39 46 15 Apr-87 49 33 18 
Oct-87 49 42 9 Oct-87 56 28 16 
Apr-88 39 47 14 Apr-88 52 30 18 
Oct-88 47 40 13 Oct-88 56 28 16 
Apr-89 44 42 14 Apr-89 55 28 17 
Jul-89 47 34 19 Jul-89 52 25 23 
Oct-89 47 38 15 Oct-89 59 22 19 
Apr-90 46 38 16 Apr-90 59 24 17 
Oct-90 46 36 18 Oct-90 59 23 18 
Apr-91 47 37 16 Apr-91 59 24 17 
Oct-91 45 38 17 Oct-91 56 25 19 
Apr-92 45 37 18 Apr-92 53 29 18 
Sep-92 31 52 17 Sep-92 49 33 18 
Nov-92 32 53 15 Nov-92 49 34 17 
Apr-93 37 50 13 Apr-93 48 35 17 
Oct-93 33 49 18 Oct-93 45 35 20 
Apr-94 41 43 16 Apr-94 47 34 19 
Dec-94 38 45 17 Dec-94 48 32 20 
Apr-95 38 44 17 Apr-95 46 36 18 
Sep-95 40 43 18 Sep-95 44 35 21 
Apr-96 33 46 21 Apr-96 43 36 21 
Oct-96 34 47 19 Oct-96 42 37 21 
Apr-97 36 42 22 Apr-97 41 36 22 
Oct-97 37 43 20 Oct-97 44 35 21 
Apr-98 40 39 22 Apr-98 46 32 22 
Oct-98 37 42 21 Oct-98 49 31 20 
Apr-99 31 37 32 Apr-99 44 29 27 
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Question Four 
Question Four: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at 
all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union? 
a. very satisfied 
b. fairly satisfied 
c. not very satisfied 
d. not at all satisfied 
e. no reply 
!Belgium !Germany 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-93 3 48 30 9 10 Apr-93 3 40 38 10 10 
Oct-93 2 49 30 10 8 Oct-93 3 44 37 9 7 
Apr-94 4 48 32 8 9 Apr-94 1 40 43 8 8 
Dec-94 4 51 24 10 12 Dec-94 4 35 41 13 8 
Apr-95 5 46 26 10 12 Apr-95 6 39 36 11 8 
Oct-97 2 28 33 23 14 Oct-97 1 27 39 15 18 
Apr-98 1 28 34 22 16 Apr-98 2 30 37 12 17 
Apr-99 7 41 24 12 16 Apr-99 6 34 31 11 17 
!Denmark !Greece 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-93 4 45 36 12 3 Apr-93 8 37 26 11 18 
Oct-93 3 46 36 13 2 Oct-93 9 41 28 7 14 
Apr-94 3 43 33 13 9 Apr-94 3 25 47 10 15 
Dec-94 3 38 40 14 6 Dec-94 2 31 40 12 15 
Apr-95 4 43 34 12 8 Apr-95 3 32 34 12 18 
Oct-97 3 28 42 16 12 Oct-97 5 34 36 12 13 
Apr-98 5 35 35 13 12 Apr-98 5 34 32 15 13 
Apr-99 3 28 44 16 10 Apr-99 4 37 31 15 12 
!France !Ireland 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-93 2 38 37 13 11 Apr-93 11 51 14 7 16 
Oct-93 2 45 34 11 8 Oct-93 7 52 17 5 18 
Apr-94 2 39 38 11 11 Apr-94 6 58 13 6 17 
Dec-94 2 39 35 13 11 Dec-94 9 58 13 3 17 
Apr-95 2 37 34 17 9 Apr-95 6 57 14 4 19 
Oct-97 2 38 33 13 14 Oct-97 12 51 10 3 24 
Apr-98 3 31 34 17 16 Apr-98 9 53 10 4 25 
Apr-99 4 39 28 12 17 Apr-99 15 45 9 3 27 
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Question Four 
I Italy !United Kingdom 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. C, d. e. 
Apr-93 1 31 39 15 14 Apr-93 2 36 32 15 15 
Oct-93 2 32 38 12 16 Oct-93 2 40 27 9 22 
Apr-94 2 31 42 11 14 Apr-94 2 38 27 12 22 
Dec-94 2 39 33 10 15 Dec-94 1 28 33 15 24 
Apr-95 2 36 35 12 16 Apr-95 1 29 32 15 23 
Oct-97 4 32 31 8 25 Oct-97 3 31 24 12 29 
Apr-98 2 33 26 9 30 Apr-98 4 29 23 15 24 
Apr-99 3 40 24 8 25 Apr-99 5 27 20 17 31 
I Luxembourg !European Union 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-93 4 55 24 3 15 Apr-93 3 38 35 12 12 
Oct-93 5 55 28 6 5 Oct-93 3 42 34 9 12 
Apr-94 7 52 24 5 12 Apr-94 2 38 37 10 13 
Dec-94 8 52 24 5 11 Dec-94 3 37 35 12 14 
Apr-95 7 52 24 6 11 Apr-95 3 35 34 14 14 
Oct-97 5 45 30 7 14 Oct-97 3 32 32 12 21 
Apr-98 19 45 24 5 8 Apr-98 3 32 31 12 21 
Apr-99 11 49 21 4 15 Apr-99 6 36 27 11 20 
!The Netherlands 
a. b. C. d. e. 
Apr-93 1 48 37 6 8 
Oct-93 2 48 37 9 4 
Apr-94 1 45 40 7 7 
Dec-94 1 38 41 12 8 
Apr-95 2 43 36 10 9 
Oct-97 2 34 39 11 15 
Apr-98 2 40 35 8 15 
Apr-99 4 39 33 8 16 
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Question Five 
Question Five: On the whole, are you veiy satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
al all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country-)? 
a. veiy satisfied 
b. fairly satisfied 
c. not veiy satisfied 
d. not at all satisfied 
e. no reply 
!Belgium 
a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 4 39 29 14 14 
Nov-79 8 39 25 12 16 
Oct-80 4 30 32 19 15 
Oct-81 7 28 31 18 16 
Mar-82 7 37 32 17 11 
Oct-82 4 40 29 14 13 
Apr-83 4 39 27 17 13 
Oct-83 5 48 27 11 9 
Apr-84 6 38 34 17 5 
Oct-84 4 43 33 15 5 
Apr-85 5 47 27 14 7 
Oct-85 7 51 24 12 6 
Mar-86 7 43 25 18 7 
Oct-86 3 45 33 14 5 
Apr-87 8 45 27 13 7 
Oct-87 6 39 30 17 8 
Apr-88 9 46 27 11 7 
Oct-88 5 43 41 8 3 
Apr-89 9 49 23 12 7 
Jul-89 8 45 22 7 18 
Oct-89 8 55 25 9 3 
Apr-90 11 55 20 10 4 
Oct-90 5 51 26 12 6 
Apr-91 11 54 23 8 4 
Oct-91 7 46 30 12 5 
Apr-92 6 50 26 12 6 
Sep-92 6 47 28 14 5 
Apr-93 4 46 32 14 4 
Oct-93 4 44 31 17 4 
Apr-94 4 49 30 13 4 
Dec-94 6 53 26 11 3 
Apr-95 8 47 30 11 4 
Oct-97 2 26 34 32 5 
Apr-98 1 28 37 30 5 




a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 9 53 24 8 6 Apr-79 4 37 30 17 12 
Apr-80 17 54 18 6 5 Nov-79 3 38 32 15 12 
Apr-81 13 47 27 8 5 Oct-80 3 33 32 18 12 
Oct-81 17 50 22 7 4 Oct-81 5 48 27 7 13 
Mar-82 11 50 27 8 4 Mar-82 2 42 30 12 14 
Oct-82 12 45 29 8 6 Oct-82 5 40 32 14 9 
Apr-83 16 54 20 4 6 Apr-83 3 33 37 17 10 
Oct-83 21 50 19 3 7 Oct-83 7 39 30 13 11 
Apr-84 20 48 21 6 5 Apr-84 4 36 34 18 8 
Oct-84 20 50 19 5 6 Oct-84 4 34 38 14 10 
Apr-85 19 49 21 7 4 Apr-85 5 39 35 13 8 
Oct-85 23 49 17 4 7 Oct-85 3 36 33 18 10 
Mar-86 28 46 17 5 4 Mar-86 4 45 28 11 12 
Oct-86 18 48 21 1 6 Oct-86 6 44 28 10 12 
Apr-87 22 48 20 6 4 Apr-87 4 48 31 10 7 
Oct-87 16 53 24 5 2 Oct-87 3 39 34 15 9 
Apr-88 17 57 21 3 2 Apr-88 5 46 32 10 7 
Oct-88 13 40 37 8 2 Oct-88 8 34 43 10 5 
Apr-89 14 56 22 6 2 Apr-89 4 50 33 9 4 
Jul-89 13 54 25 5 3 Jul-89 7 49 29 9 6 
Oct-89 12 49 30 7 2 Oct-89 5 49 28 12 6 
Apr-90 21 54 18 7 0 Apr-90 5 48 28 12 7 
Oct-90 15 55 22 7 1 Oct-90 5 37 31 19 8 
Apr-91 22 60 13 4 1 Apr-91 7 54 22 12 5 
Oct-91 17 56 20 6 1 Oct-91 3 40 36 17 4 
Apr-92 22 56 17 5 0 Apr-92 2 38 34 21 5 
Nov-92 22 58 16 3 1 Sep-92 4 43 32 17 4 
Apr-93 21 60 14 4 1 Apr-93 3 38 36 20 3 
Oct-93 19 59 19 3 0 Oct-93 4 42 35 15 4 
Apr-94 17 61 16 5 2 Apr-94 4 43 33 16 4 
Dec-94 18 64 15 2 0 Dec-94 4 54 28 12 2 
Apr-97 19 64 14 2 1 Apr-95 4 44 36 15 2 
Oct-97 15 62 19 3 1 Oct-97 3 45 35 14 3 
Oct-98 27 57 14 2 1 Apr-98 4 35 39 17 4 




a. b. C. ct. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 10 70 13 2 5 Oct-80 20 33 23 22 2 
Nov-79 12 68 12 2 6 Oct-81 24 28 18 23 7 
Oct-80 9 64 17 4 6 Mar-82 19 41 21 11 8 
Oct-81 11 59 18 5 7 Oct-82 23 35 25 9 8 
Mar-82 12 56 21 7 4 Apr-83 19 40 21 13 7 
Oct-82 8 59 22 4 7 Oct-83 24 37 20 11 8 
Apr-83 12 59 18 4 7 Apr-84 19 41 21 13 6 
Oct-83 7 59 21 3 10 Oct-84 18 39 24 13 6 
Apr-84 12 59 19 3 7 Apr-85 19 40 20 13 8 
Oct-84 11 62 21 5 1 Oct-85 19 32 26 16 7 
Apr-85 13 60 19 5 3 Mar-86 18 38 17 20 7 
Oct-85 10 59 22 4 5 Oct-86 23 34 22 17 4 
Mar-86 11 69 15 2 3 Apr-87 20 41 20 15 4 
Oct-86 12 59 22 4 3 Oct-87 11 38 23 21 7 
Apr-87 10 65 19 2 4 Apr-88 14 37 20 24 5 
Oct-87 6 62 25 4 3 Oct-88 16 36 32 10 6 
Apr-88 13 64 18 2 3 Apr-89 17 35 20 22 6 
Oct-88 18 50 28 2 2 Jul-89 23 30 19 20 8 
Apr-89 10 66 18 4 2 Oct-89 11 37 25 23 4 
Jul-89 13 65 15 4 3 Apr-90 7 27 25 38 3 
Oct-89 13 65 17 3 2 Oct-90 8 36 34 19 3 
Apr-90 15 66 15 2 2 Apr-91 5 32 35 25 3 
Oct-90 16 59 17 5 3 Oct-91 5 29 39 23 4 
Apr-91 11 52 28 8 1 Apr-92 6 30 39 21 4 
Oct-91 9 52 30 6 3 Sep-92 6 30 41 20 3 
Apr-92 9 52 31 6 2 Apr-93 6 28 38 27 1 
Sep-92 7 49 34 8 2 Oct-93 5 34 41 18 2 
Apr-93 6 45 36 10 3 Apr-94 4 28 49 17 3 
Oct-93 6 45 36 11 2 Dec-94 3 28 49 18 1 
Apr-94 6 46 37 9 2 Apr-95 4 26 44 25 1 
Dec-94 9 51 31 7 2 Oct-97 4 34 45 15 2 
Apr-95 12 51 28 7 1 Apr-98 5 28 43 22 1 
Oct-97 5 40 37 15 3 Apr-99 9 53 29 9 0 
Apr-98 6 44 37 11 2 




a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 5 42 30 13 10 Apr-79 2 14 46 36 2 
Nov-79 11 46 22 15 6 Nov-79 2 19 41 36 2 
Oct-80 7 41 30 16 6 Oct-SO 3 18 45 32 2 
Oct-81 13 46 22 9 10 Oct-81 4 16 43 34 3 
Mar-82 12 44 22 11 11 Mar-82 2 19 44 31 4 
Oct-82 6 41 28 16 9 Oct-82 3 16 38 39 4 
Apr-83 6 39 30 19 6 Apr-83 2 15 46 34 3 
Oct-83 6 37 29 20 8 Oct-83 1 19 46 31 3 
Apr-84 7 43 27 16 7 Apr-84 1 19 45 31 4 
Oct-84 6 38 30 20 6 Oct-84 3 25 45 26 1 
Apr-85 8 41 27 17 6 Apr-85 2 23 45 27 3 
Oct-85 6 40 27 20 7 Oct-85 3 25 43 26 3 
Mar-86 10 42 23 18 7 Mar-86 2 28 43 24 3 
Oct-86 4 40 29 19 8 Oct-86 2 23 46 25 4 
Apr-87 8 46 24 15 7 Apr-87 2 28 42 25 3 
Oct-87 6 40 26 22 6 Oct-87 2 24 46 26 2 
Apr-88 9 46 23 15 7 Apr-88 2 25 46 25 2 
Oct-88 9 36 38 12 5 Oct-88 5 31 41 21 2 
Apr-89 10 49 23 12 6 Apr-89 2 25 44 27 2 
Jul-89 12 45 23 10 10 Jul-89 3 24 46 25 2 
Oct-89 14 45 18 15 8 Oct-89 4 25 44 23 4 
Apr-90 16 49 15 12 8 Apr-90 2 27 41 27 3 
Oct-90 11 48 20 13 8 Oct-90 2 19 43 33 3 
Apr-91 4 29 43 22 2 Apr-91 4 29 43 22 2 
Oct-91 13 44 21 16 6 Oct-91 2 18 45 33 2 
Apr-92 12 49 21 12 6 Apr-92 2 19 45 31 3 
Sep-92 13 49 19 12 7 Sep-92 1 11 40 44 4 
Apr-93 15 47 21 11 6 Apr-93 1 11 38 49 1 
Oct-93 10 50 22 13 5 Oct-93 0 12 40 45 3 
Apr-94 14 51 18 10 7 Apr-94 2 17 44 33 3 
Dec-94 12 57 21 6 3 Dec-94 2 24 48 25 1 
Apr-95 12 58 18 8 5 Apr-95 2 18 50 29 1 
Oct-97 15 55 16 5 9 Oct-97 2 28 45 21 4 
Apr-98 14 61 12 5 8 Apr-98 2 26 41 27 4 
Apr-99 21 53 15 3 8 Apr-99 3 32 41 23 2 
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Question Five 
Luxembourg !The Netherlands 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 17 44 29 4 6 Apr-79 9 55 25 6 5 
Nov-79 23 50 23 2 2 Nov-79 7 54 27 7 5 
Oct-80 18 59 17 5 1 Oct-80 9 42 34 11 4 
Oct-81 16 59 18 4 3 Oct-81 6 53 27 9 5 
Mar-82 14 49 26 9 2 Mar-82 6 49 32 8 5 
Oct-82 12 47 28 8 5 Oct-82 7 43 33 14 3 
Apr-83 13 49 23 6 9 Apr-83 7 46 33 10 4 
Oct-83 11 49 22 10 8 Oct-83 7 47 30 11 5 
Apr-84 11 53 20 9 7 Apr-84 6 48 33 10 3 
Oct-84 11 57 24 5 3 Oct-84 7 51 30 9 3 
Apr-85 15 57 20 2 6 Apr-85 7 49 29 9 6 
Oct-85 18 49 21 6 6 Oct-85 9 49 28 9 5 
Mar-86 20 55 17 2 6 Mar-86 10 51 25 5 9 
Oct-86 18 49 22 4 7 Oct-86 8 52 29 9 3 
Apr-87 16 61 17 2 4 Apr-87 7 54 28 7 4 
Oct-87 18 50 19 3 10 Oct-87 8 49 31 7 5 
Apr-88 14 56 15 4 11 Apr-88 8 53 28 6 5 
Oct-88 20 44 28 4 4 Oct-88 6 60 24 4 6 
Apr-89 21 61 16 0 2 Apr-89 11 60 22 5 2 
Jul-89 21 55 16 2 6 Jul-89 12 62 20 3 3 
Oct-89 18 59 13 2 8 Oct-89 13 60 20 4 3 
Apr-90 22 49 12 5 12 Apr-90 11 62 22 3 2 
Oct-90 20 51 19 4 6 Oct-90 12 55 25 4 4 
Apr-91 30 46 14 2 8 Apr-91 13 61 21 3 2 
Oct-91 23 54 15 1 7 Oct-91 8 55 29 5 3 
Apr-92 14 60 18 3 5 Apr-92 10 60 23 4 3 
Sep-92 18 52 20 6 4 Sep-92 7 64 22 5 2 
Apr-93 10 61 21 3 4 Apr-93 9 59 25 5 2 
Oct-93 15 58 18 3 6 Oct-93 8 59 24 6 3 
Apr-94 19 53 17 3 8 Apr-94 9 56 27 7 1 
Dec-94 14 67 12 1 5 Dec-94 4 60 28 6 2 
Apr-95 17 59 15 4 6 Apr-95 9 60 24 4 3 
Oct-97 10 60 18 5 8 Oct-97 7 64 23 4 2 
Apr-98 23 56 14 4 4 Apr-98 11 64 20 3 2 
Apr-99 21 62 9 3 6 Apr-99 13 65 17 3 2 
154 
Question Five 
.United Kingdom !European Union 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Apr-79 7 46 27 13 7 Apr-79 6 43 28 16 7 
Nov-79 7 45 28 13 7 Nov-79 7 44 27 15 7 
Oct-80 9 42 27 16 6 Oct-80 7 40 30 17 6 
Oct-81 6 42 29 13 10 Oct-81 8 42 28 14 8 
Mar-82 14 46 25 9 6 Mar-82 8 41 30 14 7 
Oct-82 13 45 23 12 7 Oct-82 8 41 28 16 7 
Apr-83 12 52 23 7 6 Apr-83 8 41 30 15 6 
Oct-83 12 49 20 12 7 Oct-83 8 43 28 14 7 
Apr-84 11 49 25 9 6 Apr-84 8 42 30 14 6 
Oct-84 12 48 27 10 3 Oct-84 8 43 32 13 4 
Apr-85 7 44 30 13 6 Apr-85 8 42 31 14 5 
Oct-85 9 43 29 15 4 Oct-85 8 41 31 14 6 
Mar-86 8 43 31 12 6 Apr-86 8 45 28 12 7 
Oct-86 11 42 29 14 7 Oct-86 10 42 29 12 7 
Apr-87 9 49 26 11 5 Apr-87 8 46 29 12 5 
Oct-87 11 45 27 13 4 Oct-87 7 44 31 13 5 
Apr-88 10 47 27 11 5 Apr-88 8 45 30 12 5 
Oct-88 10 37 37 13 3 Oct-88 10 39 37 11 3 
Apr-89 12 45 26 11 6 Apr-89 8 48 28 12 4 
Jul-89 9 47 26 10 8 Jul-89 9 47 27 11 6 
Oct-89 9 46 27 13 5 Oct-89 10 47 27 12 4 
Apr-90 7 42 33 12 6 Apr-90 9 47 28 12 4 
Oct-90 8 42 30 14 6 Oct-90 9 43 29 14 5 
Apr-91 9 51 27 9 4 Apr-91 9 48 29 11 3 
Oct-91 8 52 23 11 6 Oct-91 7 43 32 14 4 
Apr-92 9 50 27 9 5 Apr-92 7 42 32 15 4 
Sep-92 6 42 32 15 5 Sep-92 6 39 33 18 4 
Apr-93 7 42 30 16 5 Apr-93 5 37 34 21 3 
Oct-93 6 42 32 14 6 Oct-93 5 38 35 19 3 
Apr-94 6 43 29 16 6 Apr-94 5 39 35 17 4 
Dec-94 5 46 34 12 3 Dec-94 5 44 35 12 2 
Apr-95 5 43 36 11 5 Apr-95 6 42 36 14 3 
Oct-97 8 55 18 7 11 Oct-97 5 43 34 13 5 
Apr-98 9 52 20 10 9 Apr-98 6 41 34 14 4 




Part One: Have you in recent times read or heard anything about the Assembly of the 
European Community, that is to say the European Parliament? 
a. yes 
b. no 
c. no reply 
!Belgium !Denmark !France 
a. b. c. a. b. C. a. b. C. 
Apr-79 65 32 3 Apr-79 76 16 8 Apr-79 65 23 12 
Nov-79 45 46 9 Nov-79 65 27 8 Nov-79 67 27 6 
Oct-82 56 31 13 Oct-82 42 54 4 Oct-82 40 57 3 
Apr-83 31 58 11 Apr-83 31 63 6 Apr-83 30 63 7 
Oct-83 35 52 13 Oct-83 62 36 2 Oct-83 50 47 3 
Apr-84 74 26 0 Apr-84 74 24 2 Apr-84 82 17 1 
Oct-84 71 22 7 Oct-84 59 28 13 Oct-84 67 26 7 
Apr-85 66 30 4 Apr-85 60 40 0 Apr-85 69 27 4 
Oct-85 58 36 6 Oct-85 56 44 0 Oct-85 55 41 4 
Mar-86 45 47 8 Mar-86 66 30 4 Mar-86 57 40 3 
Oct-86 45 50 5 Oct-86 41 54 5 Oct-86 45 50 5 
Apr-87 47 47 6 Apr-87 44 50 6 Apr-87 46 53 1 
Oct-87 47 42 11 Oct-87 59 34 7 Oct-87 46 38 6 
Apr-88 50 38 12 Apr-88 51 43 6 Apr-88 45 50 5 
Oct-88 54 38 8 Oct-88 62 33 5 Oct-88 58 37 5 
Apr-89 62 34 4 Apr-89 54 41 5 Apr-89 65 33 2 
Jul-89 64 30 6 Jul-89 86 13 1 Jul-89 73 24 3 
Oct-89 59 34 7 Oct-89 54 39 7 Oct-89 55 39 6 
Apr-90 57 38 5 Apr-90 50 48 2 Apr-90 53 41 6 
Oct-90 49 46 5 Oct-90 45 53 2 Oct-90 46 51 3 
Apr-91 40 49 11 Apr-91 42 53 5 Apr-91 38 56 6 
Oct-91 44 45 11 Oct-91 48 49 3 Oct-91 48 46 6 
Apr-92 47 44 9 Apr-92 55 41 4 Apr-92 39 53 8 
Sep-92 53 39 6 Sep-92 59 38 3 Sep-92 57 37 6 
Apr-93 49 43 8 Apr-93 55 42 3 Apr-93 42 52 6 
Oct-93 58 33 9 Oct-93 60 39 1 Oct-93 54 41 5 
Apr-94 51 41 8 Apr-94 63 34 2 Apr-94 47 50 3 
Dec-94 56 Dec-94 60 Dec-94 46 
Apr-95 65 31 4 Apr-95 72 28 0 Apr-95 52 46 2 
Sep-95 53 43 Sep-95 80 19 Sep-95 46 52 
Apr-97 40 52 6 Apr-97 66 33 2 Apr-97 48 50 3 
Oct-97 48 47 5 Oct-97 51 46 3 Oct-97 35 61 4 
Apr-98 38 55 6 Apr-98 49 48 3 Apr-98 39 57 4 
Oct-98 40 54 6 Oct-98 55 42 3 Oct-98 38 57 5 
Apr-99 73 24 3 Apr-99 82 17 1 Apr-99 61 35 4 
156 
Question Six 
!Gennany !Greece !Ireland 
a. b. c. a. b. c. Yes No No 
Apr-79 60 27 13 
Nov-79 77 13 10 
Oct-82 69 26 5 
Oct-82 57 40 3 
Apr-83 37 58 5 
Oct-83 51 46 3 
reply 
Apr-79 73 24 3 
Nov-79 67 29 4 
Apr-83 33 66 1 
Oct-83 47 39 14 
Apr-84 67 33 0 
Oct-84 43 48 9 
Oct-82 59 32 10 
Apr-83 41 47 12 
Apr-84 79 20 1 
Oct-84 75 18 7 
Apr-85 53 42 5 
Oct-85 45 51 4 
Oct-83 52 44 4 
Apr-84 75 24 1 
Apr-85 55 36 9 
Oct-85 49 40 11 
Mar-86 39 46 15 
Oct-86 39 46 15 
Apr-87 46 43 11 
Oct-87 37 51 12 
Mar-86 37 58 5 
Oct-86 40 57 3 
Apr-87 36 59 5 
Oct-87 40 50 10 
Apr-88 51 41 8 
Oct-88 52 43 5 
Oct-84 61 29 10 
Apr-85 58 37 5 
Oct-85 54 40 6 
Mar-86 46 47 7 
Oct-86 44 52 4 
Apr-87 36 56 8 
Apr-88 47 39 14 
Oct-88 46 43 11 
Apr-89 50 44 6 
Jul-89 56 40 4 
Oct-87 39 54 7 
Apr-88 36 57 7 
Apr-89 39 52 9 
Jul-89 67 28 5 
Oct-89 55 33 12 
Apr-90 48 41 11 
Oct-90 55 37 8 
Apr-91 45 43 12 
Oct-91 49 39 12 
Apr-92 47 41 12 
Sep-92 56 34 10 
Apr-93 46 43 11 
Oct-93 58 32 10 
Oct-89 67 23 10 
Apr-90 68 28 4 
Oct-90 52 42 6 
Apr-91 45 48 7 
Oct-91 51 42 7 
Apr-92 49 43 8 
Sep-92 57 39 4 
Apr-93 54 42 4 
Oct-93 57 37 6 
Apr-94 75 21 4 
Dec-94 56 
Oct-88 57 40 3 
Apr-89 52 45 3 
Jul-89 65 31 4 
Oct-89 50 42 8 
Apr-90 53 41 6 
Oct-90 51 44 5 
Apr-91 40 57 3 
Oct-91 48 48 4 
Apr-92 44 48 8 
Sep-92 50 44 6 
Apr-93 41 53 6 
Apr-94 48 43 9 
Dec-94 54 
Apr-95 65 28 7 
Sep-95 52 40 
Apr-97 52 34 14 
Oct-97 42 40 18 
Apr-98 48 39 13 
Oct-98 42 43 14 
Apr-95 74 25 2 
Sep-95 50 47 
Apr-97 57 40 3 
Oct-97 55 40 5 
Apr-98 50 46 4 
Oct-98 50 47 3 
Apr-99 66 30 4 
Oct-93 58 34 8 
Apr-94 56 40 4 
Dec-94 48 
Apr-95 60 37 3 
Sep-95 43 53 
Apr-97 38 57 6 
Oct-97 33 60 6 
Apr-98 28 65 7 
Apr-99 60 26 14 Oct-98 32 57 11 
Apr-99 54 37 10 
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Question Six 
I Italy I Luxembourg !The Netherlands 
Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
reply reply reply 
Apr-79 77 15 8 Apr-79 76 21 3 Apr-79 76 22 2 
Nov-79 66 31 3 Nov-79 76 23 1 Nov-79 64 30 6 
Oct-82 52 45 3 Oct-82 61 37 2 Oct-82 66 30 4 
Apr-83 50 46 4 Apr-83 53 43 4 Apr-83 49 49 2 
Oct-83 47 47 6 Oct-83 67 32 1 Oct-83 52 42 6 
Apr-84 71 29 0 Apr-84 81 19 0 Apr-84 73 23 4 
Oct-84 72 25 3 Oct-84 84 15 1 Oct-84 67 25 8 
Apr-85 68 29 3 Apr-85 79 20 1 Apr-85 62 34 4 
Oct-85 69 28 3 Oct-85 74 24 2 Oct-85 50 44 6 
Mar-86 60 34 6 Mar-86 69 29 2 Mar-86 44 51 5 
Oct-86 51 45 4 Oct-86 65 33 2 Oct-86 41 55 4 
Apr-87 47 48 5 Apr-87 66 32 2 Apr-87 41 54 5 
Oct-87 46 49 5 Oct-87 60 36 4 Oct-87 32 61 7 
Apr-88 52 43 5 Apr-88 65 32 3 Apr-88 36 55 9 
Oct-88 58 36 6 Oct-88 67 29 4 Oct-88 46 48 6 
Apr-89 57 40 3 Apr-89 81 16 3 Apr-89 57 41 2 
Jul-89 72 26 2 Jul-89 75 21 4 Jul-89 71 28 1 
Oct-89 62 32 6 Oct-89 69 27 4 Oct-89 41 53 6 
Apr-90 58 37 5 Apr-90 64 32 4 Apr-90 41 57 2 
Oct-90 51 44 5 Oct-90 59 38 3 Oct-90 41 55 4 
Apr-91 51 40 9 Apr-91 69 26 5 Apr-91 39 57 4 
Oct-91 51 42 7 Oct-91 65 33 2 Oct-91 53 44 3 
Apr-92 45 47 8 Apr-92 67 27 6 Apr-92 40 55 5 
Sep-92 54 39 7 Sep-92 65 32 3 Sep-92 50 45 5 
Apr-93 47 46 7 Apr-93 59 38 3 Apr-93 38 57 5 
Oct-93 55 39 6 Oct-93 63 33 4 Oct-93 64 32 4 
Apr-94 55 39 5 Apr-94 69 29 2 Apr-94 41 56 4 
Dec-94 47 Dec-94 64 Dec-94 47 
Apr-95 60 36 4 Apr-95 66 31 3 Apr-95 60 38 3 
Sep-95 54 42 Sep-95 68 27 Sep-95 58 40 
Apr-97 71 26 3 Apr-97 78 20 2 Apr-97 58 42 1 
Oct-97 48 45 7 Oct-97 64 32 4 Oct-97 49 49 3 
Apr-98 53 41 6 Apr-98 66 32 1 Apr-98 46 50 4 
Oct-98 53 40 7 Oct-98 59 36 6 Oct-98 54 40 7 
Apr-99 68 27 6 Apr-99 83 16 1 Apr-99 68 30 2 
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Question Six 
I United Kingdom I European Union 
Yes No No Yes No No 
reply reply 
Apr-79 55 42 3 Apr-79 65 27 8 
Nov-79 55 41 4 Nov-79 66 28 6 
Oct-82 49 49 2 Oct-82 54 42 4 
Apr-83 31 66 3 Apr-83 37 59 4 
Oct-83 48 50 2 Oct-83 48 45 7 
Apr-84 72 28 0 Apr-84 75 24 1 
Oct-84 58 38 4 Oct-84 67 27 6 
Apr-85 54 44 2 Apr-85 61 34 5 
Oct-85 41 57 2 Oct-85 53 42 5 
Mar-86 38 59 3 Apr-86 49 43 8 
Oct-86 34 61 5 Oct-86 43 50 7 
Apr-87 37 60 3 Apr-87 45 50 5 
Oct-87 41 56 3 Oct-87 44 49 7 
Apr-88 36 61 3 Apr-88 46 46 8 
Oct-88 50 46 4 Oct-88 53 40 7 
Apr-89 50 47 3 Apr-89 55 41 4 
Jul-89 74 25 1 Jul-89 70 27 3 
Oct-89 48 49 3 Oct-89 55 38 7 
Apr-90 46 52 2 Apr-90 52 42 6 
Oct-90 39 59 2 Oct-90 49 46 5 
Apr-91 37 60 3 Apr-91 44 49 7 
Oct-91 56 41 3 Oct-91 52 41 7 
Apr-92 36 61 3 Apr-92 44 48 8 
Sep-92 53 43 4 Sep-92 55 38 7 
Apr-93 40 58 2 Apr-93 45 48 7 
Oct-93 58 40 2 Oct-93 57 37 6 
Apr-94 47 50 3 Apr-94 52 43 5 
Dec-94 51 Dec-94 52 
Apr-95 64 35 1 Apr-95 63 33 4 
Sep-95 59 40 Sep-95 56 41 
Apr-97 45 52 4 Apr-97 54 40 6 
Oct-97 33 62 5 Oct-97 43 48 9 
Apr-98 32 65 4 Apr-98 44 50 7 
Oct-98 31 63 6 Oct-98 43 49 8 
Apr-99 42 54 5 Apr-99 60 33 7 
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Question Six 
Part Two: If so, has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable 
impression of the European Parliament? 
a. favourable 
b. neither favourable nor unfavourable 
c. unfavourable 
d. no reply 
!Belgium !Denmark 
a. b. C. d. a. b. c. d. 
Oct-82 20 34 21 25 Oct-82 26 21 40 13 
Apr-83 34 31 21 14 Apr-83 18 25 32 25 
Apr-85 31 34 30 5 Apr-85 13 31 41 15 
Oct-85 37 41 19 3 Oct-85 14 32 42 12 
Mar-86 39 33 23 5 Mar-86 30 32 30 8 
Oct-86 33 44 18 5 Oct-86 17 36 34 13 
Apr-87 33 35 24 8 Apr-87 20 27 41 12 
Oct-87 42 33 20 5 Oct-87 18 39 36 7 
Apr-88 40 42 14 4 Apr-88 19 39 34 8 
Oct-88 49 35 13 3 Oct-88 26 45 22 7 
Apr-89 47 35 13 5 Apr-89 23 49 23 5 
Jul-89 36 44 12 8 Jul-89 24 43 26 7 
Oct-89 48 35 12 5 Oct-89 26 39 31 4 
Apr-90 49 30 14 7 Apr-90 33 29 32 6 
Oct-90 45 30 18 7 Oct-90 35 31 28 6 
Apr-91 47 27 21 5 Apr-91 38 26 28 8 
Oct-91 42 37 16 5 Oct-91 34 24 35 7 
Apr-92 41 31 19 9 Apr-92 34 28 36 2 
Sep-92 43 38 12 7 Sep-92 30 31 34 5 




a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d. 
Oct-82 27 43 25 5 Oct-82 24 28 29 19 
Apr-83 25 29 27 19 Apr-83 37 32 20 11 
Apr-85 32 40 21 7 Apr-85 20 35 42 3 
Oct-85 42 32 19 17 Oct-85 23 41 35 1 
Mar-86 42 35 16 7 Mar-86 29 36 30 5 
Oct-86 37 36 18 9 Oct-86 22 40 33 5 
Apr-87 40 33 18 9 Apr-87 19 35 44 2 
Oct=87 44 37 15 4 Oct-87 32 40 27 1 
Apr-88 52 28 12 8 Apr-88 30 41 26 3 
Oct-88 50 33 9 8 Oct-88 40 35 21 4 
Apr-89 48 30 16 6 Apr-89 35 38 22 5 
Jul-89 40 31 24 5 Jul-89 43 36 18 3 
Oct-89 46 34 14 6 Oct-89 48 24 21 7 
Apr-90 43 39 12 6 Apr-90 46 27 20 7 
Oct-90 45 36 12 7 Oct-90 48 28 17 7 
Apr-91 53 29 14 4 Apr-91 48 23 22 7 
Oct-91 46 36 14 4 Oct-91 46 28 18 8 
Apr-92 46 32 14 8 Apr-92 48 21 24 7 
Sep-92 41 37 17 5 Sep-92 44 26 24 6 




a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d 
Oct-82 40 34 13 13 Oct-82 29 25 33 13 
Apr-83 33 24 26 17 Apr-83 36 27 22 15 
Apr-85 40 26 25 9 Apr-85 38 25 31 6 
Oct-85 43 31 20 6 Oct-85 41 19 33 7 
Mar-86 42 30 21 7 Mar-86 54 19 21 6 
Oct-86 43 42 9 6 Oct-86 41 25 27 7 
Apr-87 45 36 15 4 Apr-87 47 24 23 6 
Oct-87 59 26 11 4 Oct-87 62 18 17 3 
Apr-88 52 32 10 6 Apr-88 65 18 13 4 
Oct-88 56 33 6 5 Oct-88 65 16 12 7 
Apr-89 60 30 6 4 Apr-89 69 16 8 7 
Jul-89 61 22 6 11 Jul-89 55 25 12 8 
Oct-89 68 21 5 6 Oct-89 68 14 10 8 
Apr-90 70 25 3 2 Apr-90 76 11 9 4 
Oct-90 65 23 5 7 Oct-90 65 17 13 5 
Apr-91 65 25 6 4 Apr-91 67 17 11 5 
Oct-91 69 24 4 3 Oct-91 68 16 9 7 
Apr-92 67 23 7 3 Apr-92 66 17 11 6 
Sep-92 59 28 9 4 Sep-92 67 14 13 6 
Apr-93 56 11 30 3 Apr-93 66 11 17 6 
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Question Six 
!Italy I Luxembourg 
a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d 
Oct-82 44 20 22 14 Oct-82 23 25 42 10 
Apr-83 50 20 20 10 Apr-83 15 19 61 5 
Apr-85 52 24 19 5 Apr-85 22 22 49 7 
Oct-85 55 21 20 4 Oct-85 24 37 34 5 
Mar-86 54 19 21 6 Mar-86 27 34 36 3 
Oct-86 51 25 27 7 Oct-86 26 34 36 4 
Apr-87 50 20 25 5 Apr-87 22 37 35 6 
Oct-87 61 17 17 5 Oct-87 27 36 34 3 
Apr-88 65 21 11 3 Apr-88 32 33 27 8 
Oct-88 68 19 9 4 Oct-88 37 46 13 4 
Apr-89 64 21 11 4 Apr-89 31 40 24 5 
Jul-89 66 20 10 4 Jul-89 32 38 21 9 
Oct-89 72 16 8 4 Oct-89 37 33 24 6 
Apr-90 74 16 6 4 Apr-90 35 30 33 2 
Oct-90 70 17 10 3 Oct-90 32 40 23 5 
Apr-91 67 16 11 6 Apr-91 43 33 21 3 
Oct-91 65 22 7 6 Oct-91 37 30 24 9 
Apr-92 66 22 8 4 Apr-92 37 33 25 5 
Sep-92 63 22 9 6 Sep-92 37 36 23 4 
Apr-93 58 11 25 6 Apr-93 35 20 40 5 
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Question Six 
!The Netherlands !United Kingdom 
a. b. c. d a. b. c. d. 
Oct-82 17 19 42 22 Oct-82 18 16 59 7 
Apr-83 24 26 39 11 Apr-83 23 15 52 10 
Apr-85 22 22 49 7 Apr-85 20 22 52 6 
Oct-85 25 24 45 6 Oct-85 24 12 58 6 
Mar-86 28 22 45 5 Mar-86 24 17 53 6 
Oct-86 25 27 37 11 Oct-86 22 22 53 3 
Apr-87 17 26 50 7 Apr-87 25 20 52 3 
Oct-87 31 19 42 8 Oct-87 31 20 43 6 
Apr-88 28 27 35 10 Apr-88 27 23 46 4 
Oct-88 34 26 27 13 Oct-88 41 23 32 4 
Apr-89 37 26 27 10 Apr-89 34 23 39 4 
Jul-89 21 28 42 9 Jul-89 38 24 30 8 
Oct-89 43 20 28 9 Oct-89 46 16 33 5 
Apr-90 43 23 26 8 Apr-90 45 23 25 7 
Oct-90 40 19 30 11 Oct-90 44 20 32 4 
Apr-91 42 23 27 8 Apr-91 42 15 36 7 
Oct-91 41 19 31 9 Oct-91 41 17 37 5 
Apr-92 32 25 33 10 Apr-92 43 20 30 7 
Sep-92 34 22 35 9 Sep-92 33 21 41 5 




a. b. c. d. 
Oct-82 28 26 33 13 
Apr-83 35 24 29 12 
Apr-85 31 30 33 6 
Oct-85 37 28 31 4 
Apr-86 40 27 25 8 
Oct-86 36 31 26 7 
Apr-87 34 30 30 6 
Oct-87 46 28 22 4 
Apr-88 44 31 20 5 
Oct-88 50 29 16 5 
Apr-89 49 28 18 5 
Jul-89 45 29 20 6 
Oct-89 54 24 16 6 
Apr-90 54 27 14 5 
Oct-90 53 26 15 6 
Apr-91 53 23 18 6 
Oct-91 50 27 17 6 
Apr-92 53 24 17 6 
Sep-92 46 27 21 6 
Apr-93 42 22 31 5 
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Question Seven 
Question Seven: Would you personally like the European Parliament to play a more or less 
important role than it does now? 
a. more important 
b. about the same 
c. less important 
d. no reply 
!Belgium !Denmark 
a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d. 
Apr-83 48 16 6 30 Apr-83 17 29 16 38 
Oct-83 50 16 12 22 Oct-83 19 30 22 29 
Apr-84 53 21 10 16 Apr-84 15 26 19 40 
Oct-84 56 22 11 11 Oct-84 16 34 20 30 
Apr-85 54 20 10 16 Apr-85 12 26 23 39 
Oct-85 57 22 6 15 Oct-85 13 24 26 37 
Mar-86 48 22 4 26 Mar-86 12 32 27 28 
Oct-86 52 26 8 14 Oct-86 13 30 17 40 
Apr-87 51 26 7 16 Apr-87 12 28 27 33 
Oct-87 47 29 7 17 Oct-87 16 31 25 28 
Apr-88 49 21 6 24 Apr-88 15 31 24 30 
Oct-88 43 33 10 14 Oct-88 14 41 20 25 
Apr-89 45 25 8 22 Apr-89 16 35 19 30 
Oct-89 55 22 8 15 Jul-89 19 33 30 18 
Apr-90 49 24 7 20 Apr-90 24 32 24 20 
Oct-90 51 22 8 19 Oct-90 25 33 20 22 
Apr-91 66 17 4 13 Apr-91 30 30 21 19 
Oct-91 64 19 4 13 Oct-91 29 28 25 18 
Apr-92 57 28 4 11 Apr-92 32 26 26 16 
Nov-92 56 27 7 10 Sep-92 32 31 25 12 
Apr-93 50 28 11 11 Apr-93 31 30 21 18 
Apr-94 43 32 25 Apr-94 18 73 9 
Dec-94 40 30 8 23 Dec-94 29 38 19 14 
Apr-95 53 23 8 16 Apr-95 31 34 23 12 
Sep-95 49 23 11 17 Sep-95 27 36 27 10 
Apr-97 38 26 10 26 Apr-97 30 24 29 16 
Oct-97 38 32 9 22 Oct-97 31 29 21 19 
Apr-98 43 27 8 22 Apr-98 35 31 20 15 
Oct-98 36 37 7 19 Oct-98 37 33 19 10 




a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d. 
Apr-83 55 16 3 26 Apr-83 49 17 11 23 
Oct-83 60 14 5 21 Oct-83 57 12 10 21 
Apr-84 54 18 4 24 Apr-84 44 20 10 26 
Oct-84 65 14 4 17 Oct-84 55 18 12 15 
Apr-85 69 24 3 4 Apr-85 49 20 11 20 
Oct-85 63 18 5 14 Oct-85 51 16 14 19 
Mar-86 61 17 4 18 Mar-86 52 16 13 19 
Oct-86 54 22 4 20 Oct-86 46 18 12 24 
Apr-87 55 18 6 21 Apr-87 39 19 15 27 
Oct-87 55 24 5 16 Oct-87 46 20 15 19 
Apr-88 53 23 4 20 Apr-88 42 21 14 23 
Oct-88 48 28 4 20 Oct-88 41 24 16 19 
Apr-89 61 17 4 18 Apr-89 41 23 15 21 
Jul-89 51 24 5 20 Jul-89 49 19 15 17 
Apr-90 52 23 6 19 Apr-90 43 15 19 23 
Oct-90 59 14 7 20 Oct-90 50 12 8 30 
Apr-91 65 13 4 18 Apr-91 66 11 6 17 
Oct-91 66 15 4 15 Oct-91 62 9 7 22 
Apr-92 63 14 7 16 Apr-92 59 14 8 19 
Sep-92 58 15 9 18 Sep-92 55 13 12 20 
Apr-93 49 24 9 18 Apr-93 48 18 12 22 
Apr-94 53 27 20 Apr-94 32 41 27 
Dec-94 52 21 7 20 Dec-94 44 24 12 20 
Apr-95 54 19 9 18 Apr-95 43 18 17 21 
Sep-95 49 25 9 17 Sep-95 41 25 15 20 
Apr-97 53 19 10 19 Apr-97 37 22 19 21 
Oct-97 43 27 6 24 Oct-97 30 29 15 26 
Apr-98 47 21 9 23 Apr-98 37 27 12 24 
Oct-98 47 27 8 18 Oct-98 39 25 13 23 




a. b. c. d. a. b. c. d 
Apr-83 58 6 3 33 Apr-83 41 20 10 29 
Oct-83 70 5 4 21 Oct-83 46 18 12 24 
Apr-84 65 10 4 21 Apr-84 40 22 11 27 
Oct-84 61 11 8 20 Oct-84 47 23 10 20 
Apr-85 60 8 7 25 Apr-85 44 22 13 21 
Oct-85 50 12 8 30 Oct-85 45 19 12 24 
Mar-86 56 9 5 30 Mar-86 44 18 10 28 
Oct-86 59 12 6 23 Oct-86 41 26 7 26 
Apr-87 57 13 9 21 Apr-87 33 27 10 30 
Oct-87 56 14 5 25 Oct-87 35 28 10 27 
Apr-88 54 19 3 24 Apr-88 36 29 6 29 
Oct-88 57 17 2 24 Oct-88 41 33 7 19 
Apr-89 52 19 3 26 Apr-89 39 30 4 27 
Jul-89 65 10 3 22 Jul-89 47 20 7 26 
Apr-90 69 6 4 21 Apr-90 48 22 6 24 
Oct-90 54 14 4 28 Oct-90 44 27 9 20 
Apr-91 62 9 4 25 Apr-91 53 20 9 18 
Oct-91 68 9 4 19 Oct-91 50 19 5 26 
Apr-92 63 13 3 21 Apr-92 48 24 4 24 
Sep-92 61 16 4 19 Sep-92 42 26 8 24 
Apr-93 61 15 4 20 Apr-93 41 27 7 5 
Apr-94 57 16 27 Apr-94 27 44 29 
Dec-94 65 13 4 19 Dec-94 39 33 5 23 
Apr-95 62 11 5 22 Apr-95 39 30 6 26 
Sep-95 60 15 4 21 Sep-95 33 28 5 34 
Apr-97 67 10 8 15 Apr-97 40 24 7 29 
Oct-97 69 12 5 15 Oct-97 31 34 6 30 
Apr-98 61 12 6 22 Apr-98 29 35 5 31 
Oct-98 72 15 3 10 Oct-98 34 27 8 31 




a. b. C. d. a. b. c. d 
Apr-83 71 10 1 18 Apr-83 50 33 6 11 
Oct-83 76 7 2 15 Oct-83 58 20 9 13 
Apr-84 67 8 2 23 Apr-84 57 26 3 14 
Oct-84 80 8 2 10 Oct-84 68 19 5 8 
Apr-85 72 10 1 17 Apr-85 56 25 7 12 
Oct-85 75 9 2 14 Oct-85 64 19 5 12 
Mar-86 70 11 1 18 Mar-86 57 27 9 7 
Oct-86 74 13 1 12 Oct-86 48 34 7 11 
Apr-87 66 13 3 18 Apr-87 52 33 7 8 
Oct-87 72 11 2 15 Oct-87 48 32 5 15 
Apr-88 72 11 2 15 Apr-88 42 29 7 22 
Oct-88 61 19 1 19 Oct-88 36 44 5 15 
Apr-89 61 15 2 22 Apr-89 32 43 8 17 
Jul-89 70 14 3 13 Jul-89 42 34 7 17 
Apr-90 71 12 2 15 Apr-90 34 39 9 18 
Oct-90 68 15 2 15 Oct-90 34 43 8 15 
Apr-91 72 13 3 12 Apr-91 42 33 7 18 
Oct-91 68 15 2 15 Oct-91 37 38 11 14 
Apr-92 67 13 2 18 Apr-92 43 37 11 9 
Sep-92 64 17 3 16 Sep-92 45 34 7 14 
Apr-93 62 16 4 18 Apr-93 38 41 6 15 
Apr-94 72 7 21 Apr-94 37 46 17 
Dec-94 60 15 2 23 Dec-94 52 30 6 12 
Apr-95 68 11 3 19 Apr-95 48 31 8 12 
Sep-95 67 15 2 17 Sep-95 43 34 9 14 
Apr-97 66 13 2 19 Apr-97 46 29 8 17 
Oct-97 53 19 3 24 Oct-97 32 40 11 17 
Apr-98 54 15 3 29 Apr-98 50 26 13 11 
Oct-98 61 15 2 22 Oct-98 41 35 8 16 
Apr-99 58 17 3 22 Apr-99 36 41 8 15 
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Question Seven 
!The Netherlands l United Kingdom 
a. b. c. ct. a. b. c. ct. 
Apr-83 58 20 8 14 Apr-83 34 20 27 19 
Oct-83 56 18 10 16 Oct-83 48 17 20 15 
Apr-84 56 21 8 15 Apr-84 34 23 24 19 
Oct-84 63 16 7 14 Oct-84 43 19 24 14 
Apr-85 54 19 10 17 Apr-85 40 19 23 19 
Oct-85 59 16 9 16 Oct-85 39 15 31 15 
Mar-86 57 21 9 13 Mar-86 33 19 29 19 
Oct-86 53 24 9 14 Oct-86 41 24 19 16 
Apr-87 52 22 11 15 Apr-87 35 20 28 17 
Oct-87 48 23 9 20 Oct-87 36 24 24 16 
Apr-88 46 24 10 20 Apr-88 37 23 22 18 
Oct-88 43 22 12 23 Oct-88 30 30 20 20 
Apr-89 54 20 11 15 Apr-89 35 22 20 23 
Jul-89 58 17 10 15 Jul-89 40 22 22 16 
Apr-90 54 22 11 13 Apr-90 42 18 20 20 
Oct-90 55 19 11 15 Oct-90 42 19 19 20 
Apr-91 66 13 7 14 Apr-91 50 15 17 18 
Oct-91 65 13 7 15 Oct-91 47 17 19 17 
Apr-92 66 15 8 11 Apr-92 43 20 18 19 
Sep-92 63 14 9 14 Sep-92 40 18 22 20 
Apr-93 52 21 11 16 Apr-93 38 18 26 18 
Apr-94 43 38 19 Apr-94 27 58 16 
Dec-94 52 20 7 21 Dec-94 38 21 20 21 
Apr-95 56 16 11 18 Apr-95 40 16 24 19 
Sep-95 57 20 9 14 Sep-95 39 19 23 19 
Apr-97 50 23 14 14 Apr-97 26 17 34 24 
Oct-97 49 22 16 13 Oct-97 21 29 16 35 
Apr-98 58 22 8 13 Apr-98 31 22 16 31 
Oct-98 51 26 10 13 Oct-98 28 23 19 29 




a. b. C. d. 
Apr-83 52 16 10 22 
Oct-83 59 13 10 18 
Apr-84 50 17 10 23 
Oct-84 60 16 10 14 
Apr-85 56 18 10 16 
Oct-85 56 15 12 17 
Apr-86 50 16 10 24 
Oct-86 51 19 8 22 
Apr-87 47 18 12 23 
Oct-87 50 19 10 21 
Apr-88 49 20 9 22 
Oct-88 44 25 10 21 
Apr-89 49 20 9 22 
Jul-89 52 20 10 18 
Apr-90 52 19 9 20 
Oct-90 53 17 g 21 
Apr-91 62 15 8 16 
Oct-91 58 16 8 18 
Apr-92 56 16 9 19 
Sep-92 55 16 11 18 
Apr-93 50 20 12 18 
Apr-94 44 33 23 
Dec-94 48 22 9 21 
Apr-95 49 17 13 20 
Sep-95 48 21 12 19 
Apr-97 46 18 15 21 
Oct-97 38 25 10 27 
Apr-98 43 21 9 26 
Oct-98 45 23 10 22 
Apr-99 41 22 11 26 
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Question Eight 
Question Eight: "If there were a referendum (Denmark, Ireland, France: "another 





a. b. a. b. 
Apr-92 78 23 Apr-92 62 38 
Oct-92 82 18 Oct-92 80 20 
Apr-93 75 25 Apr-93 73 27 
Oct-94 75 25 Oct-94 86 14 
!Denmark !Ireland 
a. b. a. b. 
Apr-92 44 56 Apr-92 76 24 
Oct-92 47 53 Oct-92 70 30 
Apr-93 64 36 Apr-93 79 21 
Oct-94 57 43 Oct-94 75 25 
jFrance jitaly 
a. b. a. b. 
Apr-92 57 43 Apr-92 90 10 
Oct-92 54 46 Oct-92 85 15 
Apr-93 55 45 Apr-93 85 15 
Oct-94 54 46 Oct-94 83 17 
IGennany I Luxembourg 
a. b. a. b. 
Apr-92 46 54 Apr-92 79 21 
Oct-92 59 41 Oct-92 72 28 
Apr-93 61 39 Apr-93 69 31 







































Question Nine: "Please tell me for [the] proposal, whether you are for it or against it. 
'There should be a European Monetary Union with one single currency replacing by 1999 the 




!Belgium !France jGreece 
a. b. a. b. a. b. 
Oct-90 61 16 Oct-90 62 19 Oct-90 64 10 
Oct-91 62 18 Oct-91 64 18 Oct-91 61 14 
Oct-92 65 23 Oct-92 59 33 Oct-92 71 14 
Apr-93 69 21 Apr-93 58 32 Apr-93 71 15 
Oct-93 64 27 Oct-93 59 31 Oct-93 71 14 
Apr-94 62 28 Apr-94 65 25 Apr-94 65 21 
Oct-94 66 22 Oct-94 60 32 Oct-94 69 18 
Apr-95 67 22 Apr-95 63 31 Apr-95 67 19 
Oct-95 60 27 Oct-95 65 26 Oct-95 62 20 
Apr-96 53 22 Apr-96 59 22 Apr-96 64 21 
Oct-96 56 24 Oct-96 55 30 Oct-96 63 19 
Apr-97 59 32 Apr-97 56 36 Apr-97 65 24 
Oct-97 57 32 Oct-97 58 36 Oct-97 59 27 
Apr-98 68 23 Apr-98 68 25 Apr-98 67 17 
Oct-98 74 16 Oct-98 74 20 Oct-98 75 19 
Apr-99 76 17 Apr-99 68 26 Apr-99 65 21 
!Denmark jGennany !Ireland 
a. b. a. b. a. b. 
Oct-90 35 50 Oct-90 50 27 Oct-90 58 17 
Oct-91 35 54 Oct-91 45 32 Oct-91 54 17 
Oct-92 35 60 Oct-92 36 53 Oct-92 66 20 
Apr-93 29 66 Apr-93 29 60 Apr-93 68 19 
Oct-93 26 69 Oct-93 56 33 Oct-93 68 19 
Apr-94 29 65 Apr-94 33 55 Apr-94 68 19 
Oct-94 27 69 Oct-94 38 53 Oct-94 68 19 
Apr-95 30 66 Apr-95 38 50 Apr-95 68 18 
Oct-95 34 61 Oct-95 38 49 Oct-95 69 15 
Apr-96 36 58 Apr-96 40 49 Apr-96 66 16 
Oct-96 34 62 Oct-96 39 42 Oct-96 63 17 
Apr-97 34 60 Apr-97 32 54 Apr-97 62 22 
Oct-97 32 62 Oct-97 40 45 Oct-97 67 18 
Apr-98 34 57 Apr-98 51 36 Apr-98 68 14 
Oct-98 41 53 Oct-98 54 32 Oct-98 75 11 




Oct-90 72 11 
Oct-91 69 12 
Oct-92 79 11 
Apr-93 80 11 
Oct-93 80 13 
Apr-94 74 13 
Oct-94 76 14 
Apr-95 76 13 
Oct-95 75 12 
Apr-96 78 9 
Oct-96 73 11 
Apr-97 74 15 
Oct-97 78 11 
Apr-98 83 8 
Oct-98 88 6 
Apr-99 84 9 
I Luxembourg 
a. b. 
Oct-90 47 26 
Oct-91 48 35 
Oct-92 67 24 
Apr-93 63 28 
Oct-93 65 25 
Apr-94 65 27 
Oct-94 70 20 
Apr-95 72 20 
Oct-95 65 23 
Apr-96 63 26 
Oct-96 67 23 
Apr-97 67 27 
Oct-97 62 28 
Apr-98 79 18 
Oct-98 79 14 

































































































































Question Ten: Do you see yourself in the near future as (national), (national) plus 
European, European plus (national), or European? 
a. national only 
b. national plus European 
c. European plus national 
d. European only 
e. No reply 
!Belgium jGennany 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Dec-94 29 42 14 10 6 Dec-94 29 43 15 9 5 
Apr-95 33 44 10 8 4 Apr-95 34 44 11 7 3 
Sep-95 36 45 8 8 4 Sep-95 38 43 9 5 4 
Oct-96 47 36 7 6 3 Oct-96 49 35 6 5 4 
Apr-97 50 34 8 5 4 Apr-97 47 33 9 6 5 
Apr-98 43 38 8 7 3 Apr-98 49 35 7 5 4 
Oct-98 44 41 6 6 3 Oct-98 46 37 9 4 3 
!Denmark !Greece 
a. b. C. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Dec-94 48 44 4 3 1 Dec-94 46 48 4 2 1 
Apr-95 48 42 4 3 1 Apr-95 52 41 4 2 1 
Sep-95 56 38 3 2 1 Sep-95 53 44 2 1 1 
Oct-96 57 36 4 2 1 Oct-96 61 34 3 2 1 
Apr-97 55 40 3 2 1 Apr-97 54 42 1 2 1 
Apr-98 48 45 3 2 1 Apr-98 56 39 3 1 1 
Oct-98 52 42 3 3 1 Oct-98 50 46 3 1 0 
!France !Ireland 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. C. d. e. 
Dec-94 22 52 12 11 3 Dec-94 38 50 6 3 4 
Apr-95 28 51 9 9 4 Apr-95 40 49 4 4 3 
Sep-95 30 55 7 6 3 Sep-95 47 45 3 1 4 
Oct-96 33 49 8 7 4 Oct-96 50 40 4 4 3 
Apr-97 32 50 8 5 4 Apr-97 50 42 3 2 3 
Apr-98 31 49 9 6 4 Apr-98 53 37 4 3 4 
Oct-98 35 49 9 7 1 Oct-98 51 42 4 1 2 
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Question Ten 
l1taly l United Kingdom 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Dec-94 25 55 12 4 4 Dec-94 49 34 7 7 3 
Apr-95 22 56 11 6 4 Apr-95 53 32 6 6 2 
Sep-95 26 59 8 5 2 Sep-95 57 31 4 6 2 
Oct-96 35 52 6 4 2 Oct-96 60 26 6 5 3 
Apr-97 33 52 6 6 3 Apr-97 57 29 3 6 5 
Apr-98 28 55 7 5 5 Apr-98 60 25 5 5 5 
Oct-98 29 56 8 5 2 Oct-98 62 27 4 5 3 
!Luxembourg !European Union 
a. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. d. e. 
Dec-94 17 51 13 12 7 Dec-94 33 46 10 7 4 
Apr-95 17 50 13 14 6 Apr-95 37 45 9 6 3 
Sep-95 20 42 11 21 6 Sep-95 40 46 6 5 3 
Oct-96 26 44 14 13 4 Oct-96 46 40 6 5 3 
Apr-97 23 46 11 16 5 Apr-97 45 40 6 5 4 
Apr-98 31 43 7 13 6 Apr-98 44 41 6 5 4 
Oct-98 23 45 13 15 4 Oct-98 43 43 7 4 2 
!The Netherlands 
a. b. C. d. e. 
Dec-94 33 50 9 6 3 
Apr-95 34 51 9 4 3 
Sep-95 43 46 6 4 1 
Oct-96 43 48 5 4 1 
Apr-97 42 48 5 4 1 
Apr-98 45 46 6 3 1 
Oct-98 40 5i 6 2 0 
Source: Eurobarometre 
Refer European Commission in Bibliography 
* Months listed are the approximate dates that fieldwork was carried out. For more 
specific times please see relevant Eurobarometre. 
** Data taken directly from Eurobarometre. Editors of data have rounded figures to 
the nearest whole numbers. Consequently some lines may equal less than or more 
than 100 equal. 
***Sample sizes are on average 1000 people per country with the except of 
Luxembourg (500), the United Kingdom (Great Britain 1000, Nothem Ireland 300), 




A: Voter Turnout for European Elections 
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 
Austria 67.7 49 
Belgium 91.6 92.2 90.7 90.7 90 
Denmark 47.4 52.3 46.1 52.9 50.4 
Finland 60.3 30.1 
France 60.7 56.7 48.7 52.7 47 
Germany 65.7 56.8 62.4 60 45.2 
Greece 78.6 77.2 79.9 71.2 70.2 
Ireland 63.6 47.6 68.3 44.0 50.5 
Italy 85.5 83.9 81.5 74.8 70.8 
Luxembourg 88.9 87.0 87.4 88.5 85.8 
The 57.8 50.5 47.2 36.0 29.9 
Netherlands 
Portugal 72.2 51.1 35.5 40.4 
Sweden 41.6 38.4 
Spain 68.9 54.8 59.1 64.4 
United 31.6 32.6 36.2 36.4 24.0 
Kingdom 
European 63.0 61.0 58.5 56.8 49.4 
Union 
Source: European Parliament: United Kingdom Office 
Refer to European Parliament in Bibliography 
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Source: Journal of Electoral Studies 
Refer: Journal of Electoral Studies in Bibliography 
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